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Robert Addie & Sons (Collieries) Ltd v. Dumbreck
Factual and Procedural Background
The Appellants owned a field adjoining a public road in The City. Large gaps in the boundary fence enabled members of the public—particularly children—to enter the land and play around a pulley wheel that intermittently hauled trucks by cable. Although the Appellants’ employees repeatedly warned intruders to leave, those warnings were often ignored. On the day in question a young child (the Respondent’s son) was playing on or near the wheel when it began to move without warning, causing fatal injuries.
The Respondent (the child’s father) sued for damages. The First Division of the Court of Session found the Appellants liable, holding that they owed a duty of care because they knew children habitually entered the field. The Appellants appealed to the House of Lords, contending that the child was a trespasser and that no duty of care was owed beyond refraining from wilful or reckless injury.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the deceased child was on the premises as an invitee, a licensee, or a trespasser at the time of the accident.
- If the child was a trespasser, whether occupiers owe any duty of care beyond avoiding wilful or reckless harm.
- Whether authorities such as Cooke v. Midland Great Western Railway of Ireland and Lowery v. Walker impose a higher duty toward trespassers than traditionally recognised.
Arguments of the Parties
Respondent's Arguments
- Relied on Cooke v. Midland Great Western Railway of Ireland and Lowery v. Walker to contend that an occupier who knows of habitual trespass by children owes a duty to make the premises safe, even if those children are technically trespassers.
- Emphasised that the wheel was “dangerous and attractive to children and insufficiently protected,” effectively rendering it a trap.
- Argued that the Appellants’ failure to erect an effective fence or give adequate warning when the wheel was started amounted to implied permission for the children’s presence.
Appellants' Arguments
- Maintained that the child was a trespasser, not an invitee or licensee, because permission—express or implied—had never been given.
- Submitted that, under both English and Scots law, an occupier owes no duty of care to a trespasser other than to refrain from wilful or reckless harm.
- Distinguished Cooke and Lowery on the basis that those cases involved licensees, not trespassers.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Cooke v. Midland Great Western Railway of Ireland [1909] AC 229 | Children treated as licensees when occupier tacitly permits their presence; duty to remove or guard traps. | Distinguished: decision rested on implied licence, therefore irrelevant to duties owed to trespassers. |
| Lowery v. Walker | Continued tolerance of public use may amount to a licence, imposing a duty to guard against known dangers. | Distinguished: child here lacked any implied licence; thus the higher duty did not arise. |
| Latham v. R. Johnson & Nephew Ltd. | Authoritative classification of visitors into invitees, licensees and trespassers with graduated duties. | Cited to reaffirm the tripartite framework and the minimal duty owed to trespassers. |
| Hardy v. Central London Railway Co. | No liability for injuries to trespassers unless caused wilfully or by traps set with intent to injure. | Relied on as accurate statement of English law parallel to Scots law. |
| Coffee v. M'Evoy | Irish authority affirming minimal duty toward trespassers. | Cited as consistent with the English and Scots position. |
| Haughton v. North British Railway Co. | Liability only where occupier’s servants act with reckless disregard after knowing trespassers are present. | Used to illustrate the limited circumstances in which a trespasser can succeed. |
| Devlin v. Jeffray's Trustees | Visitors “must take the lands as they find them” when on property without right or invitation. | Quoted with approval as encapsulating the governing rule. |
| Holland v. Lanarkshire Middle Ward District Committee | No duty to fence a disused quarry against trespassing children. | Cited as Scots precedent supporting Appellants’ position. |
| Reilly v. Greenfield Coal and Brick Co. | Liability where injured child was lawfully on a public road within the occupier’s premises. | Used to contrast situations where the claimant is not a trespasser. |
| Mackenzie v. Fairfield Shipbuilding & Engineering Co. | Occupier liable when it knows and allows children to use dangerous premises—implied licence. | Distinguished on ground of implied permission absent here. |
| Boyd v. Glasgow Iron and Steel Co. 1923 SC 758 | Duty to licensees to protect against concealed dangers. | Highlighted difference between licensees and trespassers. |
| Grand Trunk Railway of Canada v. Barnett | General rule that a trespasser “trespasses at his own risk.” | Adopted as authoritative statement of the governing principle. |
| Thompson v. North British Railway Co. | No recovery for an injured railway trespasser despite railway negligence. | Cited to reinforce absence of duty beyond avoiding wilful harm. |
| Cummings v. Darngavil Coal Co. | Trespassing child injured by haulage wheel could not recover. | Identified as factually similar and supportive of Appellants’ case. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
1. Classification of the visitor. The House emphasised that the first and decisive step is assigning the visitor to one of three rigid categories: invitee, licensee or trespasser. On the unchallenged findings, the child had neither express nor implied permission to be on the land; the Appellants had consistently protested against intrusions. Tolerance of continuing trespass did not amount to permission. Accordingly, the child was a trespasser.
2. Duty owed to a trespasser. Reviewing English, Scots and Irish authorities, the Court reaffirmed that occupiers owe trespassers no duty of reasonable care. The sole obligation is to refrain from wilful acts or reckless disregard tantamount to malice. The pulley wheel, although dangerous, was a legitimate part of the Appellants’ business and was not operated with intent to injure.
3. Analysis of cited precedents. Precedents relied on by the Respondent (Cooke; Lowery) were distinguished because the injured parties in those cases were licensees, not trespassers. Numerous decisions—Hardy, Grand Trunk Railway, Devlin and others—confirmed the minimal duty toward trespassers.
4. Rejection of a “fourth category.” The Court rejected the suggestion that a class of “quasi-trespasser” exists between licensee and trespasser, finding no basis for such a category in English or Scots law.
5. Application to facts. Because the child was a trespasser and no wilful or reckless act was proven, the Appellants breached no duty. Sympathy for the Respondent could not alter the legal framework.
Holding and Implications
APPEAL ALLOWED; judgment for the Respondent set aside and the action dismissed, with costs awarded to the Appellants.
Implications: The decision firmly restates the tripartite classification of visitors and confirms that, in both English and Scots law, occupiers owe trespassers no duty of care beyond avoiding wilful or reckless injury. It rejects any intermediate category and underscores that failure to erect effective fencing or to prevent habitual trespass does not, without more, convert a trespasser into a licensee. The ruling therefore limits occupiers’ liability and offers clear guidance for future cases involving injuries to trespassers, especially children.
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