JT, R v

Factual and Procedural Background

The Attorney General sought the court’s opinion on the requirements to establish falsity under the Forgery and Counterfeiting Act 1981 ("the 1981 Act") concerning whether a tachograph record sheet was capable of being a false instrument. The factual background involved a passenger coach journey from the United Kingdom to Germany via Belgium on 6 March 1998. The tachograph record indicated that the driver took a break between 16:43 and 17:24 hours, implying another driver operated the vehicle during that period, as required by law. In reality, there was only one driver, making the record inaccurate.

The inaccuracy arose because the driver either operated a switch on the tachograph recorder intended for use only when not driving or inserted the recording disc in a position designated for a non-driver. At trial in the Crown Court, the driver pleaded not guilty to forgery of the tachograph record sheet under Sections 1 and 9 of the 1981 Act. After legal argument, the trial judge ruled that the driver’s conduct could not constitute the offence charged. Consequently, the prosecution offered no evidence, and the jury acquitted the defendant.

Legal Issues Presented

1. What must be proved for an instrument to purport to have been made in circumstances in which it was not in fact made so as to establish falsity under the Forgery and Counterfeiting Act 1981?
2. Whether the tachograph record sheet in the instant case was capable of being a false instrument under the 1981 Act.

Arguments of the Parties

Attorney General's Arguments

• The Attorney General relied on the interpretation of Section 9(1)(g) of the 1981 Act, which concerns instruments purporting to have been made or altered in circumstances in which they were not in fact made or altered.
• He submitted that falsity arises if an instrument requires certain circumstances to exist before it can be made or altered, and those circumstances do not exist.
• He referred to established case law, particularly the cases of Donnelly and Jeraj, to support a narrow interpretation of falsity that focuses on the instrument purporting to be made in particular circumstances that must exist.

Respondent's Arguments

• The respondent argued that if the record had been written manually by the driver, the error would have been as to the contents, not the making of the document, and thus would not constitute forgery.
• He contended that the falsity related to the content (i.e., the presence of another driver) rather than the circumstances of the document’s making.

Table of Precedents Cited

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court analysed the statutory language of Section 9(1)(g) of the 1981 Act, which concerns instruments purporting to be made or altered in circumstances that did not in fact exist. It emphasized the necessity for the instrument to "purport" to have been made under particular circumstances and that falsity arises when those circumstances are absent.

Reviewing the case law, the court identified a tension between the broader interpretation in Donnelly and the narrower approach in Warneford and Gibbs. It concluded that the precedents of Donnelly and Jeraj remain binding but should be confined to cases where certain circumstances must exist for the instrument to be properly made or altered.

The court rejected the respondent’s argument that the falsity related only to the contents rather than the making of the instrument. It found that the tachograph record is produced continuously and that the falsity concerned the period when the record purported to show a second driver operating the vehicle, which did not exist. Thus, the instrument was false because it purported to be made in circumstances (presence of a second driver) that did not exist.

Accordingly, the court held that the tachograph record sheet was capable of being a false instrument under Section 9(1)(g) because it required the existence of certain circumstances for its making, and those circumstances were not present.

Holding and Implications

The court held that the tachograph record sheet was capable of being a false instrument under Section 9(1)(g) of the Forgery and Counterfeiting Act 1981.

The decision clarifies that falsity under this provision arises where an instrument requires certain factual circumstances to exist for its making or alteration, and those circumstances do not in fact exist. The ruling confines the scope of falsity to lies about the instrument’s own making circumstances rather than lies about external facts or contents.

This opinion resolves the conflict in previous authorities by affirming the binding nature of Donnelly and Jeraj, while limiting their application to appropriate factual contexts. The direct effect is that tachograph record sheets produced under false pretences of a second driver can constitute false instruments. The opinion does not establish a new precedent but provides authoritative guidance on interpreting Section 9(1)(g).