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Anm Group Ltd v. Gilcomston North Ltd & Ors
Factual and Procedural Background
The Plaintiff owns and operates an agricultural centre and auction mart known as the Thainstone Centre, comprising interconnected spaces including a concourse, lairage, and a former general purposes hall (demolished in 2003 and excluded from the present claim). The Defendants, involved in the design and construction of the Centre in the late 1980s and early 1990s, include architects (third Defendants), consulting engineers (fourth Defenders), and contractors (second Defenders and first Defenders as subcontractors). The Plaintiff claims substantial damages relating to widespread roofing failures affecting the concourse and lairage. The Defendants deny liability and assert that the claim is barred by the five-year prescription under the Prescription and Limitation (Scotland) Act 1973. A preliminary proof on prescription has been conducted in two stages, with evidence heard in 2006 and 2008.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the requirements of section 11(1) of the Prescription and Limitation (Scotland) Act 1973 were satisfied to commence the running of prescription more than five years before the action's initiation in 2002, considering the cause and progression of the roofing problems.
- If prescription began to run earlier, whether its running was delayed under section 11(3) due to the Plaintiff's lack of awareness, despite reasonable diligence, of the loss or damage caused by the Defendants' acts or defaults.
- Whether the running of prescription was delayed or interrupted under section 6(4) due to error on the Plaintiff's part induced by the third Defendants as professional advisers after roofing problems emerged.
Arguments of the Parties
Defenders' Arguments
- Material roofing problems were known to the Plaintiff by late 1996/early 1997, starting the running of prescription at that time, which was more than five years before the action.
- The nature and cause of these problems were substantially identical throughout the Centre.
- The Plaintiff was, or could have been with reasonable diligence, aware of all relevant matters by April 1997.
- The Plaintiff was never under error regarding these matters, nor was any error induced by the third Defendants.
- The roofing problems were serious and progressive, with evidence of cracking and failure from as early as 1992 and 1996.
- The roofing of the Centre should be considered as a single entity (unum quid) for prescription purposes.
- Prescription should not be fragmented by minor differences or separate areas of the roof.
Pursuers' Arguments
- Although aware of roofing problems in the general purposes hall from late 1996, the Plaintiff did not appreciate a cause of action until later dates between late 1997 and 1999 for the concourse and lairage.
- The present claim excludes the general purposes hall and focuses only on the concourse and lairage.
- The Plaintiff was not aware, and could not with reasonable diligence have been aware, of the loss and damage caused by the Defendants within the five-year period before raising the action.
- Any error in awareness was induced by the third Defendants, preventing prescription from running.
- Each area of the roof should be treated separately for prescription purposes due to differences in construction and problems.
- The Plaintiff acted reasonably and responsibly by placing matters in the hands of the third Defendants for investigation and advice.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| BP Exploration Operating Co Ltd v Chevron Shipping Co 2002 SC (HL) 19 | Onus of proof regarding prima facie prescription under section 11(1) lies with the party pleading prescription. | The court accepted that the Defenders bore the onus of proving prima facie prescription, while the Plaintiff bore the onus regarding exceptions under sections 11(3) and 6(4). |
| Sinclair v MacDougall Estates Limited 1994 S.L.T. 76 | Recognition that different breaches and damages occurring at different times may warrant separate prescriptive periods. | The court considered this principle in allowing for separate treatment of distinct defaults and damages. |
| Strathclyde Regional Council v WA Fairhurst & Partners 1997 S.L.T. 658 | Clarification of onus of proof for prescription and acceptance that Defenders must prove facts justifying prescription. | The court followed this decision to allocate the burden of proof accordingly. |
| Britannia Building Society v Clarke 2001 S.L.T. 1355 | Affirmation of Plaintiff's onus to prove lack of awareness under section 11(3). | The court endorsed this allocation of onus in the present case. |
| Pirelli General Cable Works Limited v Oscar Faber & Partners 1983 2 A.C. 1 | Judicial admission can relieve parties from further proof of prescription. | The court found no such admission in the pleadings and rejected arguments to that effect. |
| Ross v Associated Portland Cement Manufacturers Limited 1964 1 WLR 768 | Where a party leads no evidence, adverse inferences may be drawn in favor of the opposing party. | The court applied this principle regarding the Defenders' failure to lead evidence on awareness. |
| O'Donnell v Murdoch McKenzie & Co. Limited 1967 S.C. (H.L.) 63 | Inferences favorable to the party leading evidence may be drawn when the opposing party leads none. | The court held no obligation to draw inferences where none were justified but accepted the principle generally. |
| Sinclair, Cole v Lonie 2001 S.C. 610, Musselburgh & Fisherrow Co-operative Society Limited v Mowlem (Scotland) Limited 2004 SCLR 412 | Multiple discrete incidents of loss or damage from separate defaults may have independent prescriptive periods. | The court adopted this approach, allowing for separate prescription periods for distinct defects. |
