Factual and Procedural Background
The Plaintiff, by information in the Kings Bench, on behalf of the Crown and himself, demanded from the Defendant the sum of four hundred and fifty pounds for retailing wine without a licence ninety times in the parish of Stepney, Middlesex, contrary to the Statute of 12 Car. 2. The Defendant pleaded nil debet and submitted to a jury trial. The jury found that the Defendant owed nothing except fifty pounds, relating to the statute of 7 E. 6 concerning retailing of wines. The jury further found that the Defendant was a freeman of the City of London and of the Company of Vintners, had retailed wine within two miles of London, and had sold wine in his tavern in Stepney. Letters patent under the Great Seal dated 9 Jac. incorporated the Company of Vintners with rights to retail wine notwithstanding the statute of 7 E. 6, and the Act of 12 Car. 2 contained a proviso preserving the rights of the Company of Vintners.
Upon this special verdict, three legal questions were raised: whether the patent of 9 Jac. was void in its creation; if not, whether it became void on the death of King James; and if valid, whether the proviso in the Act of 12 Car. 2 preserved the rights granted by the patent against the Act.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the patent of 9 Jac. was void in its creation.
- If not void in its creation, whether it became void by the death of King James.
- If valid and not void by death, whether the proviso in the Act of 12 Car. 2 preserved the rights granted by the patent against the Act.
Arguments of the Parties
Plaintiff's Arguments
- The patent of 9 Jac. was void in its creation because the statute of 7 E. 6 was a law for the public good (pro bono publico) and the King could not dispense against such penal laws, especially not to a corporation of unknown members.
- The King could not grant a general dispensation to a corporation without knowledge of the individuals or their number, which was inconsistent with the trust reposed in the King by law.
- The dispensation to the Company of Vintners effectively nullified the statute of 7 E. 6 and was thus void.
Defendant's Arguments
- If the patent was validly created, it remained valid after King James's death.
- The proviso in the Act of 12 Car. 2 preserved the rights granted by the patent.
- The King has the power to dispense with penal laws of the nature of the statute of 7 E. 6, as shown by constant practice of licensing particular persons to retail wine.
- The King may dispense to corporations as well as individuals, even if the persons or their number are unknown.
- The patent to the Company of Vintners was a lawful dispensation, consistent with the King's prerogative and the ends of the statute.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent |
Rule or Principle Cited For |
Application by the Court |
| Case of 11 H. 7 |
Distinction between malum prohibitum and malum per se; King may dispense with malum prohibitum but not with malum per se. |
Used to analyze whether the statute of 7 E. 6 offense was malum prohibitum (dispensable) or malum per se (indispensable). |
| Brook, title Commission, N. 5 |
Incorporation and delegation of powers by the King, e.g., justices of the peace appointed by the King's Great Seal. |
Supports that the City's grant of dispensations does not equate to making justices of the peace, emphasizing the King's prerogative. |
| Cases of Norris v. Mason (Trinity 2 Jac.), Young v. Wright (Mich. 12 Car. 2) |
Judgments on letters patents to the Vintners of London. |
Referenced as precedents supporting the validity of the patent dispensation to the Vintners. |
| Statutes of 7 E. 6 and 12 Car. 2 |
Penal statutes regulating retail sale of wine and the King's power to grant licences. |
Central statutory framework governing the dispute over the validity of the dispensation and the rights of the Vintners. |
| Statute 1 H. 7 |
King cannot pardon or discharge suits commenced by common informers without their consent. |
Supports limits on the King's power to dispense with rights affecting third parties. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Court analyzed the nature of the offense under the statute of 7 E. 6, distinguishing between mala prohibita (offenses prohibited by statute) and mala in se (inherently wrongful acts). It held that the offense of selling wine without a licence was mala prohibita, a penal law designed for the public good but not malum per se, and therefore capable of dispensation by the King.
The Court rejected the argument that the King's dispensation to a corporation was invalid because the King did not know the individuals or their number, reasoning that the King may dispense to corporations and their successors, as supported by historical practice and legal authorities. The Court distinguished dispensations that affect the King's own rights from those that affect third-party rights, holding that the King cannot dispense with rights belonging to others, but may dispense with his own rights or those rights which cause no particular damage to others.
The proviso in the Act of 12 Car. 2 preserved the rights of the Company of Vintners, and the patent granted by King James was valid and survived his death. The dispensation was consistent with the statutory scheme and did not nullify the statute but regulated the number and persons allowed to retail wine.
The Court examined various categories of penal laws and dispensations, concluding that the King's power to dispense is broad but not unlimited, particularly excluding mala in se and offenses causing particular damage to others for which private actions lie. It also emphasized that dispensations do not transfer property or rights but merely render otherwise unlawful acts lawful for the dispensed person or entity.
Holding and Implications
The Court held that the patent of 9 Jac., granting the Company of Vintners the right to retail wine notwithstanding the statute of 7 E. 6, was validly created, did not become void upon King James's death, and that the proviso in the Act of 12 Car. 2 preserved those rights. Consequently, the Defendant, as a freeman of the Company of Vintners, was lawfully licensed to sell wine within the limits specified by the patent.
The direct effect of this decision is that the Defendant is not liable for the full amount claimed under the statute, except for the limited sum found by the jury. The ruling affirms the King's prerogative to dispense with certain penal laws in favor of corporations and clarifies the limits of such dispensations, but does not establish new precedent beyond the application of existing legal principles to the facts.