Factual and Procedural Background
The case arises from an incident on 17th July 1994 involving the Plaintiff, a seventeen-year-old refugee and citizen of Somalia, and her ten-year-old cousin. They were allegedly attacked near their home by white teenagers who set a dog on the Plaintiff, causing injury. The Plaintiff called the police via a 999 emergency call. The police officers who responded allegedly failed to assist her, instead arresting and charging her without cause with affray, common assault, and causing unnecessary suffering to a dog. She was released on bail the same day and subsequently acquitted when no evidence was offered.
The Plaintiff commenced proceedings against the Commissioner of Police for the Metropolis on 13th January 1995, claiming damages for false imprisonment, assault and battery, and malicious prosecution. The Defendant denied these claims but accepted they disclosed causes of action. The Plaintiff also alleged unlawful racial discrimination by the attending police officers under the Race Relations Act 1976, which the Defendant sought to strike out. The Central London County Court judge refused to strike out the racial discrimination claim, and the Defendant appealed that decision.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether a police officer falls within the scope of section 20 of the Race Relations Act 1976 concerning discrimination in the provision of goods, facilities, or services to the public.
- Whether the Chief Officer of Police (the Commissioner) is vicariously liable under the Race Relations Act 1976 for discriminatory acts committed by police officers.
Arguments of the Parties
Appellant's Arguments
- Police constables are office-holders, not employees, and thus section 16 of the Race Relations Act and section 48 of the Police Act 1964 do not create an employer-employee relationship between the Commissioner and constables.
- Section 53 of the Race Relations Act restricts proceedings unless authorized by the Act itself; the Commissioner is not alleged to have personally discriminated, and the constables were not acting as his agents with authority under section 32(2).
- Police officers exercise original authority by virtue of their office, not delegated authority, so the general law of agency does not apply to them.
- Section 20 does not apply to police officers performing their statutory duties, as these involve discretion and judgment in law enforcement, not the provision of services akin to those offered by private persons.
- Public policy considerations and established case law protect police officers from civil actions that might impede their duties, including claims of racial discrimination under the Act.
- Section 53 prohibits claims against the Commissioner based on vicarious liability for acts of police officers under the Race Relations Act.
Appellee's Arguments
- Section 20 of the Race Relations Act is wide enough to include police officers in respect of parts of their duties involving assistance and protection of the public.
- The police provide services to the public, such as protection and assistance, which are analogous to services provided by private persons or entities.
- Acts of racial discrimination by police officers in failing to provide protection or assistance fall within the ambit of the Race Relations Act.
- The Commissioner should be vicariously liable for discriminatory acts of police officers as the chief officer responsible for the force under section 48 of the Police Act 1964.
- There is no statutory provision excluding police officers or the police force from the application of the Race Relations Act in respect of discrimination in the provision of services.
- Public policy considerations do not justify immunity from claims of racial discrimination when police officers provide services to the public.
