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KPMG LLP v. Network Rail Infrastructure Ltd
Factual and Procedural Background
This dispute concerns the interpretation of a break-clause in a reversionary sub-underlease dated 11th July 1985 between Company A and Company B (originally Peat Marwick Mitchell & Co and British Railways Board respectively). The lease followed the form of a draft lease attached to an agreement dated 13th December 1974 involving a third party, The University.
The contested clause, paragraph 5 in Part II of the 5th Schedule, relates to the lessee's right to determine the lease at specified intervals, conditional upon prior rent reviews and, originally, an increase in rent. A critical portion of the clause—the "increased rent condition"—was omitted in the final 1985 lease, creating ambiguity as to whether the lessee has three break opportunities dependent on rent review and increased rent, or five break opportunities, some independent of rent review.
The background includes extensive negotiations and multiple drafts between solicitors for the parties, during which the omission occurred, likely as a typographical error. The lease term was split into an initial 21-year term and a 31-year reversionary term to save stamp duty, adjusting dates in the break-clause accordingly.
The original trial judge found in favor of Company B, granting rectification of the lease to include the omitted words on the basis of mutual mistake. Company A appeals that decision.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the omission of the increased rent condition in the break-clause can be corrected by rectification on the basis of mutual mistake.
- If rectification is not possible, what is the correct construction and meaning of the disputed paragraph in the lease?
- Whether the court can correct the mistake by construction, supplying the omitted words as part of interpreting the lease.
- Whether the lessee has three break rights dependent on rent review and increased rent, or five break rights with some independent of rent review.
Arguments of the Parties
Appellant's Arguments (Company A)
- The lease should be construed as it stands, without the omitted words, giving the lessee five break opportunities: three dependent on rent review and two "free-standing" based solely on notice during specific years.
- On the evidence, the parties’ intentions changed after the omission, with Company A mistakenly believing the omission was deliberate and favorable.
- The trial judge's finding that the parties’ intentions remained unchanged was not supported by the evidence and was an erroneous inference.
- The 1974 draft lease should be given limited or no weight in construction, especially as leases are addressed to successors who may not have access to prior agreements.
- The claim for rectification based on mutual mistake was not proven by convincing evidence.
Respondent's Arguments (Company B)
- The lease should be rectified to reinstate the omitted increased rent condition, reflecting the parties’ common continuing intention at the time of execution.
- The omission was a mutual mistake, and there was convincing proof that the parties intended only three break rights, all dependent on a rent review and an increase in rent.
- Alternatively, if rectification is not granted, the lease should be construed to give effect to the parties’ intentions, either by implying the omitted words or construing the additional break rights as dependent on rent review.
- Reliance on the legal principles from Swainland Builders Ltd v Freehold Properties Ltd to argue that the court can rectify even where details are not fully agreed, provided the common intention is clear.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Swainland Builders Ltd v Freehold Properties Ltd [2002] 2 EGLR 71 | Requirements for rectification on the basis of mutual mistake: common continuing intention, outward expression, continued intention at execution, and mistake in the document. | Guided the court’s assessment of whether rectification was appropriate; distinguished from the present case on the basis of the extent of common intention. |
| Investors Compensation Scheme v West Bromwich Building Society [1998] 1 WLR 896 | Principles of contract construction focusing on the objective meaning of words in light of the factual matrix, excluding subjective intentions in rectification claims. | Used to frame the limits of admissible evidence in interpreting the lease and the relevance of prior drafts. |
| HIH Casualty and General Insurance Ltd v New Hampshire Insurance Co [2001] 2 Lloyds Rep 161 | Admissibility and limited assistance of prior contracts in construing later contracts; cautious approach to prior agreements when superseded. | Supported the trial judge’s narrow view on the relevance of the 1974 draft lease, though ultimately disagreed with on appeal. |
| Homburg Houtimport BV v Agrosin Private Ltd [2004] 1 AC 715 ("The Starsin") | Power of courts to correct obvious omissions by construction using standard precedents, even when the clause is defective. | Provided analogy supporting correction of the omission in the lease by importing words from the 1974 draft lease. |
| Wilson v Wilson (1854) 5 HLCas 40 | Early authority on correction of mistakes by construction where an obvious error appears on the face of the instrument. | Supported principle that courts can correct clear clerical errors as part of contract construction. |
| East v Pantiles Plant Hire Ltd [1982] 2 EGLR 111 | Clarification of conditions for correction by construction: clear mistake and clear correction. | Referenced in discussing the requirements for correction of the lease clause. |
| Holding & Barnes plc v Hill House Hammond Ltd [2001] EWCA Civ 1334 | Use of contemporaneous documents as background for construction and correction of obvious errors. | Supported the approach that contemporaneous leases can assist in construction and correction. |
| Ladbroke Group plc v Bristol City Council [1988] 1 EGLR 126 | Permissibility of referring to an earlier agreement for the purpose of construing a lease when a term is otherwise inexplicable. | Considered but found not decisive; the lease in this case was not expressed to be granted pursuant to the earlier agreement. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The court first considered the claim for rectification based on mutual mistake, applying the established legal requirements. The trial judge found that the omission was a mistake and that the parties’ common intention remained to include the increased rent condition, thus justifying rectification. However, on appeal, this conclusion was critically examined. The appellate court found that the evidence did not convincingly establish that the parties’ intentions remained unchanged after the omission, especially given the contemporaneous correspondence and meeting evidence. The court concluded that Company B failed to discharge the burden of proof for rectification.
The court then examined the alternative argument that rectification could be granted in a more flexible manner as in Swainland Builders Ltd, but rejected this approach because the difference in intentions was substantive, not merely procedural.
Turning to construction, the court applied the principles from Investors Compensation Scheme and related authorities, permitting consideration of the 1974 draft lease as part of the factual matrix. The court rejected the trial judge’s narrow approach to the relevance of the prior draft lease, emphasizing that it was a detailed, negotiated document closely related to the final lease.
The court considered the power to correct obvious mistakes by construction, citing The Starsin and other authorities which allow courts to supply omitted words when the omission is clear and the missing words can be identified with reasonable certainty.
Applying this to the disputed clause, the court found that the omission of the increased rent condition was obvious and that the 1974 draft lease provided a clear precedent for the missing words. The court rejected the appellant’s interpretation that the lease granted five break rights, finding it inconsistent with the structure and purpose of the clause and the parties’ intentions.
Ultimately, the court concluded that the proper construction of the clause, corrected by supplying the omitted words, gave the lessee only three break rights, all dependent on a rent review and an increase in rent, in line with the original commercial intention.
Holding and Implications
The appeal is dismissed.
The court upheld the trial judge's decision to rectify the lease to include the omitted increased rent condition, thereby limiting the lessee’s break rights to three, all contingent on rent reviews resulting in increased rent. The direct consequence is that Company A does not have additional "free-standing" break rights and must await the lessor's initiation of rent reviews to exercise break options.
No new legal precedent was established; the decision applies established principles of rectification and contract construction to the facts of this case.
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