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Jackson, Re Setting of Minimum Term an Application Under Criminal Justice Act 2003
Factual and Procedural Background
In September 1985, the body of the victim was found in Spinney Wood, Luton, having suffered multiple blunt injuries to the head, neck, and chest. Items of the victim's clothing discovered days later were stained with semen, which years later yielded a DNA profile matching the Applicant. The Applicant was arrested in 1998 and subsequently tried at Reading Crown Court before Judge Garland and a jury. He was convicted of murder on 27th January 2000 by a majority verdict and sentenced to life imprisonment with a tariff set at 15 years. A renewed application for permission to appeal was refused in January 2001.
The trial judge did not recommend a whole life tariff under the relevant legislation but considered the murder brutal without exceptional circumstances warranting such a recommendation. The judge fixed a median tariff of 15 years, noting the absence of a clear motive and minor injuries suggesting attempted sexual assault. The Chief Justice at the time, Lord Bingham, agreed with a tariff of 14-15 years.
Following the Criminal Justice Act 2003, the Applicant applied to the High Court to set his minimum term, which cannot exceed the previously notified 15 years tariff. The court received submissions from both parties and considered relevant case law, including the application of Article 7(1) of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), before deciding the matter without an oral hearing.
The background also includes detailed reports on the Applicant's progress in custody and risk assessments, which were considered in relation to whether exceptional progress warranted a reduction in the tariff.
Legal Issues Presented
- What would the appropriate tariff for the offence have been at the time it was committed in 1985?
- Does Article 7(1) of the European Convention on Human Rights require that the minimum term imposed now should not exceed the tariff applicable at the time of the offence?
- Even if Article 7(1) does not impose such an obligation, is the tariff at the time of the offence a material circumstance that the court must or may take into account?
- Should the minimum term be reduced to reflect the Applicant's exceptional progress in custody?
- Should allowance be made for time spent on remand?
Arguments of the Parties
Applicant's Arguments
- The minimum term should be less than 15 years, reflecting the tariff likely to have been recommended if convicted shortly after the offence in 1985, estimated at around 12-13 years.
- Article 7(1) ECHR prohibits imposing a heavier penalty than that applicable at the time of the offence, supporting a reduced tariff.
- The Applicant has made exceptional progress in custody, which should justify a reduction in the minimum term.
- It is unfair for the Applicant to be treated differently from other transitional cases under Schedule 22 of the Criminal Justice Act 2003.
Crown's and Secretary of State's Arguments
- While there may have been a sexual element to the murder, the minimum term cannot exceed the notified tariff of 15 years.
- Paragraph 10 of Schedule 22 reflects the obligation under Article 7(1) ECHR, preventing a heavier penalty than that which could have been imposed at the time of the offence.
- Article 7(1) should be interpreted as preventing imposition of a penalty exceeding the maximum legally permissible at the time, not necessarily the tariff likely to have been recommended.
- The Applicant's progress, though very good, does not meet the high threshold of "exceptional progress" required to reduce the tariff.
- Allowance for time spent on remand should be made against the minimum term.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| R v Caines [2007] 1 WLR 1109 | Guidance on setting minimum terms and consideration of exceptional progress in custody. | Used to assess whether the Applicant’s progress justified a reduction in tariff; concluded progress was very good but not exceptional. |
| Hammond [2004] EWHC Admin 2753 | Oral hearing discretion despite statutory provision for decision without hearing. | Supported the court’s decision to consider, but ultimately decide without, an oral hearing. |
| R (Uttley) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2004] 1 WLR 2278 | Interpretation of Article 7(1) ECHR regarding retrospective increase of penalties. | Guided the court’s interpretation of Article 7(1), confirming no violation if the penalty does not exceed that legally permissible at the time of offence. |
| R v Sullivan [2005] 1 Cr App R 3 | Clarification that minimum terms must not exceed those permissible at time of offence to comply with ECHR Articles 5 and 7. | Confirmed that the court must reduce the minimum term if necessary to avoid imposing a heavier penalty than was possible at the time of offence. |
| Flynn v HM Advocate (No.1) [2004] UKPC D 1 | Consideration of Article 7(1) in the context of minimum terms and parole eligibility. | Supported the view that Article 7(1) does not prevent consideration of post-conviction matters but focuses on legality of penalty at time of offence. |
| Coeme v Belgium (App No. 32492/96) | Requirement that punishment imposed does not exceed limits fixed by law at the time of offence. | Reinforced the principle that the court must ensure the penalty does not exceed the legal maximum at the time of the offence. |
| King v UK (2007) 45 EHRR SE5 | Application of Article 7(1) to minimum term extensions after sentencing. | Dismissed complaint that a longer punishment part was imposed retrospectively, affirming no violation of Article 7(1). |
| R (Cole) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2003] EWHC 1789 | Definition and examples of exceptional progress in custody for tariff reduction. | Provided framework for assessing exceptional progress, applied to Applicant’s case to determine tariff adjustment. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The court first considered the appropriate tariff at the time of the offence in 1985, noting the absence of statutory regulation then but finding that a 15-year tariff fell within a reasonable range. The court examined Article 7(1) ECHR, which prohibits imposing a heavier penalty than that applicable at the time of the offence. The court reviewed authoritative case law, including R (Uttley), Flynn, and Coeme, concluding that Article 7(1) protects against penalties exceeding the maximum legally permissible at the offence time, not against variations within that range or against differences in tariff norms.
The court rejected the Applicant’s argument that the tariff should be reduced to reflect historical norms or differences in treatment among transitional cases, emphasizing the need to follow the Parliamentary scheme and the existing tariff ceiling. It also considered the Applicant’s custodial progress, applying the stringent criteria from R v Caines and R (Cole) for exceptional progress. While the Applicant’s conduct and achievements were commendable and better than average, the court found this did not meet the high threshold required for tariff reduction, particularly given ongoing denial of responsibility and medium risk assessments.
Finally, the court allowed the period spent on remand to count towards the minimum term, in accordance with submissions and standard practice.
Holding and Implications
The court’s final decision was to set the Applicant’s minimum term at 15 years, consistent with the previously notified tariff by the Home Secretary. The court found no legal basis to reduce this term either under Article 7(1) ECHR or on the grounds of exceptional progress in custody.
The direct effect is that the Applicant’s minimum term remains unchanged, with time spent on remand counting towards it. The court’s decision adheres strictly to established legal principles and statutory frameworks without establishing new precedent or altering the treatment of similar transitional cases under the Criminal Justice Act 2003.
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