Factual and Procedural Background
On 8th November 1999, at an auction held at the Langham Hilton Hotel, the Plaintiff purchased two neighbouring commercial properties in Shoreditch, comprising a car park and adjacent warehouses, sold as a single lot. The car park was owned by the First Defendant (a local authority) and occupied by Company A under an agreement described as a licence, while the warehouses were owned by the Second Defendant. The Plaintiff paid 10% of the purchase price on the day of the auction and completed the purchase on 9th February 2000.
The Plaintiff alleges that the Defendants made two false representations: (a) that Company A occupied the car park as a contractual licensee terminable on three months’ notice, whereas Company A was in fact a tenant protected under the Landlord and Tenant Act 1954; and (b) that the First Defendant, as local planning authority and co-vendor, had no objection to residential or live/work development on the car park site, whereas the true position was that planning policies strongly favoured employment use and restricted residential development.
The Plaintiff seeks damages rather than rescission, and a trial on liability only was ordered. Both Defendants concede liability in damages if the Plaintiff establishes misrepresentation in respect of either issue.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether an action lies for misrepresentation as to law, or whether the traditional rule barring such claims has been displaced by the House of Lords decision in Kleinwort Benson Ltd v Lincoln City Council (1999).
- Whether damages under the Misrepresentation Act 1967, s.2(2) may be awarded in lieu of rescission when the right to rescind has been lost.
- Whether the contractual arrangement between Company A and the First Defendant, described as a licence, was in fact a tenancy protected by the Landlord and Tenant Act 1954 based on the presence of exclusive possession, rent, and term.
Arguments of the Parties
The opinion does not contain a detailed account of the parties' legal arguments.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent |
Rule or Principle Cited For |
Application by the Court |
| The Moorcock (1889) 14 PD 64 |
Implied terms necessary for business efficacy in contracts. |
Used to infer exclusive possession was implied in the licence agreement to give it commercial effect. |
| Liverpool City Council v Irwin [1977] AC 239 |
Implied terms in tenancy agreements. |
Supported implication of exclusive possession in the arrangement with Company A. |
| Street v Mountford [1985] 1 AC 809 |
Creation of tenancy based on three hallmarks: exclusive possession, rent, and term. |
Decisive authority to characterize the arrangement as a tenancy despite being labelled a licence. |
| Errington v Errington and Woods [1952] 1 KB 290 |
Exceptional circumstances negating tenancy despite exclusive possession. |
Not applicable here as no exceptional circumstances existed. |
| A G Securities v Vaughan [1990] 1 AC 417 |
Reaffirmed Street v Mountford principles and that parties cannot contract out of Rent Acts by calling a tenancy a licence. |
Supported the court’s conclusion that the arrangement was a tenancy despite the label of licence. |
| Bruton v London and Quadrant Housing Trust [2000] 1 AC 406 |
Exclusive possession creates tenancy even if the landlord is a licensee. |
Decisive against arguments that the agreement was only a licence due to temporary occupation. |
| Hinks v Fleet [1986] 2 EGLR 243 |
Distinguished between licences and tenancies in context of caravans and parking. |
Rejected analogy with Company A’s occupation, as exclusive possession was necessary for commercial viability. |
| Bracey v Read [1962] 3 WLR 1194 |
Definition of "premises" under Landlord and Tenant Act 1954 includes open sites. |
Supported classification of the car park as premises for tenancy protection purposes. |
| Young v Bristol Aeroplane Co Ltd [1944] 1 KB 718 |
Binding nature of precedent and overruling principles. |
Permitted the court to depart from the traditional "misrepresentation of law" rule in light of later authority. |
| Kleinwort Benson Ltd v Lincoln City Council [1999] 2 AC 349 |
Established that mistakes of law can give rise to claims for restitution. |
Foundation for rejecting the rule barring misrepresentation claims based on law. |
| Bilbie v Lumley (1802) 2 East 469 |
Origin of "mistake of law" rule. |
Discussed historically as basis for the now discredited "misrepresentation of law" rule. |
| Beattie v Lord Ebury [1873] LR 7 Ch App 777 |
Misrepresentation must be of fact, not merely law, to give rise to liability. |
Reviewed and found insufficient to maintain the "misrepresentation of law" rule post-Kleinwort Benson. |
| Rogers v Ingham (1876) 3 Ch D 351 |
Application of mistake of law rule where parties had full knowledge of facts. |
Clarified that relief might be available where parties do not share full knowledge of facts. |
| Beesly v Hallwood Estates Ltd [1961] WLR 549 |
Definition of mistake of law with all relevant facts known. |
Supported distinction between mistake of fact and law relevant to misrepresentation claims. |
| Smith v Land and House Property Corporation (1884) 28 Ch D 7 |
Distinction between statements of opinion and fact in misrepresentation. |
Guided analysis of representations made by vendors concerning tenancy status. |
| The Lucy [1983] 1 Lloyd's LR 188 |
Implied misrepresentation by omission of material facts. |
Supported finding that catalogue representations were misleading by omission. |
| Andre and Cie S.A. v ETS Michel Blanc & Fils [1979] 2 Lloyd's LR 427 |
Representation as to foreign law treated as fact; distinction between law and fact is illusory. |
Supported rejection of the "misrepresentation of law" rule. |
| Cooper v Phibbs (1876) 2 LR HL 149 |
Ignorance of private rights is excusable; distinction between public law and private rights. |
Supported the proposition that private rights misrepresentations are actionable. |
| Lowe v Lombank Ltd [1960] WLR 196 |
Distinction between contractual obligations and estoppel by representation. |
Rejected contractual effect of purchaser acknowledgments as excluding misrepresentation liability. |
| Strover v Harrington [1988] 2 WLR 572 |
Liability of principals for acts of their agents. |
Vendors liable for misrepresentations made by their agents. |
