Awua, R (on the application of) v Brent London Borough Council

Factual and Procedural Background

The Appellant arrived in the United Kingdom from Ghana in 1980. From 1988 to 1991 she co-habited with a partner in The City, where they had two children. When her partner expelled her while she was pregnant with their second child, she sought assistance from Company B (a local housing authority with which she had a connection). On 7 October 1991, Company B concluded that she was homeless, in priority need and not intentionally homeless, thereby accepting a full housing duty under section 65(2) of the Housing Act 1985.

Company B initially placed the Appellant in a hotel and, from 31 January 1992, in a two-bedroom flat at [Number] Clarendon Road. Pursuant to its one-offer policy, Company B later arranged that Company C offer her another flat at [Number] Jellicoe House. After inspecting it, the Appellant refused the offer. This refusal discharged Company B’s duty and the Appellant received notice to quit the Clarendon Road flat.

The Appellant then applied to Company A, another authority with which she had a local connection. After investigation, Company A found her to be homeless and in priority need but intentionally homeless, reasoning that her refusal of the Jellicoe House offer caused her eviction from Clarendon Road. It therefore limited assistance to the duty contained in section 65(3).

The Appellant sought judicial review. A single judge quashed Company A’s decision, holding that her former accommodation was “temporary” and therefore could not constitute “accommodation” for the purpose of intentional homelessness. The Court of Appeal reinstated the intentional-homelessness finding, deciding that the Clarendon Road flat counted as accommodation even if temporary. The Appellant appealed to the House of Lords.

Legal Issues Presented

1. Whether, for the purposes of sections 58 and 60 of the Housing Act 1985, the word “accommodation” is confined to “settled” or “permanent” housing.
2. Whether Company A lawfully concluded that the Appellant became intentionally homeless when she ceased to occupy the Clarendon Road flat after refusing a suitable offer.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

• “Accommodation” under sections 58 and 60 must be “settled”; temporary housing cannot ground a finding of intentional homelessness.
• Consequently, ceasing to occupy the Clarendon Road flat did not fall within section 60(1), and the intentional-homelessness finding was unlawful.

Respondent's Arguments

• The statute draws no distinction between settled and temporary housing; any place reasonably occupiable qualifies as “accommodation.”
• The Appellant deliberately refused a suitable offer and, as a result, ceased to occupy accommodation reasonably available to her, satisfying section 60(1).

Table of Precedents Cited

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

Delivering the only full speech, Judge Hoffmann (with whom the other Law Lords agreed) provided a detailed statutory construction:

• Statutory Language. Sections 58 and 60 use the term “accommodation” without qualification; importing a “settled home” requirement is unsupported by text.
• Symmetry of Provisions. Amendments creating section 58(2A) (reasonableness to continue occupation) align the definition of homelessness with intentional homelessness. Physical suitability, not permanence, is the touchstone.
• Re-examination of Case Law. Earlier authorities invoking “settled” accommodation arose in causation contexts (e.g., Dyson) and should not redefine accommodation generally.
• Policy Considerations. Requiring permanence would blur the line between emergency duties to the homeless and broader housing-allocation functions, contrary to Lord Brightman’s guidance in Puhlhofer.
• Practicality. The permanence doctrine has produced artificial constructs such as “discharging the duty in stages” and inconsistent outcomes; abandoning it restores clarity.
• Application to Facts. The Clarendon Road flat was accommodation reasonably available for the Appellant’s occupation pending the Jellicoe House move. Her deliberate refusal directly caused her loss of that housing, satisfying section 60(1). Hypothetical alternative scenarios (e.g., what would have happened had she accepted the offer) are irrelevant under Din.

Holding and Implications

Appeal dismissed.

Consequently, the Respondent’s determination that the Appellant was intentionally homeless stands. The House of Lords clarifies that “accommodation” under the Housing Act 1985 does not require permanence or a “settled” quality; what matters is physical suitability and reasonableness to continue occupation. This ruling removes the previously perceived obligation on local authorities to secure permanent housing for unintentionally homeless applicants, thereby reshaping homelessness practice without creating new precedent outside statutory construction.