Rush v Police Service of Northern Ireland & Anor

Factual and Procedural Background

The Plaintiff brought an action against the Defendants alleging negligence related to the bombing on 15 August 1998 in a town in Northern Ireland, resulting in the death of an individual and damage to business premises. The Statement of Claim asserted that the bomb was planted by a proscribed terrorist organisation, which had been infiltrated by an informer providing intelligence to security forces. The Plaintiff alleged that the Defendants had contemporaneous knowledge of the bombers' movements and target through intercepted communications but failed to act to prevent the bombing or to implement an effective evacuation strategy. The Defendants applied to have the Statement of Claim struck out pursuant to Order 18, Rule 19(1) of the Rules of the Court of Judicature (Northern Ireland) 1980 on the grounds that it disclosed no reasonable cause of action and/or was frivolous or vexatious. The Master ordered dismissal of the Plaintiff's action, and the Plaintiff appealed that decision.

Legal Issues Presented

1. Whether the amended Statement of Claim discloses a reasonable cause of action against the Defendants for negligence related to their alleged failure to prevent or mitigate the bombing.
2. Whether the Statement of Claim is frivolous or vexatious and thus an abuse of the court's process.
3. Whether exceptions to the core principle established in Hill v Chief Constable of West Yorkshire exist such that the Defendants owed a duty of care to the Plaintiff under the pleaded circumstances.
4. The applicability and scope of statutory provisions under the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 (RIPA) regarding disclosure of intercepted communications in the proceedings.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

• The Defendants had actual knowledge of the bombers' route, target, and timing through intercepted mobile communications.
• The Defendants failed to apprehend the bombers or implement an effective evacuation strategy despite precise intelligence.
• The Defendants' actions or omissions constituted negligence amounting to an exception to the core principle that police owe no duty of care in such circumstances.
• The evidence to be adduced includes telephone billing, movement of vehicles, and general intelligence beyond intercept material, potentially falling outside RIPA restrictions.
• The Plaintiff contended that the Hill principle should be revisited in light of the distinct nature and scale of the crime and its impact on the peace process.

Respondents' Arguments

• The amended Statement of Claim discloses no reasonable cause of action and is frivolous and vexatious.
• The allegations of foreknowledge by Defendants were based solely on a television programme and have been discredited by an official review by the Intelligence Services Commissioner.
• The official review concluded that no intelligence existed indicating a bomb attack on the date and location, and that real-time tracking of mobile phones as depicted was impossible in 1998.
• The Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 prohibits disclosure of intercepted communications in such proceedings, limiting the evidence available to the Plaintiff.

Table of Precedents Cited

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court began by reaffirming the core principle from Hill v Chief Constable of West Yorkshire that the police generally owe no duty of care to individuals in the prevention and investigation of crime absent special circumstances. The court acknowledged the existence of exceptions to this principle, as recognized in subsequent case law, particularly where the police have assumed responsibility or where operational decisions cause direct harm.

The court carefully considered the pleadings, which alleged that the Defendants had actual and precise foreknowledge of the bombing through intercepted communications, a circumstance distinguishable from cases where police must interpret or assess reports from the public. The court found it at least arguable that this foreknowledge and failure to act could amount to an exception to the Hill principle, potentially constituting "outrageous negligence" or exceptional circumstances warranting a duty of care.

The court rejected the Defendants' contention that the claim was frivolous or vexatious, noting that the allegations were not so clearly unsustainable as to constitute an abuse of process. The court also recognized the limitations imposed by the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 on the disclosure of intercept evidence but acknowledged that other forms of evidence might be admissible. The court declined to engage in detailed evidential analysis at this preliminary stage, emphasizing the need for disclosure and trial to resolve factual disputes.

Accordingly, the court reversed the decision of the Master to strike out the claim on the basis that it disclosed no reasonable cause of action and found the claim was not frivolous or vexatious at this stage.

Holding and Implications

The court held that the appeal against the striking out of the Plaintiff's claim should be allowed. The decision of the Master Bell to dismiss the action pursuant to Order 18, Rule 19(1)(a) and (b) was reversed. The summons was dismissed, and costs were reserved to the trial judge, with the Plaintiff's costs to be taxed under legal aid legislation.

The direct consequence is that the Plaintiff's claim proceeds to trial, allowing fuller examination of the factual and legal issues raised. The court did not establish any new legal precedent but emphasized the need for caution in applying the Hill principle at the strike-out stage and acknowledged that exceptions to that principle remain open for consideration on the facts. The ruling underscores the principle that cases involving complex issues of public policy and alleged police negligence with precise foreknowledge should not be prematurely dismissed without full factual inquiry.