Factual and Procedural Background
This opinion concerns an application by the Attorney General under Order 52 of the Rules of the Supreme Court for the committal of the Defendant for contempt of court. The alleged contempt arose during her service as a juror in a criminal trial at a Crown Court in July 2010. It is alleged that the Defendant conducted internet research about the case and disclosed the results to fellow jurors, contrary to judicial instructions.
The Defendant, a juror in a trial involving serious charges of grievous bodily harm, was accused of searching for information about the case and the accused on the internet and sharing that information with other jurors during deliberations. This conduct led to the jury being discharged and a retrial ordered. The Defendant was subsequently charged with contempt of court and faced sentencing.
The procedural context includes a discussion on the appropriate method of proceeding for contempt arising in these circumstances, with reference to the obsolescence of trials for contempt on indictment and the current practice of committal proceedings under Order 52.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the Rules of the Supreme Court Order 52 provide the appropriate process for dealing with contempt of court arising from a juror's internet research and disclosure during a trial.
- Whether trials for contempt on indictment remain a viable or appropriate procedure.
- The legal test for contempt of court in this context, specifically whether deliberate disobedience of a judicial direction by a juror that creates a risk of prejudice to the due administration of justice constitutes contempt.
- Whether the Defendant deliberately disobeyed the judge's direction prohibiting internet research about the case and thereby prejudiced the administration of justice.
- The appropriate sentence for contempt of court by a juror who conducted unauthorized internet research and disclosed information to fellow jurors.
Arguments of the Parties
Defendant's Arguments
- The Defendant contended that her actions were not deliberate disobedience of the court's instructions but rather a misunderstanding, partly due to language and focus issues.
- She argued that her internet searches were motivated by a desire to understand the meaning of a legal term ("grievous") and that she did not intend to influence or prejudice the jury's verdict.
- The Defendant asserted that she did not recall the judge's explicit instruction not to use the internet and believed the judge's comments were advisory rather than mandatory orders.
- She claimed that any disclosure to other jurors was not intended to disrupt the trial process and that she would not have spoken about it if not prompted by another juror's inquiry.
- Her counsel invited the court to consider mitigation factors, including her positive character, lack of prior convictions, absence of personal gain or agenda, and the stresses caused by the proceedings, suggesting suspension of any custodial sentence.
- The Defendant also challenged the legal test applied by the court, submitting that the test of contempt should involve an order rather than a direction and questioned whether contempt could arise from a judicial direction given in summing-up.
Attorney General's Arguments
- The Attorney General applied for committal of the Defendant for contempt under Order 52 of the Rules of the Supreme Court, asserting that the Defendant deliberately disobeyed the judge’s clear and unequivocal direction not to conduct internet research about the case.
- It was submitted that the Defendant's conduct created actual prejudice to the administration of justice by introducing information not admitted in evidence to the jury deliberations.
- The Attorney General maintained that trials for contempt on indictment are obsolete and that the proper procedure is by committal proceedings under Order 52.
- The legal test applied was that contempt arises where a juror deliberately disobeys a judicial direction and thereby creates a risk of prejudice to the due administration of justice.
- It was argued that the Defendant’s internet research and disclosure undermined the integrity of the jury system and the administration of justice.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent |
Rule or Principle Cited For |
Application by the Court |
| R v Tibbetts [1902] 1 KB 77 |
Demonstrated that contempt of court could be tried on indictment as misdemeanours; last known case of such trial. |
The court held that trials for contempt on indictment are obsolete and ought not to be revived, relying on this precedent as historical context. |
| Attorney General v Butterworth [1963] 1 QB 696 |
Recognition of the disuse of trial for contempt on indictment, though possibility of revival was noted. |
The court acknowledged the obsolescence of trial on indictment for contempt and favoured committal proceedings. |
| Balogh v St Albans Crown Court [1975] 1 QB 73 |
Considered contempt proceedings and suggested contempt could be dealt with by committal or indictment. |
The court noted differing judicial views but emphasized Order 52 as the proper mechanism. |
| R v D [1984] 1 AC 778 |
Discussed contempt of court and the appropriateness of trial on indictment; suggested the old method should not be revived. |
The House of Lords endorsed the view that committal proceedings are the proper remedy and trial on indictment is inappropriate. |
| In Re Lonrho plc [1990] 2 AC 154 |
Confirmed that committal proceedings in the High Court are the proper remedy for contempt of court by the media, not trial on indictment. |
The court reiterated that trial on indictment for contempt is obsolete and committal proceedings should be used. |
| R v Fraill [2011] EWCA Crim 1570 |
Established that jurors must not base verdicts on material not in evidence and emphasized the importance of jury compliance with judicial directions. |
The court relied on this precedent to underscore the seriousness of juror misconduct and the necessity of custodial sentences for contempt involving internet misuse. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The court began by addressing the procedural question of whether contempt arising from a juror's internet research should be tried by indictment or by committal proceedings under Order 52. After reviewing authorities, the court concluded that trials for contempt on indictment are an obsolete mechanism and that the appropriate process is committal proceedings under Order 52.
Turning to the facts, the court carefully examined the Defendant’s background, education, and language proficiency, concluding that she was fully capable of understanding the judge’s directions. The court noted the repeated and explicit instructions given to the jury not to use the internet to research the case or discuss it outside the courtroom, including clear notices posted in jury rooms and judicial directions at trial.
The Defendant’s internet research, including searching for the accused’s previous conviction and disclosing this information to fellow jurors, was found to be deliberate disobedience of the judge’s order. The court rejected the Defendant’s claim of inadvertence or misunderstanding, finding her testimony selective and lacking credibility, especially her claim of stumbling upon the information accidentally and not intentionally searching the Defendant's name.
The court emphasized that the Defendant’s conduct caused actual prejudice to the administration of justice by introducing extraneous information not admitted in evidence, which led to the jury being discharged and a retrial ordered. The court highlighted the serious impact on the complainant, the jury, and public resources.
Regarding the legal test, the court applied the standard that contempt arises where a juror deliberately disobeys a judicial direction and thereby creates a risk of prejudice to the due administration of justice. The court acknowledged a dispute over the precise formulation of the test but confirmed its application in this case.
On sentencing, the court recognized the Defendant’s positive character and mitigating factors but concluded that the seriousness of the contempt and its impact on the jury system warranted an immediate custodial sentence. The court underscored the importance of maintaining the integrity of the jury system and public confidence in the administration of justice, noting that misuse of the internet by jurors is a grave irregularity.
Holding and Implications
The court FOUND THE DEFENDANT GUILTY OF CONTEMPT OF COURT for deliberately disobeying the judge’s direction prohibiting internet research and disclosing information to fellow jurors, thereby prejudicing the administration of justice.
The Defendant was sentenced to six months' imprisonment, with the order to serve three months immediately.
The direct effect of this decision is the imposition of a custodial sentence on the Defendant and her discharge from jury service. The ruling reinforces the principle that jurors must strictly comply with judicial directions to preserve the fairness and integrity of trials. The court clarified that trials for contempt on indictment are obsolete and confirmed the continued use of committal proceedings under Order 52 for such contempts.
No new legal precedent was established beyond affirming established principles regarding juror conduct, contempt, and procedural mechanisms for contempt proceedings.