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Highland & Universal Properties Ltd v. Safeway Properties Ltd
Factual and Procedural Background
The pursuers and respondents, landlords since February 1994, owned a shopping centre in The City, formerly Wester Hailes Shopping Centre and renamed Westside Plaza in October 1996. The defenders and reclaimers became tenants of Store Number 1, the largest unit in the centre, in 1974, operating a supermarket business under the name Presto. In 1979, a formal Sub-lease was entered into between the defenders and the pursuers' predecessors, with an expiry date of 24 March 2009.
The Sub-lease contained clauses obliging the defenders to keep the premises open for retail trade of goods typically sold in a high class retail store during normal business hours. Over time, the shopping centre experienced a decline in trade and appearance, leading to public investment and refurbishment beginning in the early 1990s.
In 1995, the defenders decided for commercial reasons to cease trading from the premises, announcing their intention publicly and proceeding without notifying the pursuers. The pursuers raised legal action, obtaining interim orders requiring the defenders to keep the store open. The defenders challenged the enforceability and specificity of the relevant lease clauses and contended that the court should exercise discretion to refuse specific implement.
The Lord Ordinary found in favour of the pursuers, declaring the defenders bound to keep the store open under the terms of the Sub-lease and rejecting the defenders' arguments for refusing specific implement. The defenders appealed, raising questions about the competency and discretion of the court to grant specific implement orders in such circumstances.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether it is competent under Scots law for a court to grant a decree of specific implement requiring a party to carry on business over a period of time.
- Whether the particular lease clause obliging the defenders to keep the store open is sufficiently certain and precise to found a decree of specific implement or is void for uncertainty.
- Whether, even if competent and sufficiently certain, the court should exercise its discretion to refuse specific implement on grounds that it would be inconvenient or unjust to grant such a remedy.
Arguments of the Parties
Defenders' Arguments
- The obligation to keep the store open is too unspecific and vague, rendering the relevant lease clause void for uncertainty.
- As a matter of Scots law, it is not competent for the court to grant an order requiring a party to carry on a business continuously over a period, as opposed to requiring specific acts or results.
- The court should, in the exercise of its discretion, almost invariably refuse to grant such orders due to practical difficulties including the need for constant court supervision, uncertainty in compliance, and potential undue burden on the defenders.
- Reliance was placed on English case law, notably Co-operative Insurance Society Limited v. Argyll Stores (Holdings) Limited, to highlight practical and policy reasons against granting such orders.
Pursuers' Arguments
- Under Scots law, unlike English law, a party generally has a legal right to enforce contractual obligations by specific implement, subject only to limited, well-established exceptions which do not include obligations to carry on business.
- The relevant lease clause, when properly construed in context, is sufficiently certain and precise to support a decree of specific implement.
- The court’s discretion to refuse specific implement is to be exercised only in exceptional cases with very cogent reasons, such as when enforcement would be inconvenient, unjust, or cause disproportionate hardship.
- Recent Scottish authorities support the competence of such orders and demonstrate that practical difficulties feared by defenders have not materialised in practice.
- The obligation to keep the premises open is critical to the pursuers’ investment and damages would not be an adequate remedy.
- The defenders’ construction of the lease clause was misconceived; the phrase "trade specified" in the Sub-lease should be understood as permitting the sale of any goods sold in a high class retail store, not all goods.
- The phrase "normal hours of business" refers to the tenant’s established hours, which can be determined by evidence and are not meaningless.
- The court should adopt a pragmatic and commercially realistic approach in interpreting and enforcing "keep open" clauses.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Stewart v. Kennedy (1890) 17 R. (H.L.) 1 | Establishes that under Scots law a party has a legal right to specific implement of contractual obligations, subject to a residual discretionary power to refuse in exceptional cases. | Affirmed that the court’s discretion to refuse specific implement is exceptional and requires very cogent reasons; no such reasons existed in this case. |
| Co-operative Insurance Society Limited v. Argyll Stores (Holdings) Limited [1998] AC 1 | Highlights practical difficulties and discretionary considerations in granting specific performance orders to carry on business under English law. | Distinguished English discretionary approach from Scots legal right; supported competence of specific implement under Scots law and did not support defenders’ claim of incompetence. |
| Grahame v. Magistrates of Kirkcaldy (1882) 9 R. (H.L.) 91 | Confirms existence of court discretion to refuse specific implement in exceptional cases with cogent reasons. | Reinforced the principle that discretion is exceptional and must be justified by inconvenience or injustice. |
| Retail Parks Investments Limited v. The Royal Bank of Scotland plc 1996 SC 227 | Recognizes competence of specific implement orders in appropriate circumstances, including obligations to carry on business. | Supported the view that such orders are competent and have been effectively enforced without undue difficulty. |
| Church Commissioners for England v. Abbey National plc 1994 SC 651 | Endorses the competence of interim orders for specific implement of continuing contractual obligations. | Confirmed that interim enforcement orders of the nature in issue are competent and practical. |
