Factual and Procedural Background
In 2015, the biennial Defence and Security Equipment International ('DSEI') exhibition was held at the Excel Centre, London E.16. Prior to the exhibition, a group of Interested Parties obstructed vehicles en route to the venue, leading to their arrest and charges of wilfully obstructing the highway under section 137 of the Highways Act 1980. In April 2016, the Interested Parties were tried before District Judge Hamilton at Stratford Magistrates Court, where they relied on a defence of reasonable force under section 3(1) of the Criminal Law Act 1967 (CLA 1967) to prevent crime. Following a five-day trial with factual and expert evidence, they were acquitted.
The Director of Public Prosecutions (DPP) subsequently sought an order compelling the Magistrates' Court to state a case for the High Court's opinion or, alternatively, to quash the District Judge's decision and remit the case for retrial. The District Judge had refused to state a case, prompting judicial review proceedings initiated by the DPP.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the defence under section 3(1) of the CLA 1967, permitting the use of reasonable force to prevent crime, was available to the Interested Parties in the circumstances of obstructing the highway to prevent alleged unlawful arms sales and international crimes.
- Whether the District Judge erred in law by refusing to state a case for the opinion of the High Court following the acquittal.
- Whether the use of force by the Interested Parties was reasonable, judged objectively, in the circumstances they believed them to be.
- The proper legal interpretation and application of the defence under section 3(1) of the CLA 1967, including the requirement of imminence and immediacy of the crime being prevented.
- Whether the conduct of the Interested Parties constituted the use of force within the meaning of section 3(1) of the CLA 1967.
Arguments of the Parties
The opinion does not contain a detailed account of the parties' legal arguments.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent |
Rule or Principle Cited For |
Application by the Court |
| R v. Jones (Margaret) and others [2007] 1 AC 136 |
Clarification that the defence under s.3(1) CLA 1967 applies only to offences under domestic law; limits on use of force by private citizens to prevent crime; importance of imminence; limits on self-help; inadmissibility of expert evidence on legality of acts. |
The court relied heavily on Lord Hoffmann's speech to establish legal principles on the availability and limits of the s.3(1) defence, concluding the defence was not available absent an imminent or immediate crime. |
| Birch v. DPP (1999) Divisional Court (unreported) |
Requirement of a close link between the use of force and an imminent or apprehended breach of the peace or serious offence; refusal to allow evidence of alleged unlawful activities unrelated to imminence. |
Cited to reject the defence where the obstruction was not linked to an imminent crime and to distinguish peaceful protest from use of force in prevention of crime. |
| Hutchinson v. Newbury Magistrates' Court (2000) 122 ILR 499 |
Emphasis on absence of immediate and instant need to act invalidating the s.3(1) defence; availability of lawful alternatives. |
Referenced to support the principle that self-help is not reasonable absent emergency and immediacy. |
| R v. Barkshire (unreported, 21 May 2010) and subsequent Court of Appeal Criminal Division [2011] EWCA Crim 1885 |
Consideration of whether the s.3(1) defence is available for protestors using force to prevent climate-related crimes; judicial caution about withdrawing the defence from jury. |
Discussed as a related case where the defence was ruled unavailable but with reservations expressed by the Court of Appeal. |
| R v. Bard and others [2014] EWCA Crim 463 |
Reaffirmation of the unavailability of the s.3(1) defence in protest cases absent imminent crime; quashing convictions on procedural grounds. |
Used to demonstrate that certain trial judges' rulings excluding the defence were legally sound. |
| Swales v. Cox [1981] 1 QB 849 |
Definition of "force" as application of energy to an obstacle with intent to remove it. |
Applied to distinguish conduct amounting to use of force from other forms of obstruction. |
| R v. Renouf [1986] 1 WLR 522 |
Confirmation that "force" is ordinary English and does not require judicial interpretation; s.3(1) defence should be left to jury when applicable. |
Supported the view that use of force includes direct physical acts but must be linked to crime prevention. |
| DPP v. Bayer [2004] 1 WLR 2856 |
Application of s.3 defence to peaceful attachment to vehicles believed to be involved in illegal activity. |
Used to illustrate that force can be applied indirectly, e.g., chaining to vehicles, but must be connected to crime prevention. |
| R v. North West Suffolk (Mildenhall) Magistrates Court [1998] EnvLR 9 |
