C v M

Factual and Procedural Background

The case concerns a claim in which a District Judge disallowed a success fee of £42,537 from a total bill of £170,000 presented by the Plaintiff. The success fee comprised £28,512 for solicitors and £14,025 for counsel. The disallowance was made on the grounds of delay, and no application for relief from this sanction was made. The Plaintiff initially entered into a conditional fee agreement (CFA) in 1999, which ended before 1 April 2000, the commencement date of the Access to Justice Act 1999 (Transitional Provisions) Order 1999. Subsequently, the Plaintiff entered into another CFA after this date.

Legal Issues Presented

1. Whether, in a transitional case, a conditional fee agreement in existence sometime prior to 1 April 2000 is sufficient for the restrictions on recovery of success fees under the 1999 Order to apply.
2. The proper construction and application of the Access to Justice Act 1999 (Transitional Provisions) Order 1999 in relation to success fees and conditional fee agreements spanning the transitional date.

Arguments of the Parties

The opinion does not contain a detailed account of the parties' legal arguments.

Table of Precedents Cited

No precedents were cited in the provided opinion.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Judge interpreted the 1999 Transitional Provisions Order in light of the facts presented. He reasoned that for transitional cases, it suffices that a conditional fee agreement was in existence at some point before 1 April 2000 for the restrictions on recovery of success fees, as stipulated in the 1999 Order, to apply. On this basis, the Judge upheld the disallowance of the success fee and dismissed the Plaintiff's appeal.

Holding and Implications

The court’s final decision was to DISMISS THE APPEAL.

This ruling confirms that in transitional cases, the existence of a conditional fee agreement prior to 1 April 2000 triggers the application of the restrictions on success fees under the 1999 Order. The decision directly affects the Plaintiff by upholding the sanction of disallowance of the success fee but does not establish a new legal precedent beyond the interpretation of the transitional provisions in this context.