Factual and Procedural Background
The evidence at the inquest into the death of the deceased, who was shot and killed on 25 November 1992 at Falls Road, Belfast, was heard before the Coroner with a jury between 24 September and 26 October 2012. The deceased was shot by a police officer during an anti-terrorist operation involving the Royal Ulster Constabulary's Headquarters Mobile Support Unit. The inquest examined the circumstances of the shooting, including the planning and control of the operation, the conduct of police officers involved, and the justification for the use of lethal force.
Following the inquest, three judicial review applications were brought by the father of the deceased challenging various decisions of the Coroner and the Police Service of Northern Ireland (PSNI). The challenges included issues relating to disclosure of documents, the Coroner’s decisions on anonymity and screening of witnesses, the conduct and composition of the jury, and delay in commencing the inquest.
The first application challenged multiple rulings of the Coroner, including non-disclosure of the Stalker/Sampson reports, decisions on jury anonymity and verdict unanimity, and the involvement of former Special Branch Officers in the disclosure process. The second application challenged the PSNI’s refusal to disclose two statements made by a police officer to the Police Ombudsman relating to a separate but related death, contending a legitimate expectation of disclosure. The third application challenged the delay in commencing the inquest as incompatible with Article 2 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR).
The judgment addresses these applications in distinct parts, considering the factual background, legal principles, and the specific grounds of challenge.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the Coroner erred in refusing to disclose the Stalker/Sampson reports and related materials relevant to the credibility of police witnesses and similar fact evidence.
- Whether the PSNI was obliged to disclose two statements made by a police officer to the Police Ombudsman, and whether the Coroner erred in refusing to admit related evidence.
- Whether the Coroner’s decision to conduct the inquest with a jury was lawful and compatible with Article 2 ECHR, considering risks of bias and perverse verdicts.
- Whether the Coroner erred in refusing to discharge a juror (Juror J) on grounds of apparent bias.
- Whether the Coroner’s directions to the jury and the questions posed were adequate to enable an Article 2 compliant determination of the circumstances of death.
- Whether the Coroner’s decisions on anonymity and screening of police witnesses were lawful and proportionate.
- Whether the involvement of former RUC Special Branch Officers in the disclosure process compromised the independence of the inquest and breached Article 2.
- Whether the delay in commencing and conducting the inquest was compatible with the requirement of promptness and reasonable expedition under Article 2 ECHR.
- Whether the statutory scheme requiring unanimous jury verdicts and juror anonymity is compatible with Article 2 ECHR.
Arguments of the Parties
Appellant's Arguments
- The Stalker/Sampson reports were relevant and should have been disclosed to the applicant and allowed to be used in cross-examination to challenge credibility and as similar fact evidence.
- The PSNI had a legitimate expectation to disclose all documents given to the Coroner, including the two statements by Officer AA to the Police Ombudsman, which were withheld.
- The Coroner’s decision to conduct the inquest with a jury was inappropriate due to the real risk of perverse verdicts arising from sectarian loyalties and the requirement of unanimous verdicts combined with juror anonymity.
- The Coroner should have discharged Juror J on grounds of apparent bias following a note indicating the juror considered the inquest unfair, particularly to the police.
- The Coroner’s directions and questions to the jury were inadequate to ensure an Article 2 compliant verdict.
- Orders granting anonymity and screening to police witnesses undermined the effectiveness of the inquest by preventing independent inquiries, confusing the jury, and restricting public scrutiny.
- The involvement of former Special Branch Officers in the disclosure process compromised the independence of the investigation.
- The delay in commencing the inquest was unjustified and incompatible with Article 2.
- The statutory requirement for unanimous jury verdicts and juror anonymity is incompatible with Article 2 and should be replaced with majority verdicts.
Respondent and Notice Parties' Arguments
- The Coroner and PSNI accepted some relevance of the Stalker/Sampson reports but contended that the disclosed statements of Officers M and V sufficed for cross-examination and that the reports contained opinion and conjecture reducing their utility.
- The PSNI contended the legitimate expectation to disclose documents applied only to pre-inquest disclosure and that the statements relating to the 2003 death were not information concerning the 1992 death.
- The Coroner exercised discretion lawfully in deciding to conduct the inquest with a jury, having applied safeguards including jury selection procedures and directions.
- The Coroner properly considered the note from Juror J and gave directions to address procedural concerns; no evidence indicated actual bias.
- Anonymity and screening decisions were proportionate responses to real and immediate risks to witnesses, balancing operational security and fairness.
- The involvement of former Special Branch Officers was limited to administrative and redaction functions under supervision, without investigatory role, preserving independence.
- The delay in the inquest was largely attributable to deficiencies in coronial law, government inaction, and the PSNI’s resistance to disclosure; the Coroner was not responsible for delay.
