Qureshi v Victoria University Of Manchester & Anor

Factual and Procedural Background

This appeal concerns two sets of applications presented by the Plaintiff against Company A and an individual associated with it, Professor B, relating to alleged race discrimination and victimisation under the Race Relations Act 1976. The first application, supported by the Commission for Racial Equality, was presented in January 1993, complaining of discrimination and victimisation linked to a decision in October 1992 not to support the Plaintiff’s promotion to Senior Lecturer. The Plaintiff alleged victimisation also due to a prior complaint about racial discrimination in recruitment practices and additional unfavourable treatment at faculty meetings.

The second application, presented in January 1994, concerned a decision in October 1993 by Professor B, in his capacity as Dean, not to recommend the Plaintiff for promotion, citing unsatisfactory referee reports. This application included allegations of victimisation through excessive teaching duties, denial of grievance procedures, rejection of study leave, scrutiny of examination papers, and external advertisement of a relevant post.

Both applications were heard together by the Industrial Tribunal at Manchester over 15 days in 1994. The Tribunal issued extended reasons of 70 pages, concluding by majority that neither Company A nor Professor B directly discriminated or victimised the Plaintiff on racial grounds or for bringing proceedings, except that Professor B had subjected the Plaintiff to detriment by rejecting a complaint of failure to sponsor promotion, an act deemed victimisation. Issues of remedy were adjourned.

The Plaintiff appealed, arguing numerous grounds of legal error and misapplication of law, while Company A and Professor B cross-appealed against the finding of victimisation by Professor B. The appeal Tribunal heard detailed submissions and reviewed the Tribunal’s approach and findings.

Legal Issues Presented

1. Whether the Industrial Tribunal erred in law by adopting a piecemeal approach to the Plaintiff’s complaints of race discrimination and victimisation, failing to consider the cumulative effect of the evidence.
2. Whether the Tribunal correctly applied the principles of vicarious liability under section 32(1) of the Race Relations Act 1976 regarding acts done by an employee in the course of employment.
3. Whether the Tribunal’s findings on the alleged victimisation by Professor B were reasonable and lawful.
4. What is the appropriate approach for Industrial Tribunals in assessing claims of institutional racial discrimination involving circumstantial and evidentiary facts over a period of time.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

• The Industrial Tribunal wrongly fragmented the Plaintiff’s complaints, addressing each allegation individually without considering the overall context or the cumulative effect of the facts.
• This piecemeal approach made it practically impossible to infer that race or victimisation was an operative or effective cause of the less favourable treatment.
• The Tribunal’s approach failed to properly apply the legal principles governing the drawing of inferences from primary facts in race discrimination cases.
• The Tribunal misapplied the law on vicarious liability by not attributing Professor B’s act of victimisation to Company A.
• The Tribunal’s failure to consider the totality of evidence undermined the Plaintiff’s ability to prove his case on the balance of probabilities.

Respondents' Arguments

• The allegations of racial discrimination and victimisation were emphatically denied.
• The Tribunal’s findings, including the rejection of the victimisation claim against Professor B, were reasonable and supported by evidence.
• The Tribunal was correct to assess each allegation on its own facts and not to conflate evidentiary incidents with complaints forming the basis of jurisdiction.
• The failure by Professor B to investigate the complaint of discrimination did not constitute victimisation or unlawful discrimination.
• The Tribunal’s approach was consistent with the limits of its jurisdiction and evidential requirements.

Table of Precedents Cited

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court found that the Industrial Tribunal erred in law by adopting a fragmented, piecemeal approach to the Plaintiff’s complaints of race discrimination and victimisation. Instead of considering the cumulative weight and overall context of the evidence, the Tribunal treated each allegation in isolation and concluded on each without integrating the primary facts into a holistic inference regarding racial grounds or victimisation.

This approach was inconsistent with established legal principles, notably those articulated in King v. Great Britain China Centre and Chapman v. Simon, which require tribunals to assess the totality of evidence and draw just and equitable inferences from the primary facts. The Court highlighted the difficulties complainants face in proving racial discrimination, especially in institutional contexts where direct evidence is rare, and stressed the importance of tribunals properly managing circumstantial and evidentiary facts.

The Court also addressed the issue of vicarious liability under section 32(1) of the Race Relations Act 1976, noting that acts done by an employee in the course of employment are attributable to the employer. The Tribunal’s failure to apply this principle consistently was identified as an error of law.

Regarding the cross-appeal on the finding of victimisation by Professor B, the Court accepted that if the Plaintiff’s appeal succeeded on the broader grounds of law, the cross-appeal would also succeed, necessitating a reconsideration of that finding.

Consequently, the Court concluded that the appeal and cross-appeal should be allowed and the case remitted for rehearing by a differently constituted Industrial Tribunal, with guidance on the correct approach to evidence, issues, and inferences in race discrimination cases.

Holding and Implications

The Court ALLOWED the Plaintiff’s appeal and the Respondents’ cross-appeal, setting aside the previous Tribunal’s findings and ordering a rehearing before a differently constituted Tribunal.

The direct effect is that the prior findings on discrimination and victimisation are vacated pending a new hearing. The Court provided detailed guidance on the proper approach to handling complex institutional race discrimination claims, emphasizing the need to consider the totality of facts and avoid a fragmented analysis.

No new precedent was established beyond reaffirming and clarifying existing principles governing the assessment of race discrimination and victimisation claims under the Race Relations Act 1976.