Reeves v Commissioner Of Police For Metropolis

Factual and Procedural Background

The Plaintiff, as joint administratrix of the estate of the deceased, brought an action against the Defendant, the Commissioner of Police for the Metropolis, following the death of the deceased by suicide while in police custody at Kentish Town Police Station. The deceased died on 1 April 1990 after a suicide attempt on 23 March 1990, during which the police officers responsible for his custody were aware of his suicide risk due to prior incidents. On the day of the suicide attempt, the deceased was examined by a police surgeon, who identified him as a suicide risk and recommended observation, though no specific mental disturbance was found. The deceased was placed in a cell with a wicket gate left down, allowing him to hang himself by tying his shirt through the spy hole in the cell door. The trial judge found that the police owed a duty of care to the deceased to take reasonable steps to prevent suicide, that the failure to close the wicket gate was negligent, and that there was a causative link between the negligence and the death, subject to defences raised by the Defendant. The appeal before the Court of Appeal concerns the validity of those defences and the application of principles such as volenti non fit injuria, novus actus interveniens, contributory fault, and ex turpi causa.

Legal Issues Presented

1. Whether the Defendant owed a duty of care to the deceased to prevent his suicide while in custody.
2. Whether the deceased's act of suicide constituted a novus actus interveniens breaking the chain of causation.
3. Whether the defence of volenti non fit injuria (voluntary assumption of risk) applies to bar the Plaintiff's claim.
4. Whether contributory fault on the part of the deceased bars or reduces the Plaintiff's claim.
5. Whether the defence of ex turpi causa non oritur actio (no action arises from a dishonourable cause) applies to bar recovery.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

• The Defendant owed a duty of care to the deceased as a known suicide risk to take reasonable steps to prevent suicide.
• The defence of volenti non fit injuria is inapplicable because the deceased did not consent to the Defendant's negligence or voluntarily accept the risk created by the Defendant's failure to take precautions.
• The deceased's act of suicide cannot be a novus actus interveniens because the duty was specifically to prevent that very act.
• Contributory fault is inappropriate as a defence when the act relied on as fault is precisely that which the Defendant was under a duty to prevent.
• The defence of ex turpi causa should not apply since suicide is no longer a crime, and allowing recovery does not affront public conscience or encourage illegal conduct.

Respondent's Arguments

• The deceased's voluntary act of suicide, being of sound mind, constitutes volenti non fit injuria, barring the claim.
• The act of suicide was a novus actus interveniens breaking the causal link between the Defendant's negligence and the death.
• The deceased was contributory at fault for his death, justifying reduction or bar of damages under the Law Reform (Contributory Negligence) Act 1945.
• The defence of ex turpi causa applies because recovery would be contrary to public policy, given the deliberate nature of the deceased's act.

Table of Precedents Cited

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court began by affirming the existence of a duty of care owed by the Defendant's officers to the deceased, a known suicide risk, to take reasonable care to prevent his suicide while in custody. The trial judge's findings of negligence in leaving the wicket gate open and the causative link to the death were accepted and unchallenged.

The Court rejected the defence of volenti non fit injuria. It reasoned that the defence is inappropriate where the defendant's duty is to prevent the very act (suicide) that occurred. The deceased's voluntary act of suicide cannot be said to have consented to the Defendant's negligence or to have assumed the risk created by that negligence. The Court distinguished the present case from typical volenti situations and emphasized the artificiality of applying volenti where the risk is the Defendant's failure to prevent the act.

Regarding novus actus interveniens, the Court held that the deceased's suicide was not a new intervening act breaking the chain of causation because the duty was specifically to prevent that very act. The suicide was foreseeable and integral to the duty, thus the causal link remained intact.

The defence of contributory fault was also rejected. The Court found it inconsistent to allow a defence based on the deceased's deliberate act when that act was precisely what the Defendant was under a duty to prevent. Analogies with statutory duties in other contexts supported this conclusion. While the deceased's act constituted "fault" under the Law Reform (Contributory Negligence) Act 1945, the defence was not applicable here.

Finally, the Court dismissed the ex turpi causa defence. It reasoned that permitting recovery does not affront public conscience or encourage illegal conduct, especially as suicide is no longer a crime. The defence was logically inconsistent with the existence of the duty to prevent suicide and would undermine that duty's content.

Overall, the Court emphasized the unique nature of the duty to prevent suicide in custody and the inapplicability of traditional defences that rely on voluntary assumption of risk or public policy objections in this context.

Holding and Implications

The Court ALLOWED THE APPEAL, set aside the trial judge's order, and entered judgment for the Plaintiff awarding damages.

The direct consequence is that the Defendant is liable for damages for breach of duty in failing to prevent the deceased's suicide while in custody. The Court rejected the Defendant's defences of volenti non fit injuria, novus actus interveniens, contributory fault, and ex turpi causa. No new precedent was established beyond clarifying the inapplicability of these defences in the specific context of a duty to prevent suicide of a detainee known to be at risk. The decision reinforces the principle that such a duty of care must be given meaningful content, and that deliberate acts by the detainee do not negate liability where the duty was to prevent precisely those acts.