| Munro v. Liquidator of Balmagowan Estates Company 1949 SC 49 | Requires decrees for specific implement to be sufficiently precise, leaving no doubt as to obligations. | Applied the principle to assess the precision of the lease clause and the order in this case. |
| Grosvenor Developments (Scotland) plc v. Argyll Stores Limited 1987 S.L.T. 738 | Obiter comments on the competence of specific implement orders for obligations to carry on business. | Distinguished as obiter and confined to facts; no general rule of incompetence established. |
| Gloag on Contract (Textbook) | Identifies exceptions to specific implement, including where enforcement would unduly restrain personal liberty. | Confirmed that obligations to carry on business do not fall within recognized exceptions. |
| Salaried Staff London Loan Co. Ltd. v. Swears and Wells 1985 SC 189 | Discusses the court’s discretion to refuse remedies in exceptional cases. | Supported the limited and exceptional nature of the discretion to refuse specific implement. |
| White and Carter (Councils) Ltd. v. McGregor 1962 SC (HL) 1 | Reiterates principles on discretion to refuse specific implement. | Adopted analysis of Lord Watson on the discretion’s exceptional application. |
| Visionhire Ltd. v. Britel Fund Trustees Ltd. 1991 S.L.T. 883 | Discusses differences between English and Scots law in enforcement of contractual provisions. | Confirmed that differences in remedies between jurisdictions do not warrant altering settled Scots law. |
| Patina Limited v. Lowe 1985 E.G.L.R. 540 | Interprets "high class furnished accommodation" in lease terms. | Used to consider the meaning of "high class retail store" and its ascertainability. |
| Ropemaker Properties Limited v. Noonhaven Limited 1989 2 E.G.L.R. 50 | Interprets restrictive user covenant relating to "high class restaurant/nightclub". | Considered in relation to the clarity and enforceability of similar descriptive terms. |
| Co-operative Wholesale Society Limited v. Saxone Limited 1997 S.L.T. 1052 | Supports competence of specific implement orders for "keep open" clauses. | Referenced to support the pursuers’ construction and enforcement approach. |
| Moore (Case cited) | Example of refusal of specific implement where enforcement would impose disproportionate burden. | Illustrated exceptional exercise of discretion to refuse specific implement. |
| Begg v. Jack (1875) 3 R. 35 | Equitable power to award equivalent relief where exact restoration is impossible or unreasonable. | Referenced in context of court’s discretion to refuse specific implement. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The court began by reviewing the historical and legal background of specific implement as a remedy under Scots law, affirming the fundamental distinction from English law whereby specific implement is generally a legal right rather than a discretionary equitable remedy. The court emphasized the long-standing principle that the creditor may elect to seek specific implement or damages, with the court’s discretion to refuse specific implement being rare and requiring very cogent reasons grounded in injustice or inconvenience.
The defenders’ argument that it is incompetent for the court to grant specific implement orders requiring a party to carry on business over time was rejected. The court found no general rule of incompetence in Scots law and noted that prior authorities, including recent cases, support the competence of such orders. The court distinguished obiter comments in earlier cases and underscored the practical experience of effective enforcement without undue difficulty.
Regarding the specificity of the lease clause, the court undertook a detailed construction exercise. It rejected the defenders’ literal and overly broad interpretation of the clause as meaningless and found the clause sufficiently certain when read in context. The phrase "trade specified" was interpreted as permitting the sale of any goods sold in a high class retail store, consistent with subclause prohibitions. The court acknowledged some difficulty with the term "normal hours of business" but concluded that it was capable of ascertainment by reference to the tenant’s established trading hours or the retail trade generally, thus providing sufficient precision.
The court also addressed practical concerns raised about enforcement, such as the need for court supervision and potential penal consequences. It found these concerns exaggerated in the Scottish context, where enforcement procedures require proof of deliberate defiance and where experience showed that such decrees were generally complied with without extensive litigation.
Finally, the court considered the exercise of discretion to refuse specific implement and found no basis for doing so in the present case. The defenders failed to demonstrate that enforcement would cause disproportionate hardship or injustice. The economic importance of the defenders’ continued trading to the pursuers’ investment and the inadequacy of damages as a remedy weighed heavily in favour of granting specific implement.
Holding and Implications
The court’s final decision was to allow the reclaiming motion, but only to the limited extent of clarifying the terms of the order regarding "normal hours of business". The court held that:
It is competent under Scots law to grant a decree of specific implement requiring a party to carry on business over a period of time, provided the terms of the obligation are sufficiently certain and precise.
The lease clause in question is not void for uncertainty and is sufficiently precise to support a decree of specific implement, when construed in context.
The court’s discretion to refuse specific implement is exceptional and was not properly exercised in this case, as no cogent reasons of inconvenience or injustice were established.
As a result, the defenders remain bound to keep the store open according to the terms of the Sub-lease and the order of specific implement granted by the Lord Ordinary is upheld with minor modification for clarity.
No new precedent was established beyond the reaffirmation of settled Scots law principles. The decision underscores the distinctiveness of Scots law in granting specific implement as a legal right and confirms the practical enforceability of "keep open" clauses in commercial leases.
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