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AM v. The Secretary of State
Factual and Procedural Background
This appeal concerns a claimant who was awarded the lower rate of the mobility component and the highest rate of the care component of Disability Living Allowance (DLA) from 12 March 2004 to 11 March 2007. In 2006, during this award period, the claimant married her appointee. A renewal claim submitted in late 2006, through the appointee, was successful, extending the same rates of benefit for a further five years until 11 March 2012.
On 12 June 2010, following an investigation, the award was superseded with effect from 12 July 2008, determining that the claimant no longer satisfied the conditions for either component from that date. It was concluded that the claimant’s mobility and care needs had diminished or ceased, resulting in an overpayment of £7,403.50, which was recoverable from the appointee.
Both the claimant and the appointee appealed the decision. Prior to the appeal hearing, the appointee was charged under section 112(1D) of the Social Security Administration Act 1992 for failing to notify the Secretary of State of a change in circumstances affecting the claimant’s entitlement to DLA, specifically that her capabilities had improved between 16 July 2008 and 25 May 2010. The precise extent of the improvement and its impact on entitlement were not detailed in the charge.
There was ambiguity as to whether the appointee pleaded guilty or not guilty at trial, but he was ultimately convicted and received a 12-month conditional discharge.
The tribunal rejected the appeal, identifying only the appointee as a party, though it acknowledged that he was appealing on behalf of the claimant. The tribunal held that absent fresh evidence undermining the conviction, the appointee’s conviction barred the appeal.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the appointee’s criminal conviction constitutes a conclusive bar to the appeals against the supersession and overpayment decisions.
- To what extent can a tribunal in social security appeals rely on or challenge a criminal conviction when determining benefit entitlement.
- Whether the claimant, who was not a party to the criminal proceedings, is bound by the appointee’s conviction in relation to her benefit entitlement.
- The scope of public policy limitations on challenging a criminal conviction in civil or inquisitorial social security proceedings.
- The proper approach to the burden of proof and evidential weight of criminal convictions in social security tribunals where strict rules of evidence do not apply.
Arguments of the Parties
The opinion does not contain a detailed account of the parties' legal arguments.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| R(U) 24/55 | Criminal convictions are generally treated as conclusive proof of the act or omission constituting the offence, except in very exceptional cases. | The court examined the limits of reliance on criminal convictions in social security appeals, noting that convictions carry considerable probative weight but are not always determinative. |
| R(S) 10/79 | A conviction may be disregarded if the evidence on appeal is plainly inconsistent with the grounds for conviction, especially where the evidence underlying the conviction is unknown. | The court acknowledged this principle but emphasised that tribunals should generally give weight to convictions unless exceptional evidence is presented. |
| R(S) 2/80 | Disagreed with earlier authorities that a conviction shifts the legal burden of proof in social security tribunals; the conviction may shift only the evidential burden. | The court rejected the view that convictions change the legal burden of proof in tribunals and clarified the proper evidential role of convictions. |
| Stupple v Royal Insurance Co Ltd [1971] 1 Q.B. 50 | In civil proceedings, the burden of proof may shift to a convicted person to prove innocence on a balance of probabilities. | Referenced to explain the difference between civil courts and social security tribunals regarding burden of proof and evidential weight. |
| Caine v Palace Steam Shipping Co. [1907] 1 KB 670 | A conviction does not constitute res judicata in civil proceedings involving different parties; estoppel requires mutuality. | Used to support that the claimant is not bound by the appointee’s criminal conviction as she was not a party to those proceedings. |
| Hollington v Hewthorn & Co. Ltd. [1943] KB 587 | Evidence of convictions is inadmissible in civil proceedings because the conviction represents only the opinion of the criminal court and lacks probative value. | The court acknowledged this principle but noted it was overruled for courts by the Civil Evidence Act 1968; however, it remains relevant for tribunals where strict rules of evidence do not apply. |
| Hunter v Chief Constable of the West Midlands Police [1982] AC 529 | It is generally against public policy to use civil proceedings to collaterally attack a final criminal conviction. | The court applied this public policy principle to social security appeals, limiting attempts to challenge convictions absent new compelling evidence. |
| Adamson v Waveney DC [1997] 2 All ER 898 | A convicted person can be heard to argue that convictions are irrelevant or should not jeopardise their application due to age, circumstances, or seriousness. | The court accepted that tribunals should consider the context and circumstances of convictions when assessing their impact. |
| Nottingham City Council v Farooq [1998] EWHC Admin 991 | Civil appeal courts are not entitled to review the merits of criminal convictions. | Supported the principle that criminal convictions should not be re-litigated in civil or social security proceedings. |
| R v Greater Birmingham Supplementary Benefit Appeal Tribunal ex p. Khan [1979] 3 All ER 759 | Tribunals are not bound strictly by the rules of evidence but must consider only probative material relevant to the case. | Clarified that tribunals must assess evidence for probative value, even if strict evidential rules do not apply. |
| R v Deputy Industrial Injuries Commissioner ex p. Moore [1965] 1 QB 456 | Emphasises the need for evidence to have probative value even where strict rules of evidence do not apply. | Supported the principle that tribunals must rely on logically probative evidence. |
| Mahon v Air New Zealand [1984] AC 808 | Similar emphasis on probative value of evidence in proceedings where strict rules of evidence do not apply. | Reinforced the principle that evidence must be probative for tribunals to rely upon it. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The court began by noting the procedural history, including the appellant’s criminal conviction related to failure to notify a change in circumstances affecting benefit entitlement. It clarified that the claimant, who was not a party to the criminal proceedings, is not bound by the appointee’s conviction and that the tribunal must independently determine her entitlement based on the evidence before it.
The court examined the legal principles surrounding the evidential and legal effect of criminal convictions in social security appeals. It reviewed prior case law, noting that tribunals must generally treat convictions as having considerable probative weight but are not strictly bound by them, especially where new or conflicting evidence exists.
The court rejected the notion that a criminal conviction shifts the legal burden of proof in social security tribunals, although it may shift the evidential burden. It emphasised that tribunals operate under inquisitorial procedures without strict rules of evidence and must assess probative value carefully.
The court discussed public policy considerations, reaffirming that it is generally impermissible for a party to use civil or social security proceedings to collaterally attack a criminal conviction, unless there is convincing new evidence undermining the conviction. However, it acknowledged an exception for specialist tribunals with expertise in social security law to make independent findings on benefit entitlement, potentially differing from the criminal court’s conclusions.
Applying these principles, the court held that the tribunal should consider the evidence and admissions underlying the appointee’s conviction but is not bound by the conviction itself in determining the claimant’s benefit entitlement. The tribunal must also consider the overpayment recovery against the appointee in light of the claimant’s entitlement and the benefit actually received.
The court further clarified that the tribunal may have regard to the conviction as evidence, notwithstanding statutory provisions limiting consideration of circumstances arising after the decision date, analogous to medical evidence post-dating a decision.
Holding and Implications
The appeal was ALLOWED. The decision of the First-tier Tribunal was set aside, and the case was remitted to be reheard by a new tribunal in accordance with the directions provided.
The direct effect of this decision is that the claimant’s benefit entitlement must be reconsidered independently of the appointee’s criminal conviction, with the tribunal applying the legal principles outlined. The appointee’s conviction is relevant evidence but not determinative. The ruling clarifies the proper approach to criminal convictions in social security appeals but does not establish new precedent beyond the application of established principles to the facts.
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