| Museprime Properties Ltd v Adhill Properties Ltd [1990] 2 EGLR 196 |
Materiality and inducement in misrepresentation claims. |
Applied to assess inducement and reliance by the Plaintiff on misrepresentations. |
| The Siboen and the Sibotre [1976] 1 Lloyd's LR 293 |
Materiality and inducement in contract formation. |
Referenced for principles on inducement and reliance. |
| Goff v Gauthier 62 P&CR 388 |
Unfairness of exclusion clauses shielding deliberate misrepresentation. |
Supported rejection of exclusion clauses in this case. |
| Walker v Boyle [1982] 1 WLR 495 |
Reasonableness test for exclusion clauses under UCTA. |
Applied to assess reasonableness of contractual terms excluding liability. |
| South Western General Property Co Ltd v Marton 263 EGLR 1090 |
Exclusion of liability for misrepresentation of material facts is unfair and unreasonable. |
Supported finding that exclusion clauses here were unreasonable. |
| Government of Zanzibar v British Aerospace (Lancaster House) Ltd [2000] 1 WLR 2333 |
Damages in lieu of rescission under Misrepresentation Act 1967 s.2(2). |
Considered in relation to availability of damages where rescission is lost. |
| Floods of Queensferry Ltd v Shand Construction Ltd [2000] Building LR 81 |
Damages in lieu of rescission; limits on availability. |
Followed in concluding s.2(2) damages are not available once right to rescind is lost. |
| Jaggard v Sawyer [1995] 1 WLR 269 |
Damages in lieu of injunction; judicial views on remedies. |
Referenced for judicial opinion on remedies analogous to s.2(2) damages. |
| Thomas Witter Ltd v TBP Industries Ltd [1996] 2 All ER 573 |
Contrary authority on availability of damages under s.2(2) after loss of rescission right. |
Distinguished and not followed. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The court first analyzed the nature of Company A's occupation of the car park. Despite contractual documents describing the arrangement as a licence, the court found that the three hallmarks of a tenancy—exclusive possession, rent, and term—were present. Exclusive possession was implied to give business efficacy, and the parties' conduct confirmed the creation of a tenancy protected under the Landlord and Tenant Act 1954. The court relied on established authorities such as Street v Mountford and Bruton v London and Quadrant Housing Trust to reject attempts to characterize the arrangement as a mere licence.
Next, the court examined the representations made in the auction catalogue, which described Company A's occupation as a licence terminable on three months' notice. The court held that this was a misrepresentation, as the true legal position was that Company A held a protected business tenancy, terminable only by statutory procedures requiring longer notice. The use of the term "licence" in the catalogue was found to be misleading and deliberately employed to mask the existence of a tenancy, thereby inducing potential purchasers, including the Plaintiff, to bid under a false impression.
The court then addressed the long-standing rule that no action lies for misrepresentation of law. It concluded that this rule has been displaced by the House of Lords decision in Kleinwort Benson Ltd v Lincoln City Council, which abolished the analogous "mistake of law" rule. The court reasoned that the distinction between law and fact in misrepresentation claims is artificial and unsupported by principle, and that misrepresentations as to private rights, such as tenancy status, are actionable.
Regarding the Plaintiff's reliance, the court accepted that the Plaintiff relied on the catalogue's description and was induced to purchase by the misrepresentation. The Plaintiff had no reasonable means of discovering the true nature of Company A's interest before the auction, and the Defendants' agents deliberately withheld or distorted material information to avoid deterring bidders.
The court rejected the Defendants' statutory defence under the Misrepresentation Act 1967 s.2(1), finding that the Defendants and their agents did not believe the representations were true and had no reasonable grounds for such belief. The court also found that contractual terms purporting to exclude or limit liability for misrepresentation were neither fair nor reasonable, especially given the deliberate nature of the misrepresentation and its materiality to the Plaintiff.
On the issue of damages in lieu of rescission under s.2(2), the court held that since the Plaintiff had lost the right to rescind, no such damages were available, following recent first instance authorities and considering the legislative purpose of the provision.
Turning to the second alleged misrepresentation concerning planning consent, the court found that the Planning Guidelines prepared by the First Defendant’s planning officer were accurate and genuinely held opinions, and that the representations in the catalogue concerning planning were not false. The Plaintiff failed to prove reliance or loss arising from any alleged misrepresentation about planning matters. The court noted that the Plaintiff’s subsequent planning applications did not comply with the guidelines and that refusals were based on legitimate planning considerations.
Holding and Implications
The court held that:
- The Defendants made a material misrepresentation by falsely describing Company A’s tenancy as a licence terminable on three months’ notice.
- The traditional rule barring claims for misrepresentation of law has been displaced and does not protect the Defendants.
- The Plaintiff was induced to purchase in reliance on this misrepresentation and suffered loss as a result.
- The Defendants’ statutory defence under Misrepresentation Act 1967 s.2(1) fails.
- The Plaintiff is entitled to damages for the misrepresentation concerning the car park tenancy.
- The claim based on alleged misrepresentations about planning consent fails and is dismissed.
- Damages in lieu of rescission under s.2(2) are not available as the Plaintiff has lost the right to rescind.
The direct effect is that the Plaintiff may recover damages from the Defendants for the misrepresentation concerning the nature of Company A’s interest in the car park. No new precedent is established beyond confirming the application of Kleinwort Benson Ltd to misrepresentation of law claims and clarifying the legal characterization of the tenancy in this context.