- The absence of an express exclusion for the police in the Act supports the argument that the Act applies to police officers providing services.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent |
Rule or Principle Cited For |
Application by the Court |
| R v Immigration Appeal Tribunal, Ex parte Kassam [1980] 1 WLR 1037 |
Held that a Minister of the Crown exercising statutory powers was not providing "services" within the meaning of the Sex Discrimination Act 1975 and analogous provisions. |
Used to argue that police officers performing statutory duties may not be providing services under the Race Relations Act, but distinguished due to the nature of police services. |
| Savjani v Inland Revenue Commissioners [1981] 1 QB 458 |
Held that the Inland Revenue were providing services under the Race Relations Act, despite performing statutory duties. |
Supported the proposition that public authorities, including police, can provide services within the meaning of the Act. |
| In re Amin [1983] 2 AC 818 |
Confirmed that acts done by public officials in certain statutory contexts are not "services" under the Act if they involve the exercise of original authority rather than provision of services. |
Guided interpretation of whether police acts fall within the scope of the Act. |
| Marrinan v Vibart [1963] 1 QB 234, 529 |
Reaffirmed absolute immunity of witnesses from civil action for acts done in preparation of evidence. |
Referenced in public policy arguments protecting police from civil liability in certain functions. |
| Hill v Chief Constable of West Yorkshire [1989] AC 53 |
No general duty of care owed by police to individual members of the public in respect of detention and apprehension of criminals. |
Supported public policy considerations limiting police liability. |
| Calveley v Chief Constable of Merseyside [1989] AC 1228 |
Police officers investigating allegations against other officers owed no duty of care to subjects of investigation. |
Supported public policy arguments against imposing duties that may impede police functions. |
| Alexandrou v Oxford [1993] 4 All ER 328 |
Held it would not be in public interest to impose duty of care on police attending negligently investigated burglar alarm call. |
Used to emphasize public policy limits on police liability. |
| Fisher v Oldham Corporation [1930] 2 KB 364 |
Police officers are not servants or agents of local authorities for tort liability purposes; they exercise original authority as peace officers. |
Key authority rejecting vicarious liability of police chiefs for officers' acts under agency principles. |
| Hawkins v Bepey [1980] 1 WLR 419 |
Police officer acting under express authority of chief constable acts in a representative capacity; prosecution proceedings do not lapse on officer's death. |
Distinguished as involving express authority, not implied agency. |
| Lonrho plc v Tebbit [1991] 4 All ER 973 |
Emphasized the importance of deciding difficult legal questions on the basis of established facts. |
Supported the court's caution in deciding complex statutory interpretation issues at an early procedural stage. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The court examined the scope of the Race Relations Act 1976, particularly section 20, which prohibits discrimination in the provision of goods, facilities, or services to the public. It considered whether police officers, in performing parts of their duties involving assistance and protection of the public, fall within the definition of persons providing services under the Act. The court found that the language of section 20 is sufficiently broad to encompass police officers when providing protective services, analogous to services provided by private persons or entities.
The court distinguished the police officers' functions from other statutory roles held not to provide services under the Act, noting that the police provide a service of protection to victims of crime, which is within the ambit of section 20. It rejected the argument that public policy considerations or the nature of police powers should exclude police officers from the Act's application in this context.
Regarding vicarious liability, the court examined section 48 of the Police Act 1964, which imposes liability on the chief officer of police for torts committed by constables under his direction and control. However, the court found this provision conflicted with the restrictive provisions of the Race Relations Act, particularly sections 53 and 57, which limit proceedings to those expressly authorized by the Act and require claims against principals to be based on sections 32 or 33.
The court held that police constables are office holders exercising original authority, not agents of the Commissioner, and thus the Commissioner is not vicariously liable under section 32. It relied on the authority of Fisher v Oldham Corporation, which rejected the principal-agent relationship between police officers and local authorities for tort liability. The court concluded that the claim against the Commissioner for racial discrimination under section 20 must be struck out as barred by section 53 of the Race Relations Act.
The court also expressed reservations about deciding complex issues of statutory interpretation on a striking out application based on unparticularised pleadings, emphasizing the importance of resolving such matters on established facts.
Holding and Implications
The court ALLOWED THE APPEAL by the Defendant (Commissioner of Police for the Metropolis) and struck out those parts of the Plaintiff's claim alleging racial discrimination against the Defendant under the Race Relations Act 1976.
The court held that while police officers may, in certain circumstances, be subject to claims under section 20 of the Race Relations Act for discriminatory acts in providing services, the Commissioner is not vicariously liable for such acts because police officers are not agents or employees of the Commissioner in the relevant legal sense. Section 53 of the Race Relations Act prohibits proceedings against the Commissioner in this context.
The direct effect is that the Plaintiff's racial discrimination claim against the Commissioner is dismissed, but the claim against individual police officers remains arguable. The court did not establish any new precedent altering the existing understanding of police officers' status or vicarious liability under the Act, instead reaffirming established principles. The Plaintiff was granted leave to appeal to the House of Lords, and proceedings were stayed pending any such appeal.