Interpretation of "frivolous" in s.111(5) Magistrates Court Act 1980; refusal to state a case must not be based on correctness of decision alone. |
Guided the court to conclude that the District Judge erred in refusing to state a case as the application was not frivolous. |
| Sunworld Ltd v. Hammersmith & Fulham London Borough Council [2000] 1 WLR 2102 |
Procedural approach when a Magistrates Court refuses to state a case; judicial review as an alternative. |
Supported the procedural correctness of the High Court hearing the judicial review claim after refusal to state a case. |
| Southwark London Borough Council v Williams [1971] Ch 734 |
Law’s suspicion of self-help remedies; permitted only in special circumstances. |
Reinforced the principle that use of force by private individuals is tightly controlled and exceptional. |
| Burmah Oil Co Ltd v Lord Advocate [1965] AC 75 |
Obsolescence of individual rights of self-help in modern law; preference for official intervention. |
Used to support the limited scope for individual use of force outside emergency. |
| Lord Advocate's Reference No 1 of 2000 2001 JC 143 |
Warning against allowing individuals to use force based on their own opinions; risk of dangerous precedents. |
Supported the court’s caution against permitting the s.3(1) defence in cases of political protest. |
| R v Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis, Ex p Blackburn [1968] 2 QB 118 |
Requirement for citizens to use democratic methods and courts for law enforcement rather than vigilante actions. |
Emphasized the limits on citizen self-help and the role of law enforcement agencies. |
| Hibberd v Director of Public Prosecutions (1996) Divisional Court (unreported) |
Example of protest-related litigation and the limits of legal defences based on protest motives. |
Referenced in the context of civil disobedience and legal tactics employed by protesters. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The court undertook a detailed examination of the defence under section 3(1) of the CLA 1967, focusing on whether the Interested Parties were entitled to use reasonable force to prevent crime by obstructing the highway. The court identified two key questions: whether the defendants honestly believed they were preventing a crime, and whether the force used was reasonable in the circumstances as they perceived them. The first question is subjective; the second is objective.
The court found that the defence requires the crime being prevented to be imminent or immediate and that there must be a clear nexus between the use of force and the prevention of that crime. In this case, no imminent crime was occurring on the highway, and any alleged crimes were at the exhibition site. The obstruction of vehicles not involved in illegal activity and the generalized nature of the alleged crimes meant the defence was inapplicable.
The court criticized the District Judge's reliance on the sincerity of the defendants' beliefs and the absence of a finding of imminence, concluding these were material errors of law. It further clarified that the use of force for the defence applies to direct physical application of energy to an obstacle, such as chaining oneself to a vehicle, but not to mere obstruction without force.
Regarding procedural matters, the court held that the District Judge wrongly refused to state a case, as the application was neither frivolous nor misconceived. The court also addressed expert evidence, finding that much of it was irrelevant or inadmissible, particularly opinions on the legality of the activities in question, which are matters for the court.
Finally, the court acknowledged the complex interplay between civil disobedience, conscientious protest, and the rule of law, emphasizing that the legal system does not permit individuals to take law enforcement into their own hands absent emergency situations.
Holding and Implications
The court held that the District Judge erred in law by allowing the Interested Parties to rely on the defence under section 3(1) of the CLA 1967 and by refusing to state a case for the High Court's opinion. The court concluded that the defence was not available in the circumstances, as there was no imminent crime and no proper nexus between the force used and crime prevention.
However, in the unusual circumstances of this case, the court declined to quash the acquittals and remit the case for retrial. The court noted factors including unresolved factual issues, the passage of time affecting evidence presentation, procedural delays in judicial review, the Interested Parties' good character, and the relatively minor nature of the offence (summary trial with a fine maximum).
The direct effect is that the Interested Parties remain acquitted, and no retrial will occur. The court’s decision clarifies the strict limits on the availability of the s.3(1) defence and underscores the necessity of imminence and a direct link between force and crime prevention. No new precedent was established beyond affirming existing principles and correcting the District Judge's errors.