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R v. Gould
Factual and Procedural Background
On 22nd March 1967, the Appellant was arraigned at Inner London Sessions on a charge of bigamy. In the absence of his counsel, who was late, the Appellant pleaded guilty. Upon arrival, the Appellant's counsel sought to withdraw the guilty plea to advance a defence based on the Appellant's honest and reasonable mistaken belief that a Decree Absolute dissolving his previous marriage had been granted at the time of the second marriage. The Deputy Chairman refused to allow withdrawal of the plea, convicted the Appellant, and sentenced him to a conditional discharge. The Appellant appealed, raising the legal question of whether an honest and reasonable belief that the former marriage had been dissolved is a defence to bigamy under the Offences Against the Person Act 1861.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether, under Section 57 of the Offences Against the Person Act 1861, an honest and reasonable belief by a defendant that his former marriage had been dissolved at the time of a second marriage constitutes a valid defence to a charge of bigamy.
- Whether the Court of Appeal should depart from the precedent established in R. v. Wheat (1921), which held that such a belief is not a defence.
- How to interpret the statutory language creating the offence of bigamy, particularly whether mens rea (a guilty mind) is an essential element of the offence.
Arguments of the Parties
Appellant's Arguments
- The Appellant honestly and reasonably believed that his former marriage had been dissolved by a Decree Absolute at the time of his second marriage.
- Such an honest and reasonable mistaken belief should constitute a defence to bigamy under the statute.
- The precedent in R. v. Wheat was wrongly decided and conflicts with earlier authority, particularly R. v. Tolson.
Prosecution's Arguments
- The prosecution accepted that the Appellant held an honest and reasonable belief regarding the dissolution of his former marriage.
- No further application was made by the prosecution following the judgment, indicating acquiescence in the Court's reasoning.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| R. v. Wheat (1921) | Held that an honest and reasonable belief that a former marriage had been dissolved was not a defence to bigamy. | The Court found this precedent conflicted with other authorities and was wrongly decided, thus declining to follow it. |
| Young v. Bristol Aeroplane Company Limited (1944) | Sets exceptions to the doctrine of stare decisis in the Court of Appeal's civil jurisdiction. | Referenced to explain that the Court of Appeal in criminal jurisdiction is less rigid and may depart from prior decisions. |
| R. v. Taylor (1950) | Illustrates application of stare decisis exceptions in criminal cases. | Used to support the Court's authority to depart from previous criminal decisions. |
| R. v. Tolson (1889) | Established that mens rea is an essential ingredient in the offence of bigamy; an honest and reasonable mistaken belief about the relevant fact is a defence. | The Court relied on this majority decision to support its conclusion that mens rea is necessary and that honest mistake is a valid defence. |
| R. v. Prince | Considered the nature of offences mala in se and the role of mens rea. | The Court distinguished this case from bigamy, noting the latter is not mala in se and thus mens rea is essential. |
| Thomas v. The King (High Court of Australia, 1937) | Held that an honest and reasonable mistaken belief regarding dissolution of a prior marriage is a defence to bigamy. | The Court found this decision persuasive and consistent with its reasoning, supporting the defence of honest mistake. |
| R. v. King (1964) | Followed the Australian decision in Thomas v. The King, supporting honest mistake as a defence. | The Court concurred with the result of this case and parts of its reasoning, though respectfully differed on its view of Wheat. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Court began by examining the statutory language of Section 57 of the Offences Against the Person Act 1861, which defines bigamy in absolute terms without explicitly including mens rea. The Court noted that while the statute includes exceptions (provisos) relating to dissolution or voiding of prior marriages, these are not defences but rather define when the person is no longer "married" for the purposes of the offence.
The Court then considered whether the statute should be interpreted literally as an absolute offence or construed to include mens rea, following the presumption that criminal statutes require a guilty mind. The Court reviewed the conflicting authorities:
- R. v. Tolson held by majority that mens rea is essential and that an honest, reasonable mistake about the status of the prior marriage is a defence.
- R. v. Wheat held the opposite, denying the defence, but the Court found the reasoning in Wheat flawed and inconsistent with Tolson.
The Court also analyzed the reasoning in R. v. Prince, distinguishing it because that case involved an offence mala in se, unlike bigamy.
Further persuasive authority was found in the High Court of Australia's Thomas v. The King, which aligned with Tolson and rejected Wheat's reasoning. The Court of Criminal Appeal's decision in R. v. King was also examined and found to support the defence of honest mistake, although the Court respectfully disagreed with its view that Thomas was distinguishable from Wheat.
The Court concluded that there is no principled or policy reason to distinguish between different kinds of honest and reasonable mistakes about the status of a prior marriage and that the offence of bigamy requires mens rea. Consequently, the Court held that the Appellant's honest and reasonable belief that his former marriage had been dissolved is a valid defence.
Holding and Implications
The appeal is allowed and the conviction quashed.
The Court overturned the precedent set by R. v. Wheat, clarifying that the offence of bigamy under Section 57 of the Offences Against the Person Act 1861 requires mens rea. An honest and reasonable mistaken belief that a prior marriage has been dissolved constitutes a valid defence. This decision directly benefits the Appellant by quashing his conviction. The Court did not establish a new binding precedent in the civil sense but exercised its discretion in criminal jurisdiction to depart from prior conflicting authority, thereby resolving ambiguity in the law on this point.
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