Conway, R v

Factual and Procedural Background

This opinion concerns an appeal by the Appellant against his conviction at the Crown Court at Reading on 30th March 1988 for reckless driving contrary to section 2 of the Road Traffic Act 1972. The Appellant was sentenced to six months' imprisonment and disqualified from driving for 18 months. Leave to appeal against conviction was granted, but leave to appeal against sentence was refused and not renewed. The appeal challenges the adequacy of jury directions regarding the defence of necessity or duress of circumstances raised by the Appellant's conduct during the driving incident on 6th July 1987.

On the day in question, two police officers in an unmarked vehicle attempted to speak to a passenger in the Appellant's car, who was subject to a bench warrant. After the passenger shouted warnings indicating he was wanted by the police, the Appellant drove off at speed. The police observed driving behaviour that was described as reckless, including high speeds, dangerous manoeuvres, and contraventions of traffic signs, before the Appellant was stopped. The Appellant's defence was that he believed he was escaping an imminent threat to the passenger's life, driving in panic and fear, and that this belief justified his actions.

Legal Issues Presented

1. Whether the jury should have been directed on the defence of necessity or duress of circumstances in relation to the charge of reckless driving.
2. Whether the jury should have been instructed to first determine if the Appellant's driving was reckless and, if so, to consider whether the Appellant bona fide believed he was acting in an emergency to save life, and whether such belief could justify the manner of driving.
3. Whether the defence of necessity can be raised in a charge of reckless driving and the scope of such a defence.
4. Whether the defence of duress of circumstances, as a species of necessity, applies to reckless driving and under what conditions.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

• The defence of necessity was raised on the evidence and the jury should have been directed accordingly.
• The jury should have considered whether the prosecution had disproved beyond reasonable doubt that the Appellant believed he was acting in an emergency to save the passenger from serious bodily injury.
• If the Appellant held such a belief, the jury should have been directed to consider whether the manner of driving was justified or excused in the circumstances.
• Driving recklessly involves taking an unreasonable risk, but there can be circumstances justifying such risk if taken to avoid serious harm.

Crown's Arguments

• It was accepted that the issue of duress was open to the Appellant and raised on the evidence, but the defence of necessity was not properly available on the facts.
• The judge's directions were adequate and the defence of necessity should not have been left to the jury.
• Any defence available was limited to duress of circumstances, which requires an objective test and strict limitations.
• The Court should apply an objective standard in assessing duress, not a purely subjective belief.

Table of Precedents Cited

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court examined whether the defence of necessity or duress of circumstances could be properly left to the jury in this case. It reviewed previous authorities including Denton and Willer, noting that while the defence of necessity is not clearly established in law as a general defence to reckless driving, duress of circumstances is recognized as a limited form of necessity.

The Court emphasized that duress of circumstances involves an objective test: the defendant must have been compelled to act to avoid death or serious bodily harm, and a reasonable person of similar characteristics would have acted similarly. The Court rejected the Appellant's argument for a subjective test focusing solely on the defendant's belief.

Applying these principles, the Court found that the Appellant's defence, based on fear for life and serious injury, raised a credible issue of duress of circumstances that should have been left to the jury despite counsel's concession that the defence was impossible to run. The failure to direct the jury on this defence was a significant procedural omission, as it related to the Appellant's only conceivable defence.

Consequently, the Court allowed the appeal and quashed the conviction, noting that although the jury might still have convicted, the non-direction prevented a proper consideration of the defence.

Holding and Implications

The Court's final decision was to ALLOW THE APPEAL AND QUASH THE CONVICTION.

The direct effect is that the Appellant's conviction for reckless driving is overturned due to a procedural error in jury directions regarding the defence of duress of circumstances. The Court clarified that duress of circumstances, a limited form of necessity, can be a defence to reckless driving if the defendant was compelled to drive as he did to avoid death or serious bodily harm, assessed by an objective standard. No broader defence of necessity based solely on subjective belief was recognized. The Court certified a point of law for general importance concerning the circumstances under which a driver charged with reckless driving may rely on necessity or duress of circumstances. No new precedent altering the substantive law was established beyond reaffirming existing principles and their application to jury directions.