DPP v Gomez

Factual and Procedural Background

The Respondent worked as an assistant manager in a retail electrical store. An acquaintance supplied him with two stolen building-society cheques. Relying on the Respondent’s false assurances that the cheques were “as good as cash,” the store manager authorised the release of goods worth approximately £17,000. Both cheques were later returned marked “stolen.”

The Respondent and two others were tried at The Crown Court on two counts of theft under the Theft Act 1968. After a submission of no case to answer was rejected, the Respondent pleaded guilty to one count and was convicted by a jury on the second. The Court of Appeal (Criminal Division) quashed both convictions, holding that because the store manager consented to the transactions, there had been no “appropriation.” A certificate of a point of law of general public importance was granted. The Appellant (the public prosecuting authority) appealed to the House of Lords, which heard argument before Judge Keith, Judge Jauncey, Judge Lowry, Judge Browne-Wilkinson and Judge Slynn.

Legal Issues Presented

1. Whether, when property passes with the owner’s consent that has been induced by deception, there is nevertheless an “appropriation” within section 1(1) of the Theft Act 1968.
2. Whether “appropriation” necessarily requires an element of adverse interference or usurpation of the owner’s rights, as suggested in earlier obiter dicta.
3. Whether the Court of Appeal erred in treating consent obtained by fraud as negating theft and in quashing the Respondent’s convictions.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

• Section 1(1) contains no requirement that appropriation be without the owner’s consent; therefore consent—whether genuine or induced by deception—is irrelevant.
• The earlier decision in Lawrence v. Metropolitan Police Commissioner is binding authority that appropriation can occur notwithstanding consent.
• Obiter comments in R v. Morris suggesting the contrary were wrong and should not control the present case.

Respondent's Arguments

• An appropriation must involve adverse interference with, or usurpation of, the owner’s rights; where the owner consents (even if induced by fraud) there is no such interference.
• R v. Morris correctly stated the law; the transactions were governed by a voidable contract, so no appropriation occurred at the moment possession passed.
• The convictions should remain quashed because the appropriate charge would have been “obtaining property by deception” under section 15, not theft.

Table of Precedents Cited

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

Judge Keith delivered the lead judgment. The House held that:

• The statutory phrase “dishonestly appropriates” is a composite concept; Parliament deliberately omitted any reference to the owner’s consent. Therefore, consent—whether freely given or induced—is irrelevant to whether an appropriation has occurred.
• Section 3(1) defines appropriation as “any assumption by a person of the rights of an owner.” That definition is satisfied whenever the defendant, acting dishonestly, assumes one or more proprietary rights, even with the owner’s permission.
• Lawrence constitutes binding authority on this point and has stood for two decades; obiter observations in Morris cannot override it.
• The Court of Appeal’s reliance on Morris misconceived that decision and ignored that the remarks about adverse interference were unnecessary for its outcome.
• Earlier cases (e.g., R v. Skipp and R v. Fritschy) that treated consent as negating appropriation were wrongly decided.
• Applying Lawrence, the Respondent’s conduct—dishonestly arranging for the transfer of goods knowing the cheques were stolen—amounted to an appropriation. All four elements of theft (dishonesty, appropriation, property belonging to another, intent permanently to deprive) were present.

Holding and Implications

Order: The House of Lords allowed the appeal, set aside the Court of Appeal’s decision, and restored the Respondent’s convictions. The case was remitted to the Court of Appeal (Criminal Division) for any consequential orders.

Implications: The judgment definitively resolves the tension between Lawrence and Morris, confirming that appropriation under the Theft Act 1968 can occur even where the owner consents, including consent induced by deception. This clarification restores doctrinal coherence, affects future charging decisions (theft vs. deception offences), and removes technical arguments based on consent in both retail-fraud and company-fraud contexts. No new precedent is set, but authoritative guidance is provided on the proper construction of “appropriation.”