- The statutory scheme is compatible with Article 2 because the Coroner has discretion to discharge jurors and hold inquests without a jury if unanimity cannot be achieved.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent |
Rule or Principle Cited For |
Application by the Court |
| Bennett v UK (Application no. 5527/08) |
Clarification of the legal test for self-defence in inquests and compatibility with Article 2 ECHR. |
The court held that a domestic direction omitting "absolute necessity" can comply with Article 2 depending on facts; the Coroner’s directions were sufficient. |
| Chief Constable of PSNI's Application [2010] NIQB 66 |
Disclosure obligations of the police to the Coroner in inquests. |
The Coroner must direct disclosure of potentially relevant material; the police must obtain and assess documents for relevance. |
| McCaughey v Chief Constable of PSNI [2007] UKHL 14 |
Continuing obligation of police under Section 8 Coroners Act (NI) 1959 to disclose information. |
Police must furnish all relevant information to the Coroner; obligation is ongoing. |
| McCann and Others v UK (1995) 21 EHRR 97 |
Article 2 procedural obligation requiring effective investigation into deaths involving state agents. |
The inquest must be capable of leading to a determination whether force used was justified; investigation must be independent and effective. |
| O'Brien v Chief Constable of South Wales Police [2005] 2 AC 534 |
Rules governing admission of similar fact evidence and evidence affecting witness credibility. |
Two-stage test: relevance and control; judicial discretion applies to admissibility. |
| Porter v Magill [2002] 2 AC 357 |
Test for apparent bias in judicial and jury contexts. |
The court applies a two-stage test considering circumstances and whether a fair-minded observer would find a real possibility of bias. |
| In the matter of an application by Officers C, D, H & R [2012] NICA 47 |
Discretion of Coroner; operational duty under Article 2; anonymity and screening of witnesses. |
Coroner has wide discretion to regulate inquests; positive operational duty requires proportionate protective measures. |
| R (Middleton) v West Somerset Coroner [2004] 2 AC 182 |
Discretion of Coroner in framing jury questions and scope of inquest. |
Coroner’s choice of questions is entitled to deference; must allow for proper investigation of circumstances. |
| Hemsworth v UK (Application 58559/09) |
Requirement of promptness and reasonable expedition in investigations under Article 2. |
Delays in investigation may breach Article 2 even if not impacting efficacy; investigations must commence promptly. |
| Al Rawi and others v Security Service and others [2012] 1 AC 531 |
Legal principles governing private hearings and public access. |
Private hearings require court satisfaction; public interest immunity claims must be justified. |
| Re Guardian News and Media Limited [2010] 2 AC 697 |
Balancing public interest and confidentiality in court proceedings. |
Court must consider public interest in open justice against confidentiality claims. |
| Osborn v The Parole Board [2013] UKSC 61 |
Procedural fairness and bias. |
Fairness requires impartiality; court must apply domestic and Strasbourg law to assess bias. |
| Davidson v Scottish Ministers [2004] UKHL 34 |
Definition and test for actual bias. |
Actual bias is established by showing a factor preventing objective judgment on balance of probabilities. |
| R v McParland [2008] NIQB 1 |
Application of bias test in jury trials in Northern Ireland. |
Admonition to jurors to avoid conflict; prosecution’s duty to ensure impartiality; test includes any possibility of conflict. |
| Sander v The United Kingdom [2000] ECHR 194 |
Limits of judicial directions to change juror attitudes. |
Directions unlikely to change entrenched racist views overnight; real risks exist in certain jury contexts. |
| Conway v Rimmer [1968] AC 910 |
Principles governing public interest immunity claims. |
Courts must assess justification for withholding documents on public interest grounds. |
| Wiley [1995] 1 AC 274 |
Public interest immunity and disclosure. |
Affirms principles on balancing disclosure against public interest immunity. |
| R (Condron) v National Assembly of Wales [2007] 2 P & CR 4 |
Application of apparent bias test. |
Clarifies the fair-minded and informed observer test. |
| R v Edwards [1991] 1 WLR 207 |
Cross-examination and evidence as to witness credit. |
Limits on contradictory evidence on collateral issues to avoid distraction from main issue. |
| Jordan v United Kingdom (2003) 37 EHRR 2 |
Article 2 procedural obligations in investigations. |
Investigation must be effective, independent, prompt, and allow public scrutiny. |
| Nachova & others v Bulgaria (2006) 42 EHRR 43 |
Independence and effectiveness of investigations under Article 2. |
Investigators must be independent both in law and practice; investigations must be capable of leading to punishment. |
| R v Inner West London Coroner, ex parte Dallaglio [1994] 4 All ER 139 |
Role and discretion of Coroner in inquests. |
Coroner must ensure full, fair, and fearless investigation; discretion to regulate scope of inquiry. |
| R v Coroner for North Humberside and Scunthorpe, ex parte Jamieson [1995] QB 1 |
Duties of Coroner in investigations. |
Coroner must ensure facts are fully investigated and exposed to public scrutiny. |
| Evans v Bartlam [1937] AC 473 |
Limits on appeal from discretionary decisions. |
Appeal only allowed if discretion exercised under mistake of law or other relevant error. |
| Young v Thomas [1892] 2 Ch 134 |
Limits on appellate interference with discretion. |
Discretion must not be exercised in disregard of principle. |
| Egerton v Jones [1939] 3 All ER 889 |
Limits on appellate interference with discretion. |
Discretion must not be based on irrelevant matters. |
| G v G [1985] 1 WLR 647 |
Limits on appellate interference with discretion. |
Discretion must be within reasonable ambit. |
| Jordan v Lord Chancellor and Another [2007] UKHL 14 |
Jury verdicts in Northern Ireland inquests and Article 2 compliance. |
Juries may not return lawful/unlawful killing verdicts but must be able to find facts from which such conclusions can be drawn. |
| Re Bradley and Others Application [1995] NI 192 |
Factual findings in inquests relevant to justification of force. |
Findings can point strongly towards justifiable homicide. |
| Re Gribben [2012] NIQB 81 |
Judicial review of jury questions in inquests. |
Coroner’s choice of questions entitled to deference unless strong grounds shown. |
| Jordan's (Hugh) Application [2008] NIQB 148 |
Legitimate expectation in disclosure in inquests. |
Applicant had legitimate expectation of disclosure of all documents except those subject to privilege or public interest immunity. |
| McCaughey's (Brigid) Application (Leave Stage) (No 2) [2012] NIQB 23 |
Judicial review of Coroner’s exclusion of similar fact evidence. |
Decision to exclude evidence was demonstrable error and quashed. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The court conducted a detailed and structured analysis of the multiple grounds of challenge, applying established legal principles and relevant precedents to the facts of the case.
