Grainger Plc & Ors v. Nicholson

Factual and Procedural Background

This opinion concerns an appeal by the Appellant against a decision of the Employment Tribunal that the Respondent was entitled to pursue a claim under the Employment Equality (Religion or Belief) Regulations 2003 ("the 2003 Regulations"). The preliminary issue was whether the Respondent's asserted philosophical belief about climate change and the environment qualified as a belief protected by the 2003 Regulations. The Respondent was formerly employed by the Appellant until termination on grounds disputed by the parties: the Appellant claimed redundancy, while the Respondent claimed unfair dismissal and discrimination based on his philosophical belief.

The Employment Judge recorded the Respondent's witness statement describing a deeply held belief in urgent action on climate change that affected his lifestyle choices. The Employment Judge did not conclude definitively on the nature of the belief but held that the Respondent could pursue the claim as the belief was capable of being a belief under the Regulations. The Appellant appealed this decision.

Legal Issues Presented

1. Whether the belief asserted by the Respondent qualifies as a "philosophical belief" within the meaning of the 2003 Regulations, thus attracting protection.
2. What limitations or criteria apply to the definition of "philosophical belief" under the Regulations.
3. Whether the belief must be similar to a religious belief to qualify for protection.
4. The relevance and applicability of European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) jurisprudence, particularly Article 9 and Article 2 of Protocol 1, to the interpretation of the Regulations.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

• The belief must be part of a settled system of beliefs and not a one-off or isolated belief.
• The belief must be philosophical and not merely political or scientific in nature.
• The belief should have a similar status or cogency to a religious belief.
• The Regulations should be construed independently of ECHR jurisprudence, relying on domestic and EU Framework Directive law without extending protection beyond established parameters.
• Scientific beliefs, such as those based on empirical research, should not qualify as philosophical beliefs.
• The belief must not be a political opinion or an objectionable political philosophy (e.g., racist or homophobic beliefs).

Respondent's Arguments

• The Respondent’s belief about climate change constitutes a genuine, philosophical belief that affects how he lives his life and imposes a moral duty to act and persuade others.
• The belief is capable of protection under the Regulations as it relates to a weighty and substantial aspect of human life and behaviour.
• The European Court of Human Rights jurisprudence, including Campbell and Cosans v United Kingdom, is relevant and persuasive in interpreting the scope of "philosophical belief".
• The Regulations do not limit protection to beliefs similar to religion, and philosophical beliefs can be based on secular morality or scientific understanding.
• The belief need not be shared by others to qualify for protection.
• Political beliefs may qualify if they meet the criteria of cogency, seriousness, and respect for human dignity.

Table of Precedents Cited

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court undertook a detailed analysis of the nature of philosophical beliefs protected under the 2003 Regulations, with particular reference to the European Convention on Human Rights jurisprudence and domestic case law. It emphasized that the belief must be genuinely held, relate to a substantial aspect of human life, and meet threshold criteria of cogency, seriousness, cohesion, and importance. The belief must also be worthy of respect in a democratic society and not conflict with human dignity or the fundamental rights of others.

The court rejected the Employment Judge’s conclusion that the Respondent’s belief was definitively a philosophical belief without evidence and cross-examination, noting that such factual inquiries are necessary to establish genuineness and applicability. It clarified that the belief need not be part of a broader system of beliefs or shared by others, nor must it be religious in nature. The court also held that scientific or secular philosophical beliefs, such as those based on climate change science, can qualify if they satisfy the criteria.

The court considered and rejected the Appellant’s proposed limitations that would exclude political or scientific beliefs per se, instead applying the overarching requirement that the belief be worthy of respect and consistent with democratic values and human dignity. It also addressed the issue of discrimination on grounds of lack of belief, explaining that protection extends to those discriminated against for not holding a particular belief.

Ultimately, the court upheld the Tribunal’s decision that the Respondent’s asserted belief was capable of amounting to a philosophical belief for the purposes of the Regulations, subject to full hearing and evidential testing of the belief’s genuineness and scope.

Holding and Implications

The court DISMISSED the Appellant’s appeal and upheld the Employment Tribunal’s decision that the Respondent’s asserted philosophical belief about climate change was capable of protection under the Employment Equality (Religion or Belief) Regulations 2003, but only to the extent that it was "capable of being a belief" under the Regulations and not as a final determination of fact.

The decision requires that at any full hearing there must be evidence and cross-examination to establish the genuineness and relevant characteristics of the belief. The ruling clarifies the applicable criteria for philosophical beliefs and confirms that such beliefs may include secular, scientific, or political elements if they meet the established threshold requirements.

No new legal precedent was set beyond affirming the applicability of existing ECHR jurisprudence and domestic case law in interpreting the scope of philosophical beliefs under the 2003 Regulations. The direct effect is to allow the Respondent’s claim to proceed to a substantive hearing on the merits.