Bartonshill Coal Company v. Jane McGuire, Widow

Factual and Procedural Background

On 17 September 1853 an accident occurred in The City at the Dykehead (also called Bargeddie) coal pit, operated by Company A. While being raised to the surface, an employee (“Deceased Employee”) suffered fatal injuries allegedly caused by the negligent operation of the winding machinery by a fellow employee (“Engineman”). The Deceased Employee’s widow (“Plaintiff”) sued Company A in the Court of Session, asserting that the Engineman’s negligence was attributable to the company as his employer.

A parallel action had been brought by another widow (“Plaintiff 2”) arising out of the same incident. By agreement of the parties, the legal issues in both suits were to “abide the decision” in Plaintiff 2’s case. After a jury trial in that lead case, a verdict for £100 was entered by consent in favour of the present Plaintiff.

The Lord Ordinary repelled Company A’s first two pleas in law (which denied relevancy and asserted non-liability for injury caused by a fellow servant) and approved issues for jury trial. Interlocutors dated 5 July 1855 and 19 July 1855 decerned for damages and expenses against Company A. Company A (“Appellant”) appealed to the House of Lords, challenging (i) the Lord Ordinary’s interlocutor of 31 January 1855, and (ii) the Second Division’s interlocutors of 3, 5 and 19 July 1855.

Legal Issues Presented

1. Whether the Engineman and the Deceased Employee were “fellow servants engaged in a common employment” for the purposes of the fellow-servant doctrine.
2. If they were fellow servants, whether Company A could nevertheless be held liable in damages absent proof of (a) the Engineman’s general incompetence or (b) defective machinery supplied by the employer.
3. Whether, under the Scotch Judicature Acts, an appeal lay to the House of Lords against the interlocutors complained of, notwithstanding procedural agreements between the parties and the treatment of exceptions by the Court of Session.

Arguments of the Parties

Plaintiff's Arguments

• Company A, as master, was liable for injuries caused by its servant’s negligence in the course of employment (Qui facit per alium facit per se).
• The operation of winding machinery that transported miners was part of the employer’s duty to provide safe means of access, placing liability on the company rather than on individual workmen.
• The procedural arrangements with Plaintiff 2 did not preclude immediate enforcement of the verdict or limit the scope of appeal.

Defendant's (Appellant's) Arguments

• The Engineman and the Deceased Employee were working in the same common employment; therefore the fellow-servant rule exempted Company A from liability.
• No evidence demonstrated the Engineman’s general incompetence or any defect in the machinery supplied; consequently the recognised exceptions to the fellow-servant rule did not arise.
• The interlocutors were appealable, and the understanding that judgment in this matter would follow the final outcome of Plaintiff 2’s case barred premature execution.

Table of Precedents Cited

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

Judge Chancellor, delivering the principal opinion and concurred in by Judge Brougham and Judge Cranworth, proceeded as follows:

1. Competency of Appeal. The House held that an interlocutor decerning for payment of damages after a jury verdict is “a judgment in point of law” within section 9 of the relevant Judicature Act and is therefore appealable. A final interlocutor brings up for review all intermediate interlocutors, including those disallowing exceptions.
2. Definition of Common Employment. Relying on English and Scottish authority, the court stressed that for the employer’s exemption to apply, the injurer and injured must be “in the same common employment and engaged in the same common work.” Transporting miners in the cage was integral to their mutual employment; thus the Engineman and Deceased Employee were fellow servants.
3. Application of the Fellow-Servant Rule. The established rule—applicable in both England and Scotland—exempts a master from liability for injuries one servant causes another unless (a) the negligent servant is generally incompetent and the master knew or should have known, or (b) the injury results from defective plant or machinery supplied by the master. The evidence disclosed neither circumstance.
4. Consistency of Scottish and English Law. The House rejected the argument that Scottish jurisprudence differed materially from English law, observing that any divergent dicta were reconcilable and that fundamental principles were common to both systems.

Holding and Implications

REVERSED. The House of Lords set aside all interlocutors that had awarded damages and expenses against Company A, assoilzied (absolved) the company from the conclusions of the summons, and ordered repayment of any sums already paid.

Implications: The decision confirmed that the fellow-servant doctrine, as understood in English case law, equally governs Scottish employment relationships. Employers are not liable for injuries one employee negligently causes another in the same common employment unless an established exception applies. The ruling harmonises Scottish and English authority and clarifies the scope of appellate jurisdiction under the Scotch Judicature Acts.