King v Bristow Helicopters Ltd. (Scotland); In Re M

Factual and Procedural Background

Two conjoined appeals reached the United Kingdom’s final appellate court. Both turned on whether “bodily injury” in Article 17 of the Warsaw Convention (as amended at The Hague 1955 and incorporated by the Carriage by Air Act 1961) embraces pure mental injury.

• Case 1 – Respondent v. Company A (Helicopter Accident, Scotland): A helicopter taking off from an offshore platform suffered dual-engine flame-out, descended heavily and filled with smoke. The Respondent was unhurt physically on disembarkation but developed post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) that, according to medical pleading, precipitated peptic-ulcer disease. The Lord Ordinary allowed the ulcer claim only; the First Division reinstated the full PTSD claim; Company A appealed.
• Case 2 – Plaintiff v. Carrier B (Commercial Flight, England): A 15-year-old unaccompanied passenger was indecently touched by a neighbouring traveller on an international flight. She later suffered a single episode of major depressive illness without any physical lesion. The County Court upheld liability under Article 17; the Court of Appeal reversed; the Plaintiff appealed.

Legal Issues Presented

1. Does “bodily injury” in Article 17 cover psychiatric illness unaccompanied by any physical damage to the body?
2. If mental injury can trigger Article 17 only when it produces a physical manifestation, what degree of manifestation is required (e.g., physiological brain change, secondary physical disorder such as ulceration)?
3. Should the Convention be interpreted by reference to 1929 medical understanding or in light of contemporary medical evidence?

Arguments of the Parties

Respondent / Plaintiff

• “Bodily injury” ought to be read broadly to include any harm to the person, whether physical or psychological, thereby aligning with the humanitarian purpose of passenger protection.
• The brain is part of the body; demonstrable psychiatric disorders involve biochemical or structural brain changes and so satisfy the bodily-injury requirement.
• International uniformity favors decisions such as Rosman, Weaver and Daddon, which admit recovery for mental injury.

Appellants / Defendants

• The ordinary meaning of “bodily injury” contrasts bodily harm with purely mental upset; delegates in 1929 never contemplated strict liability for stand-alone psychiatric harm.
• Allowing recovery for unverifiable mental conditions would expose carriers to limitless, speculative claims and upset the Convention’s risk-allocation bargain.
• United States Supreme Court authority—especially Eastern Airlines v Floyd—and Australian decisions show consistent rejection of pure psychological claims.

Table of Precedents Cited

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The appellate panel unanimously adopted a textual, autonomous reading of Article 17:

1. The adjective “bodily” narrows “injury” to physical harm to the passenger’s body, relying on the French “lésion corporelle.”
2. Uniform international interpretation is paramount; leading overseas authority (Floyd) excludes stand-alone mental injury, and the House wished to remain within that mainstream.
3. Medical advances may demonstrate that some psychiatric illnesses involve demonstrable physical changes. Where a claimant proves such change—e.g., brain damage evidenced by expert testimony—the condition may satisfy Article 17; but absent that proof, shock, fear or depression alone do not.
4. Consequently:
   • Mental injuries per se are uncompensated.
   • Physical sequelae of mental distress (e.g., peptic ulcers) are compensable because they constitute separate bodily injury causally linked to the accident.
5. The Court rejected policy arguments about increased litigation exposure, noting the evidential threshold for proving genuine bodily change.

Holding and Implications

HELICOPTER APPEAL (ALLOWED): The initial order confining the claim to the peptic-ulcer allegation was restored; purely psychiatric heads of claim were struck out.

COMMERCIAL-FLIGHT APPEAL (DISMISSED): Because the Plaintiff suffered no physical injury and led no evidence of brain or other bodily change, Article 17 provided no remedy.

Implications: The judgment cements the United Kingdom’s alignment with the prevailing U.S. and Australian position that strict-liability recovery under the Warsaw Convention demands proof of physical harm, while leaving open the possibility that advanced medical evidence of brain injury could satisfy the “bodily injury” threshold in future claims. No new precedent was set beyond clarifying this jurisdiction’s adherence to the mainstream interpretation.