Entick v Carrington & Ors

Factual and Procedural Background

The Plaintiff brought an action in trespass against the Defendants, alleging that on 11 November 1762, the Defendants forcibly broke and entered the Plaintiff's dwelling-house in the parish of St. Dunstan Stepney, Middlesex, and remained there for four hours without consent. During this time, they allegedly disturbed the Plaintiff's possession, broke open doors, locks, iron bars, boxes, chests, and drawers, examined private papers and books, and took away printed charts and pamphlets, causing damage estimated at £2,000.

The Defendants pleaded not guilty and also asserted two pleas of justification. They claimed to have acted under a warrant issued by the Earl of Halifax, a Secretary of State, dated 6 November 1762, authorizing them, with a constable, to search for and apprehend the Plaintiff as the author or concerned party in seditious papers titled The Monitor, or British Freeholder. The warrant empowered them to seize the Plaintiff and his books and papers to be examined before the Earl of Halifax or his assistant, Lovel Stanhope Esq., a law-clerk to the Secretary of State.

The Defendants admitted entering the Plaintiff's house and searching it but contended they did so lawfully under the warrant. The Plaintiff replied that the Defendants acted without lawful cause and demanded a jury inquiry. The case was tried before the Lord Chief Justice at Westminster-Hall, resulting in a special verdict. The jury found certain acts not guilty but were uncertain whether the Defendants were guilty of trespass in breaking and entering, disturbing possession, searching rooms and private papers, and seizing some books and papers. They assessed damages at £300 if the Defendants were found guilty. The jury also found that in another plea, the Defendants acted wrongfully in breaking and entering.

The case was argued twice at the Bar by counsel for both parties, with detailed submissions on the legality of the warrant, the powers of the Secretary of State, and the applicability of statute law.

Legal Issues Presented

1. Whether the Defendants were justified in their entry, search, seizure, and detention of the Plaintiff and his papers under the warrant issued by the Secretary of State.
2. Whether the Secretary of State had lawful authority to issue such a warrant to search and seize the Plaintiff's papers and person without prior hearing or proof.
3. Whether the Defendants were protected from liability under the statute 24 Geo. 2, c. 44, which limits actions against officers acting under warrants of justices of the peace.
4. Whether the Defendants' failure to take a constable to assist in executing the warrant affected their legal protection under the statute.
5. The scope and limits of the powers of the Secretary of State as a magistrate or conservator of the peace in issuing warrants for search and seizure.

Arguments of the Parties

Plaintiff's Arguments

• The Secretary of State is not a justice of the peace or conservator of the peace within the meaning of statute 24 Geo. 2, c. 44, and thus the statute does not protect the Defendants.
• The Defendants disobeyed the warrant by not taking a constable to assist, which removes any statutory protection they might have had.
• The warrant was illegal as it authorized a general search and seizure without prior examination or proof, akin to a Star Chamber tyranny.
• The warrant allowed the Defendants to break open doors, boxes, and pry into private papers unlawfully, violating the sanctity of private property.
• The practice of such warrants since the Revolution is too recent and cannot establish legality for actions contrary to common law and liberty.
• The Defendants unlawfully delegated the examination to the law-clerk instead of the Earl of Halifax personally, contrary to the warrant.
• The Plaintiff was never given a demand for perusal or copy of the warrant as required by statute.

Defendants' Arguments

• The Secretary of State has lawful power to issue warrants to commit for treason, seditious libels, and other offences against the State, similar to a justice of the peace.
• The Defendants, as King's messengers, are officers executing the warrant and are protected under statute 24 Geo. 2, c. 44, by analogy and construction.
• The warrant was lawfully issued by the Earl of Halifax, a Secretary of State and Privy Counsellor, who has exercised such authority since the Revolution without controversy.
• The Defendants' failure to take a constable does not remove their protection because they are officers of the Secretary of State.
• The practice of issuing such warrants has been longstanding and accepted in law for over eighty years.
• The delegation to the law-clerk, who is a justice of the peace, was lawful and proper under the circumstances.
• The power to search for and seize seditious libels is necessary to prevent rebellion and protect the State.

Table of Precedents Cited

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court carefully examined the nature and extent of the Secretary of State's powers, the statutory protections available to officers executing warrants, and the legality of the warrant itself. It distinguished the Secretary of State from justices of the peace and conservators of the peace, noting that the statute 24 Geo. 2, c. 44, which limits actions against officers acting under warrants, applies only to justices of the peace and their officers, not to the Secretary of State or his messengers.

The Court found that the Defendants failed to comply with the warrant's terms by not taking a constable to assist, a condition expressly stated in the warrant, thereby forfeiting any statutory protection.

Importantly, the Court held that the Secretary of State did not have lawful authority to issue a general warrant allowing the Defendants to break and enter, search all rooms and private papers, and seize all books and papers without prior examination, hearing, or proof of guilt. Such a warrant was deemed illegal and void, as it contravened the principles of common law, the sanctity of private property, and the liberties of subjects.

The Court rejected the argument that longstanding usage since the Revolution could establish legality for such warrants, emphasizing that illegality cannot be cured by mere practice. It underscored that the warrant resembled the oppressive practices of the Star Chamber, which had been abolished.

The Court also noted the improper delegation of authority by delivering the Plaintiff and his papers to the law-clerk instead of the Earl of Halifax personally, as required by the warrant.

Overall, the Court concluded that the Defendants' actions constituted an unlawful trespass and violation of the Plaintiff's rights.

Holding and Implications

The Court rendered judgment for the Plaintiff, holding that the Defendants were not justified in their entry, search, seizure, and detention under the warrant issued by the Secretary of State.

The decision directly invalidated the warrant as illegal and void, reinforcing the protection of private property and individual liberty against arbitrary executive power. It established that Secretaries of State do not possess the unchecked authority to issue general warrants for search and seizure without due process.

This ruling curtailed the use of such warrants, emphasizing the necessity of lawful authority, proper procedure, and statutory compliance in actions affecting personal liberty and property. No new precedent was created beyond the direct effect on the parties, but the judgment served as a significant safeguard against arbitrary governmental intrusions.