Woolmington v DPP

Factual and Procedural Background

In December 1934 the Appellant fatally shot his 17-year-old wife after she had left the marital home to live with her mother. He claimed the shooting was accidental, asserting that he had brought a sawn-off rook rifle only to threaten suicide in order to persuade her to return.

The Appellant was tried at the Somerset Assizes; the jury initially disagreed. A second trial at the Bristol Assizes on 14 February 1935 resulted in a conviction for wilful murder and a sentence of death. The Court of Criminal Appeal dismissed his appeal, notwithstanding a misdirection argument, by invoking the proviso in section 4(1) of the Criminal Appeal Act 1907. The Attorney-General then certified that the case raised a point of exceptional public importance, enabling the present appeal to the House of Lords.

Legal Issues Presented

1. Whether the trial judge erred in directing the jury that, once the prosecution proved that the deceased died at the Appellant’s hands, the burden shifted to the Appellant to satisfy the jury that the killing was accidental or amounted only to manslaughter.
2. Whether, if such a misdirection occurred, the Court of Criminal Appeal was entitled to dismiss the appeal under the proviso to section 4(1) of the Criminal Appeal Act 1907 on the ground that no substantial miscarriage of justice had occurred.

Arguments of the Parties

The opinion does not contain a detailed account of the parties' legal arguments.

Table of Precedents Cited

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

Writing for a unanimous Appellate Committee, Judge Sankey conducted an exhaustive historical survey of English criminal law and evidence. He noted that the dictum attributed to Sir Michael Foster, often cited for the proposition that the accused must “satisfactorily prove” accident or mitigation, had been repeated uncritically in later textbooks and dicta but lacked precedent in decided cases.

The Court drew a clear distinction between (i) evidential stages where evidence of killing and malice may permit an inference of murder and (ii) any legal requirement that the accused bear the ultimate burden of proof. It held that, save for recognised exceptions (insanity and express statutory provisions), the common law maintains a “golden thread”: the prosecution must prove beyond reasonable doubt (a) that the deceased died as a result of a voluntary act of the accused and (b) that the act was accompanied by malice.

The summing-up in the present trial incorrectly told the jury that, once the prosecution proved death at the Appellant’s hands, “he has to show” circumstances alleviating or excusing the killing. This misdirection reversed the burden of proof and was therefore an error of law.

Regarding the proviso in section 4(1) of the Criminal Appeal Act 1907, the House concluded that it could not be applied. Given the misdirection on a central issue, the House could not be satisfied that the jury would inevitably have convicted had they been properly instructed. Accordingly, the conviction could not stand.

Holding and Implications

HELD: Appeal allowed; conviction quashed; cause remitted to the Court of Criminal Appeal for further proceedings consistent with this judgment.

Implications: The decision authoritatively re-affirms that, at common law, the prosecution carries the legal burden of proving every element of a criminal offence, except where Parliament expressly provides otherwise or where the defence is insanity. dicta suggesting that an accused must “satisfy” the jury of accident or mitigation are disapproved. The ruling thus fortifies the presumption of innocence and has become a foundational authority on the burden of proof in the United Kingdom.