O'Neill v. Governors of St Thomas More RC School & Anor

Factual and Procedural Background

This appeal concerns a decision of an industrial tribunal held in Bedford in 1994 regarding an applicant employed as a probationary teacher of religious education and personal relationships at a Roman Catholic voluntary aided school in Bedford. The applicant was constructively dismissed, with the tribunal awarding a basic unfair dismissal award but dismissing her claim for sex discrimination. The applicant contended that her dismissal was directly related to her pregnancy, claiming sex discrimination. The governors of the school were the employers and denied discrimination, arguing the dismissal was due to the untenability of her position following a publicized relationship with a Roman Catholic priest.

The applicant was employed from April 1990 and began teaching in September 1990. Her probation was extended due to difficulties in relationships with pupils and colleagues. She was absent due to illness and pregnancy-related reasons from September 1991 onwards and never returned to work. The governors decided to dismiss her in May 1992 after learning of her pregnancy by a local Roman Catholic priest, which they considered incompatible with her role teaching religious education. Despite offers to modify her duties, the applicant refused to resign. She was prevented from returning to work in September 1992 and salary payments ceased. Proceedings for breach of contract were settled by consent. The applicant then brought claims for unfair dismissal and sex discrimination before the industrial tribunal.

The tribunal found the dismissal unfair but dismissed the sex discrimination claim. The appeal tribunal reviewed the legal principles and procedural history, including a review application and procedural orders allowing the governors to participate despite late filings. The appeal focuses on whether the tribunal erred in law in dismissing the sex discrimination claim.

Legal Issues Presented

1. Whether the applicant’s constructive dismissal was directly discriminatory on the ground of sex due to her pregnancy.
2. Whether the industrial tribunal correctly applied the legal principles of causation and discrimination in the context of pregnancy-related dismissal.
3. How to properly apply the comparison and causation elements under the Sex Discrimination Act 1975 and relevant European Community law.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

• The applicant argued that her dismissal was a direct result of her pregnancy, constituting sex discrimination under the Sex Discrimination Act 1975.
• She contended that the governors’ embarrassment and the public knowledge of her pregnancy by a Roman Catholic priest were grounds for constructive dismissal based on sex discrimination.
• She maintained that the tribunal’s distinction between "pregnancy per se" and pregnancy in the circumstances of the case was legally flawed.

Respondent's Arguments

• The governors conceded unfair dismissal but denied sex discrimination, asserting the dismissal was due to the untenability of the applicant’s role following the publicized relationship with a Roman Catholic priest, not pregnancy itself.
• They argued the dismissal was not "on the ground of her sex" but on grounds related to maintaining the religious ethos of the school.
• The governors relied on legal principles distinguishing pregnancy from pregnancy-related circumstances and submitted that the tribunal had correctly applied the law concerning causation and mixed motives.
• They cited precedent cases to support the position that dismissal linked to pregnancy consequences but not pregnancy itself does not constitute sex discrimination.

Table of Precedents Cited

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The appeal tribunal analysed whether the industrial tribunal had correctly applied the legal principles regarding sex discrimination in the context of pregnancy-related dismissal. The tribunal acknowledged that dismissal solely because of pregnancy is direct sex discrimination under both domestic law (Sex Discrimination Act 1975) and European Community law, including the Equal Treatment Directive and relevant European Court of Justice decisions.

The tribunal emphasised that the correct legal test is objective causation: whether the dismissal would have occurred but for the applicant’s sex (pregnancy being unique to women). It rejected reliance on the subjective motives of the governors, which the industrial tribunal had used to distinguish between "pregnancy per se" and pregnancy linked to the relationship with a priest. The appeal tribunal found this distinction legally erroneous because pregnancy and its surrounding circumstances are causally connected and inseparable for discrimination purposes.

The tribunal noted that the industrial tribunal’s finding that the dismissal was due to the pregnancy by a Roman Catholic priest and the public nature of that relationship actually confirmed that pregnancy was the effective cause of dismissal. The appeal tribunal therefore concluded that the industrial tribunal failed to apply the correct legal principles of causation.

It further clarified that the appeal tribunal’s role was to determine errors of law, not to reweigh facts. The industrial tribunal’s error was legal in misapplying the causation test. The appeal tribunal also reviewed relevant case law, including Webb and James, to establish the appropriate approach to causation and comparison in pregnancy discrimination cases.

Finally, the tribunal noted that establishing liability for sex discrimination does not guarantee compensation, which remains a matter for the industrial tribunal to determine in light of all circumstances.

Holding and Implications

The appeal tribunal ALLOWED the appeal, holding that the industrial tribunal erred in law by dismissing the applicant’s claim for sex discrimination. It declared that the governors discriminated against the applicant on the ground of her sex in constructively dismissing her.

The case was remitted to the industrial tribunal to determine appropriate remedies, including whether compensation or other relief is just and equitable under the Sex Discrimination Act 1975. The decision clarifies that dismissal related to pregnancy, including pregnancy-related circumstances, constitutes sex discrimination. However, this ruling does not automatically entitle the applicant to substantial compensation, as remedies depend on the tribunal’s further assessment.

No new precedent was set beyond the application and clarification of existing legal principles regarding pregnancy discrimination and causation under the Sex Discrimination Act and European law.