Contains public sector information licensed under the Open Justice Licence v1.0.
IC v. Dransfield
Factual and Procedural Background
The Plaintiff made a Freedom of Information Act 2000 (FOIA) request to Company A seeking approved design drawings for a pedestrian bridge and lightning protection system test results. Company A refused the request as vexatious under section 14(1) of FOIA. The Information Commissioner issued a Decision Notice upholding the refusal. The Plaintiff appealed to the First-tier Tribunal (FTT), which allowed the appeal, ruling the request was not vexatious and ordered disclosure. The Information Commissioner was granted permission to appeal to the Upper Tribunal. The Upper Tribunal allowed the appeal by the Information Commissioner, set aside the FTT's decision, and re-made the decision dismissing the Plaintiff's appeal, holding the request was vexatious.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the First-tier Tribunal correctly applied the legal test under section 14(1) of FOIA to determine if the Plaintiff's request was vexatious.
- What is the proper legal meaning and application of "vexatious request" under section 14(1) of FOIA.
- Whether the particular FOIA request in question was vexatious considering the previous course of dealings between the Plaintiff and Company A.
Arguments of the Parties
Information Commissioner's Arguments
- The term "vexatious" should be given its ordinary, natural meaning within the statutory context of FOIA.
- The test involves a flexible balancing exercise considering whether the request is likely to cause distress, disruption, or irritation without proper or justified cause.
- The five factors in the Information Commissioner's Guidance (obsessiveness, harassment/distress, significant burden, disruption/annoyance, lack of serious purpose or value) are useful but not exhaustive or binding.
- Context and history of previous dealings are crucial; even a benign request may be vexatious if it forms part of a burdensome pattern.
- The FTT erred by drawing an incorrect distinction that only requests continuing the same complaint could be vexatious.
- The FTT failed to consider material factors such as the burden on the public authority and the Plaintiff's intemperate allegations.
Company A's Arguments
- Tribunals generally apply the correct approach summarised by the considerations identified in prior FTT decisions.
- The FTT in this case failed to apply the proper balancing exercise and erred in law.
- The distinction drawn by the FTT between requests linked by the same complaint and those only sharing subject matter is unworkable and would cause disputes.
- The FTT's decision was perverse given the unchallenged evidence of burden and conduct.
- Decision makers must weigh all relevant factors and may properly find a single factor outweighs others.
Plaintiff's Arguments
- The Plaintiff argued he was reasonable and that Company A and the Information Commissioner were vexatious.
- He criticized the conduct of Company A and the Information Commissioner but acknowledged the relevance of context and history.
- The Plaintiff claimed the previous FOIA requests were "ghost documents" not produced in evidence.
- He contended the FTT's decision restored his faith in FOIA and that his language was not abusive.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Camden LBC v Information Commissioner [2012] UKUT 190 (AAC) | First-tier Tribunal decisions on section 14(1) are persuasive but not binding precedents. | Used to explain the limited precedential value of prior FTT decisions and caution against elevating factual findings to legal principles. |
| Hampshire County Council v JP (SEN) [2009] UKUT 239 (AAC) | One FTT decision cannot bind another; FTT decisions are fact-specific and persuasive only. | Reinforced the non-binding nature of FTT decisions on vexatious requests. |
| Pinner v Everett [1969] 1 WLR 1266 | Statutory interpretation principle that words should be given their ordinary, natural meaning. | Supported the approach to interpreting "vexatious" in its ordinary meaning within FOIA. |
| R (D and Another) v Secretary of State for Work and Pensions [2010] EWCA Civ 18 | Adoption of ordinary natural meaning in statutory interpretation. | Supported the application of the plain meaning rule to the word "vexatious". |
| Wise v Information Commissioner (GIA/1871/2011; EA/2010/0166) | Vexatiousness involves proportionality and manifestly unjustified or inappropriate use of a formal procedure. | Used to support the concept of "vexatiousness by drift" and the importance of proportionality in section 14(1) analysis. |
| Independent Police Complaints Commission v Information Commissioner (EA/2011/0222) | Section 14(1) should be applied to uphold public authorities against grossly excessive or ill-intentioned requests. | Supported the view that abuse of FOIA rights should be resisted to protect the Act's integrity. |
| Murrell v Secretary of State for Social Services (Court of Appeal) | Definition of perverse or irrational tribunal decision as one no reasonable tribunal could make. | Applied in considering whether the FTT's decision was perverse; found it surprising but not perverse. |
| Crake v Supplementary Benefits Commission [1982] 1 All ER 498 | Soft law guidance as signposts rather than binding rules. | Used to illustrate the advisory nature of the Information Commissioner's Guidance. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Upper Tribunal began by affirming the ordinary, natural meaning of "vexatious" in the statutory context of FOIA, emphasizing that it connotes a manifestly unjustified, inappropriate, or improper use of the Act. The Tribunal accepted the Information Commissioner's Guidance as a useful tool but cautioned against treating it as binding or exhaustive.
The Tribunal identified four broad themes to consider in determining vexatiousness: the burden on the public authority, the requester's motive, the value or serious purpose of the request, and any harassment or distress caused to staff. It stressed the importance of a holistic and flexible balancing exercise rather than a rigid checklist.
Applying these principles to the facts, the Tribunal found that although the Plaintiff's request was short, focused, and benign in isolation, the extensive history of approximately 40 letters and multiple FOIA requests over several years on related health and safety topics imposed a significant burden on Company A. The history indicated a pattern likely to generate further burdensome correspondence if the request were answered.
The Plaintiff's motive was examined in light of his prior intemperate and unsupported allegations of fraud and malfeasance, which caused distress to staff. While the immediate request was reasonable in tone, the broader context revealed a vexatious pattern.
The Tribunal concluded that the First-tier Tribunal erred by drawing an artificial distinction between requests linked by the same complaint and those sharing only subject matter, and by failing to properly consider the burden and the Plaintiff's conduct. The FTT's decision was set aside because it fettered its discretion and misapplied the law.
The Upper Tribunal re-made the decision dismissing the Plaintiff's appeal and upholding the Information Commissioner's Decision Notice that the request was vexatious within section 14(1) of FOIA.
Holding and Implications
The appeal by the Information Commissioner is allowed, the First-tier Tribunal's decision is set aside, and the Plaintiff's appeal against the Decision Notice is dismissed.
The direct effect is that the Plaintiff's FOIA request is properly refused as vexatious under section 14(1). No new precedent was established beyond clarifying the proper approach to vexatious requests under FOIA. The decision emphasizes the need for a holistic, context-sensitive analysis considering burden, motive, value, and harassment, and cautions against overly rigid applications of guidance. It reinforces that repeated or voluminous requests imposing disproportionate burdens may be refused as vexatious, even if individual requests appear benign.
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