Haley v London Electricity Board

Factual and Procedural Background

The Appellant, who had been totally blind for many years, customarily walked unaccompanied from his home along a residential pavement in The City before boarding a bus to work. On the morning in question, employees of the Respondent (a public-utility undertaking) were excavating a trench in that pavement under statutory authority. In lieu of a protective barrier, the workers positioned a “punner” (a long-handled, weighted tool) diagonally across the walkway, rising from a few inches above ground at the kerb to roughly two feet at the inner railings. The Appellant’s white cane did not detect the obstruction; he tripped, fell, and sustained serious injury (including deafness). He sued in negligence. The trial judge and the Court of Appeal dismissed the claim, holding that the Respondent owed no special duty to blind pedestrians. The Appellant petitioned to the House of Lords.

Legal Issues Presented

1. Whether persons carrying out works on a public pavement owe a duty of reasonable care to blind (or otherwise disabled) pedestrians, in addition to able-bodied users.
2. If such a duty exists, whether the Respondent’s method of guarding the excavation satisfied the standard of reasonable care.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

• The Respondent should reasonably have foreseen that blind persons might use the pavement; statistical evidence showed a significant blind population in The City.
• A low, slanting punner was a hidden trap to a blind pedestrian using a cane; a light fence about two feet high (routinely employed by other utilities) would have provided adequate warning.
• Common-law principles, notably the “neighbour” test, require a measure of care commensurate with users’ disabilities when such users are reasonably foreseeable.

Respondent's Arguments

• The duty of care extends only to ordinary able-bodied pedestrians; there is no special obligation toward the blind or infirm absent specific notice.
• The measures taken (notice boards, punner, pick and shovel) were adequate to alert normally sighted persons exercising reasonable care.
• Imposing liability would create an unmanageable burden, requiring extensive precautions for every conceivable infirmity.

Table of Precedents Cited

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The House unanimously held that ordinary principles of negligence apply on public pavements: the reasonable person must anticipate the presence of those with disabilities when, as a matter of common knowledge, such persons are likely to be present.

Key steps in the analysis included:

• Foreseeability: Statistical evidence and everyday experience show that blind individuals frequently navigate urban pavements; therefore their presence on the day in question was reasonably foreseeable.
• Standard of Care: A blind pedestrian is entitled to expect that unusual, low-lying obstacles will be guarded by a barrier detectable by a white cane. A light fence approximately two feet high (such as that routinely used by the Post Office) would meet this standard without imposing undue burden.
• Adequacy of Precautions: While the punner, boards, and spoil heap sufficed for sighted persons, they constituted a hidden danger to the blind. Evidence showed a cane could easily pass over the punner at the point of contact; thus the arrangement was ineffective as a warning.
• Policy Concerns: The Lords rejected arguments that recognising such a duty would paralyse street works, noting that modest, inexpensive guards already in common use would satisfy the obligation.
• Critique of Authority: The House declined to follow the broad dictum in Pritchard v. Post Office, observing that it was decided on inadequate argument and that the ratio conflicted with fundamental negligence principles.

Holding and Implications

APPEAL ALLOWED. Liability in negligence was established; the matter was remitted for assessment of damages.

Implications: The decision confirms that those undertaking works on public pavements must take reasonable steps to protect blind and other foreseeably vulnerable pedestrians. The ruling does not mandate elaborate safeguards in every context; it requires only measures a reasonable operator would adopt, such as a simple two-foot barrier. No new statutory regime was created, but the judgment clarifies the common-law duty of care in urban environments.