| Greater Glasgow Health Board v Baxter Clark & Paul 1990 S.C. 237 | Awareness of some loss caused by negligence starts prescription, even if identity of responsible party is unknown. | The court followed this interpretation regarding awareness and start of prescription. |
| Kirk Care Housing Association v Crerar & Partners (1995, unreported) | Awareness of loss caused by negligence is required to start prescription; identity of wrongdoer not necessary. | The court endorsed this view in construing section 11(3). |
| Glasper v Rodger 1996 S.L.T. 44 | Awareness must include knowledge that loss was caused by negligence to start prescription. | The court accepted this as binding authority. |
| GA Estates Limited v Caviapen Trustees Limited 1993 S.L.T. 1051 | Separate contractual warranties may prescribe independently. | The court applied this to support distinct treatment of claims. |
| Dunlop v McGowans 1980 SC (HL) 73 | Obligation to make reparation is indivisible; prescription runs from initial concurrence of damnum and iniuria. | The court distinguished this case to support multiple prescriptive periods for distinct defaults. |
| Murphy v Brentwood District Council 1991 AC 398 | Distinction between pure economic loss and physical damage; discussion on cause of action accrual. | The court noted this case but found it did not alter the approach to multiple prescriptive periods. |
| Stevenson v Pontifex and Wood 1887 15 R. 125, Aberdeen Development Co v Mackie, Ramsay and Taylor 1977 S.L.T. 177 | All losses flowing from the same iniuria must be sued for in one action; separate defaults may give rise to separate actions. | The court relied on these cases to confirm the legitimacy of multiple actions for distinct defaults. |
| Watson v Fram Reinforced Concrete Co (Scotland) Limited and Another 1960 S.C. (H.L.) 92 | Prescription provisions should be construed to avoid extinguishing causes of action before they arise. | The court invoked this principle in construing section 11. |
| Kaye Limited v Hosier & Dickinson Limited 1972 1 W.L.R. 146 | Legal liability of contractors arises at practical completion or final certificate. | The court held that iniuria coincided with the issue of the final certificate in 1993. |
| Homburg Houtimport BV v Agrosin Private Limited 2004 1 AC 715 | Loss must be more than insignificant to constitute cause of action; new exacerbations of known problems do not create new causes. | The court applied this test to the roofing defects. |
| Inco Europe Limited v First Choice Distributors Limited 2000 I.L.L.R. 467 | Limits on courts reading additional words into statutes; interpretation must reflect true legislative intent. | The court rejected the Defenders' argument that actionability was improperly read into section 11(3). |
| Invercargill City Council v Hamlin 1996 AC 624 | Physical damage must be manifest and more than insignificant to trigger cause of action. | The court found roofing damage exceeded this threshold by 1996. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The court began by examining the onus of proof, confirming that the Defenders bore the burden to establish prima facie prescription under section 11(1), while the Plaintiff bore the burden for exceptions under sections 11(3) and 6(4). The court rejected arguments that the Plaintiff's pleadings constituted judicial admission of prescription.
Regarding the statutory framework, the court analyzed the meaning of "loss, injury or damage caused by an act, neglect or default" under section 11, emphasizing that prescription runs from the date when such loss occurs and is actionable. The court accepted established case law that multiple distinct defaults causing separate damage may have independent prescriptive periods, but minor differences or developments of the same defect do not warrant separate treatment.
The court considered the evidence of roofing defects, noting expert testimony that serious, progressive damage was evident by 1992 and 1996, including widespread cracking and water ingress, particularly in the general purposes hall. The court held that the roofing of the Centre should be treated as a single entity (unum quid) for prescription purposes, rejecting the Plaintiff's argument for separate treatment of different roof areas.
On awareness under section 11(3), the court found that the Plaintiff was aware of serious roofing problems affecting the Centre by late 1996, particularly the general purposes hall, which triggers prescription for the entire roof. However, the Plaintiff was not aware, and could not with reasonable diligence have been aware, that the damage was caused by an actionable default before the critical dates. The court accepted that the Plaintiff reasonably relied on the third Defenders for investigation and advice and that the Defenders’ failure to provide timely advice induced error, delaying the Plaintiff's awareness.
The court rejected the Defenders' contention that the Plaintiff had sufficient knowledge to start prescription, emphasizing the lack of concrete knowledge of legal responsibility and the ongoing investigation during the relevant period. The court found the third Defenders’ conduct, including delay and advice suggesting no legal obligation, contributed to the Plaintiff’s error and delayed action.
Consequently, the court concluded that the Plaintiff's claims had not prescribed under the Act due to the exceptions under sections 11(3) and 6(4), with the Defenders failing to prove otherwise.
Holding and Implications
The court repelled the pleas of prescription raised by the Defenders and allowed a proof before answer to proceed.
This decision means that the Plaintiff’s claims are not barred by the five-year prescription period due to the Plaintiff’s lack of awareness and induced error caused by the third Defenders. The case will proceed to further examination of the merits. No new legal precedent was established; rather, the court applied and clarified existing principles regarding prescription, awareness, and induced error in the context of complex construction defects.
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