Regarding disclosure, the court emphasised the Coroner’s duty to direct disclosure of potentially relevant material and the police’s continuing obligation to obtain and provide such material under Section 8 of the Coroners Act (NI) 1959 and Article 2 ECHR. The court found that the Coroner’s refusal to disclose the Stalker/Sampson reports and the two statements made by Officer AA to the Police Ombudsman was irrational and contrary to the test of potential relevance. The court quashed the Coroner’s decisions on non-disclosure and the related verdict, holding that the applicant’s legitimate expectation of disclosure extended to these materials.
The court acknowledged that the Coroner exercised discretion in managing the inquest, including jury selection, directions, and anonymity orders. However, it found that the Coroner erred in deciding to conduct the inquest with a jury given the real risk of perverse verdicts arising from sectarian loyalties and the unanimity requirement combined with juror anonymity. The court applied the two-stage test for apparent bias to Juror J and concluded that the Coroner should have discharged this juror, quashing the decision not to do so and the verdict.
The Coroner’s questions to the jury and directions on self-defence were found to be legally sound and within his discretion, including the omission of the phrase "absolute necessity," which was not required in domestic law to comply with Article 2.
On anonymity and screening, the court recognized the operational duty to protect life under Article 2 and accepted the Coroner’s discretion to grant such measures where proportionate. It found no evidence that these decisions undermined the inquest’s effectiveness or fairness.
Regarding the involvement of former Special Branch Officers in the disclosure process, the court held that independence must be both legal and practical. It found that the roles of these officers were limited to administrative tasks under close supervision, with no investigatory function, and that sufficient safeguards were in place to maintain independence and avoid actual or apparent bias. The court rejected arguments that the Coroner had no responsibility or control over the personnel engaged by the Chief Constable.
On delay, the court accepted prior findings that most delay was caused by deficiencies in coronial law, government inaction, and resistance by the PSNI to disclosure. It found that the Coroner and Senior Coroner were not responsible for delay and dismissed the challenge against them. However, it granted a declaration against the PSNI for breaches of the Article 2 requirement of promptness and reasonable expedition, indicating the PSNI created or failed to respond appropriately to obstacles.
Finally, the court addressed the statutory scheme requiring unanimous jury verdicts and juror anonymity. It held that the scheme is compatible with Article 2, as the Coroner has discretion to discharge jurors and conduct inquests without a jury if unanimity cannot be reached or bias arises. The breach, if any, arises from the Coroner’s exercise of discretion rather than the statute itself.
Holding and Implications
The court quashed the verdict of the inquest. It quashed multiple decisions of the Coroner, including the refusal to disclose the Stalker/Sampson reports and Police Ombudsman statements, the decision to conduct the inquest with a jury, the decision not to discharge Juror J, and the acceptance of the jury verdict. The court also quashed the PSNI’s decision not to disclose certain statements and issued an order of mandamus compelling disclosure within 14 days on a confidential basis.
The court dismissed challenges to the Coroner’s decisions on anonymity and screening of witnesses and to the involvement of former Special Branch Officers in the disclosure process, finding those decisions lawful and proportionate with adequate safeguards.
The court granted a declaration that the PSNI breached the Article 2 obligation of promptness and reasonable expedition in the conduct of the inquest and indicated it would hear further submissions on damages and the form of declarations.
The court emphasized that the statutory provisions relating to jury unanimity and juror anonymity are compatible with Article 2, and that any incompatibility arises from the Coroner’s exercise of discretion, which must be properly applied.
No new precedent was established beyond the application of existing legal principles to the facts of this case. The judgment clarifies the obligations of the Coroner and the police in legacy inquests, particularly regarding disclosure, jury management, and the independence of investigative processes.