Factual and Procedural Background
The deceased, a 68-year-old man, died in a motor accident. He had been married twice, with one child from his second marriage and a mistress of approximately 17 years. The deceased purchased a house at 7, Farm Place, Kensington, in May 1973, which was occupied by the mistress and her two children, one of whom was the deceased's child. The widow was unaware of the mistress or the property. The executors of the deceased's estate initiated proceedings for possession of the property, asserting that the licence permitting the defendant's occupation had terminated upon the deceased's death or by a letter demanding vacation of the premises. The defendant denied ownership rights but claimed a contractual licence to occupy the property, contending that the licence was binding on the executors post-death.
The case was initially heard in the West London County Court by Judge McDonnell, who found no contractual licence existed. The defendant appealed to the Court of Appeal, which is the subject of this opinion.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether a contractual licence existed between the deceased and the defendant permitting her to occupy the property at 7, Farm Place for a defined period or condition.
- Whether such a contractual licence, if it existed, survived the death of the deceased and bound the executors.
- Whether the defendant provided sufficient consideration to support the existence of a contractual licence.
Arguments of the Parties
Appellant's Arguments
- The defendant claimed a contractual licence to occupy the property, either for her lifetime, while her daughter was in full-time education, or as long as either reasonably needed the accommodation.
- She relied on the long-term relationship and support provided by the deceased, including accommodation at multiple addresses and financial maintenance, as evidence of a binding contract.
- The defendant asserted consideration existed through relinquishing prior accommodation and by agreeing that the deceased would fulfill his legal obligation to support the daughter primarily by providing accommodation, foregoing enforcement actions.
- It was submitted that the contract originated soon after the birth of the daughter and was varied upon purchase of 7, Farm Place, defining the permanent home.
Respondents' Arguments
- The plaintiffs, as executors, contended that no binding contractual licence existed and that the licence terminated on the deceased's death or by written notice.
- They emphasized the absence of clear, express agreement or sufficiently certain terms to establish a contract.
- They argued that the defendant had not demonstrated the necessary consideration to support a contractual licence.
- The plaintiffs relied on the precedent that contractual licences do not automatically survive death unless clearly agreed.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent |
Rule or Principle Cited For |
Application by the Court |
| Tanner v. Tanner [1975] 1 WLR 1346 |
Recognition that a contractual licence can be inferred between a man and his mistress to occupy a house for a specified period, binding on the man's estate. |
The court considered Tanner v. Tanner as the principal authority for the possibility of a contractual licence surviving death but distinguished the facts, finding no such contract on the evidence in the present case. |
| Ward v. Byham [1956] 1 WLR 496 |
Contracts regulating maintenance obligations between parents of an illegitimate child are not contrary to public policy. |
The court acknowledged Ward v. Byham to support the principle that parents can contractually regulate maintenance but found no such contract in the present case. |
| In re T.B. [1967] Ch. 247 |
Recognition of moral obligations of a father to provide for his illegitimate child. |
Referenced to illustrate moral obligations but distinguished from legal contractual obligations, which were not found here. |
| Seaborne v. Maddy (1840) 9 C. & P. 497 |
At common law, no obligation on a father to provide for an illegitimate child. |
Used to clarify that legal obligations arise only by contract or statute, not automatically at common law. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The court examined whether a contractual licence existed, focusing on the essential elements of contract formation: offer, acceptance, intention to create legal relations, certainty of terms, and consideration. The court noted that while the deceased had provided generous maintenance and accommodation, this did not amount to a binding contract allowing the defendant to remain in occupation indefinitely or for any of the proposed periods.
The court distinguished the present facts from Tanner v. Tanner, where a contract was inferred due to clear evidence of a mutual agreement with defined terms and consideration (relinquishing prior accommodation). Here, no express or sufficiently certain contract was found. The deceased's intention to provide security was expressed in general terms and was not formalized into a binding agreement.
The court also addressed the issue of consideration, finding the defendant failed to show any consideration equivalent to that in Tanner v. Tanner. The defendant's reliance on the deceased's provision and her forbearance from enforcing support claims was insufficient to establish a contractual licence.
Both Lord Justice Megaw and Lord Justice Scarman emphasized that the continuing warm relationship and generous provision did not amount to an intention to create legal relations enforceable as a contract. The court accepted the county court judge’s careful factual findings and legal conclusions.
Holding and Implications
The Court of Appeal DISMISSED THE APPEAL, affirming the county court’s decision that no contractual licence existed entitling the defendant to remain in possession of the property.
The direct effect is that the plaintiffs, as executors, are entitled to possession of the property at 7, Farm Place, and the defendant must vacate within the prescribed period. The decision does not establish new legal principles but confirms the necessity of clear contractual terms and consideration for a licence to survive the licensor’s death.