Stone v Bolton

Factual and Procedural Background

On 9 August 1947, Plaintiff was struck by a cricket ball while standing on a public highway outside her residence at [Number] Beckenham Road, The City. The ball had been hit by a batsman during a match on the adjacent cricket ground owned and managed by Defendants. Cricket had been played on this ground since approximately 1864, and Beckenham Road had existed since 1910.

The ground was bordered by a 7-foot fence situated on rising terrain, placing the fence-top roughly 17 feet above the pitch level. Evidence revealed that balls cleared the fence only “very rarely”; six instances in roughly 38 years were proved. No prior injury to persons on the roadway had ever been recorded.

Plaintiff sued Defendants for damages, alleging (a) negligence in failing to prevent balls leaving the ground and (b) nuisance based on the same facts. At first instance, Judge [Last Name] (Oliver J.) dismissed both claims. The Court of Appeal reversed and imposed liability. Defendants (now Appellants) appealed to the House of Lords, where the present opinion was delivered on 10 May 1951.

Legal Issues Presented

1. Whether the mere foreseeability that a cricket ball might leave the ground and cause injury suffices to establish negligence, or whether a higher probability of injury is required.
2. Whether, on the same facts, Defendants had created an actionable nuisance absent proof of negligence.

Arguments of the Parties

Respondent's Arguments

• Once any ball had previously been hit into the road, Defendants were on notice of the risk and owed a duty to take effective precautions.
• The existence of occasional prior hits, though infrequent, rendered the risk reasonably foreseeable; reasonable persons would anticipate potential injury to passers-by.
• Suggested precautions included moving the pitch further from the road or raising the boundary fence.

Appellants' Arguments

• The probability of a ball leaving the ground and injuring someone was extremely small; six occurrences in 38 years did not create a duty to take further steps.
• Reasonable care does not demand precautions against every remote possibility; only risks that an ordinarily prudent person would regard as material must be addressed.
• The nuisance claim could not succeed independently of negligence.

Table of Precedents Cited

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

All five Law Lords (Lord Porter, Lord Normand, Lord Oaksey, Lord Reid, and Lord Radcliffe) allowed the appeal, though each delivered a separate speech. The collective reasoning may be summarised as follows:

• Standard of care. The occupier of a sports ground owes a duty to prevent reasonably likely injuries, not every conceivable harm. The test is that of the ordinary reasonable person (Bourhill, Glasgow Corporation).
• Probability versus foreseeability. The event was foreseeable in the sense that it could happen, but the probability was exceptionally low—six incidents in nearly four decades and no prior injury. A reasonable person would consider the risk negligible.
• Fact-finding role of the trial judge. Oliver J.’s decision was likened to a jury verdict on fact. Appellate interference is improper unless the conclusion is plainly wrong.
• Suggested precautions. Raising the fence or moving the pitch were deemed ineffectual or disproportionate; the only fool-proof measure would be to cease cricket altogether, which the law does not require given the minimal risk.
• Nuisance claim. Counsel for Respondent conceded that nuisance could not be established absent negligence; therefore, failure on negligence was fatal to nuisance.
• Rejection of res ipsa loquitur. All causative facts were known; the doctrine had no application.

Holding and Implications

Appeal ALLOWED. The judgment of the trial court dismissing the claims was restored, and Respondent was ordered to pay the costs in both the Court of Appeal and the House of Lords.

Implications: The decision clarifies that, in negligence, mere foreseeability of harm is insufficient; the probability of injury must be such that a reasonable person would take preventive measures. Sporting activities that create only an extremely small risk to neighbours will not attract liability, and nuisance will not succeed where negligence is absent. No new cause of action was created, but the case is frequently cited for the “likelihood” standard in duty-of-care analysis.