SENIOR IMMIGRATION JUDGE ESHUN SENIOR IMMIGRATION JUDGE GILL before us that either one may have triggered the decision to deport the appellant. As a Tribunal, we cannot go behind the Secretary of State's reasons for wishing to deport the appellant.24. The next challenge was that the panel should not have sought evidence of previous convictions since the respondent had obviously not raised them in making the impugned decision. That argument is with reference to the panel's findings at paragraphs and of the determination. At paragraph the Tribunal found that the appellant has a total of thirteen previous convictions, starting with his first conviction on May for taking a motor vehicle without consent for which he was fined. This was then followed by convictions on August February July August January for various motoring offences, including driving whilst disqualified. On February a conviction for handling stolen goods; on June which was again a motoring offence, and on July when he was convicted for offences of aggravated burglary when he was sentenced to four years' imprisonment. On July at Manchester Magistrates Court, for failing to surrender to custody, he was sentenced to one day's detention in default. Finally, on August again at Manchester Crown Court, he was sentenced to four months' imprisonment concurrent with the sentence he was serving for dangerous driving and associated motoring offences. The Tribunal noted that the appellant had not sought to argue that his record of previous convictions was not accurate and correct.25. It was argued by Counsel that the panel erred in law in taking into account factors that were explicitly absent from the Secretary of State's reasons in seeking to deport the appellant. The Tribunal is an impartial arbiter as to the merits of the decision and does not have to descend into the arena.26. We do not support Counsel's argument. The appellant had submitted with his bundle of documents a chronology which detailed all his convictions. He had also provided a statement in which he had said at paragraph that his criminal record was available and that he was prepared to answer questions about his offences. In the circumstances he could not now argue that the Panel were excluded from considering his previous criminal convictions. Furthermore one of the factors to be taken into account in considering deportation under paragraph is the applicant's previous criminal record and the nature of any offence of which he has been convicted. Therefore whilst we accept that the appellant's previous convictions were not included in the decision to deport or in the deportation letter, we find in the light of the evidence before us that the Panel were not excluded from considering the appellant's previous criminal convictions. We also find that all the Secretary of State needed to do was to give a reason for wishing to deport the appellant. The Secretary of State highlighted the two convictions which he thought were the most serious. The two serious offences were enough to trigger the decision to deport. The fact that the Secretary of State had not raised the appellant's previous convictions did not prevent the Panel from doing so in their consideration of paragraph of HC The panel were not restricted to the reasons cited by the Secretary of State in his reasons letter. Accordingly we find that the panel did not go beyond its remit in considering the appellant's previous conviction and did not materially err in law in doing so.27. The next challenge was the failure by the respondent to forewarn the appellant about his intention to deport him and to take the requisite procedural steps in making that decision. Counsel submitted that there should have been a questionnaire issued asking the appellant why he should not be deported. The Home Office have a policy of inviting an applicant to state why he should not be deported from the UK.28. We note from the letter to the appellant, dated May from the Home Office that the Immigration and Nationality Directorate wrote seeking reasons why he should not be deported. It is now being argued that the respondent failed to comply with this procedure. We agree with Miss O'Connor that it is not for the Tribunal to take account of the procedural steps taken by the Secretary of State but to determine the actual decision and consequences of that decision. Additionally, we find that the appellant was not prejudiced by the procedural failure, if indeed there is one, because the notice of appeal enabled him to put forward the reasons why he should not be deported. He was also at the hearing able to give reasons why he should not be deported. Accordingly, even if there was a procedural failure on the part of the respondent, we do not find that the appellant was disadvantaged by it.29. The next challenge was in relation to the Tribunal's findings on the factors listed at paragraph of HC The argument was in relation to the panel's finding that the most serious offence committed by the appellant was that of aggravated burglary. It was argued that the appellant has no previous convictions involving violence and that was a factor which went in his favour when His Honour Judge Singer was sentencing him. Judge Singer had dealt with the offence on the basis that an imitation firearm was used. It was argued that the panel had to consider all the relevant factors. The panel erred in their failure to take into account the fact that the sentencing judge had indicated a reduction in the sentence to four years to the one he had in mind. The panel had taken account of outdated risk factors and over-relied on Dr Goodfellow's report instead of the report by Mr Morris.30. We note that those arguments are in relation to paragraphs and of the panel's decision. At paragraph the panel stated that they had considered the sentencing remarks by His Honour Judge Singer. The Judge referred to the appellant's semi-admissions in that he admitted being involved in a burglary to get a debt. The Judge however observed that this was not what the jury found him guilty of. The Judge referred to the appellant as having been found guilty by the jury of the serious offence of aggravated burglary with an imitation firearm. The Judge found that the appellant's version of events was found by the jury to be lies. The appellant was a young man with a long record, mainly for offences involving vehicles. The Judge referred to the appellant as having committed a number of offences involving dishonesty, at least three offences of telling lies to the police to disguise his identity in relation to motoring offences; described the offence of burglary involving an imitation firearm as being one of the worst offences of burglary that one could be convicted of. The panel also took into account that the sentence of four years' imprisonment no doubt reflected the Judge's view of the serious nature of the offence as referred to in his sentencing remarks. In light of this evidence we find that it is incorrect to argue that the panel did not take the reduction of the sentence and the Sentencing Judge's remarks into account.31. At paragraph the panel found that it is characteristic of the appellant's history that he either denies his involvement in offences or seeks to minimise his involvement in the offences. They noted that, despite the appellant's conviction of the offence of aggravated burglary by the jury, the appellant continued to deny his involvement in that offence when he was interviewed by the probation officer, Jonathan Goodfellow, for the preparation of the pre-sentence report. Significantly, Mr Goodfellow expressed the opinion that until the appellant was able to accept responsibility, he would assess him as being likely to remain at risk of further re-offending. When the parole board assessed the appellant in their report of September some two and a half years later, they reported that the appellant continued to deny that offence and that his attitude towards his victims showed a poor level of understanding of the harm his behaviour causes. Of further significance, the parole board stated that the risk of further re-offending and of harmful behaviour had increased.32. At paragraph the Panel considered the appellant's reliance on a risk assessment report by Mr Morris, a former probation officer, employed as a probation officer by Greater Manchester Probation Services between