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B (A Child), Re
Factual and Procedural Background
The case concerns a child referred to as “the Child,” who has lived almost his entire life with the Appellant, his maternal grandmother (“Appellant”). On 6 March 2009, the Family Proceedings Court granted the Appellant a residence order and made a contact order in favour of both biological parents. The Respondent, the Child’s father (“Respondent”), appealed to the Family Division, where Judge Richards ordered a transfer of residence to the Respondent. The Appellant’s subsequent appeal to the Court of Appeal was dismissed; however, a stay was granted on condition that the Child spend extended contact time with the Respondent each week. Permission to appeal was ultimately granted, and the present court heard the matter on 14 October 2009. At the conclusion of the hearing the court announced that the appeal would be allowed, restoring the Child’s residence with the Appellant; this judgment sets out the reasons.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the Family Proceedings Court erred in its application of In re G (Children) and in stating that there were no “compelling reasons” to disrupt the Child’s existing placement with the Appellant.
- Whether Judge Richards was entitled to overturn the justices’ decision on the ground that it was “plainly wrong,” particularly in giving priority to biological parenthood over the Child’s welfare.
- Whether the Court of Appeal correctly identified errors of law justifying its dismissal of the Appellant’s appeal and its imposition of extensive contact conditions.
Arguments of the Parties
Appellant's Arguments
- The lower courts gave disproportionate weight to biological parenthood, contrary to the principles set out in In re G.
- The justices had correctly treated the Child’s welfare as paramount and fully evaluated all relevant factors; their decision was therefore not “plainly wrong.”
- The concept of “good-enough” parenting is relevant to public-law care cases, not to private-law residence disputes such as the present.
Respondent's Arguments
- The Child has a right to be brought up by his biological parent, and that factor should prevail absent compelling reasons to the contrary.
- The justices placed excessive weight on the status quo and failed to give sufficient consideration to the Respondent’s role and capability as a parent.
- Judge Richards correctly reapplied the welfare test and recognised that the Respondent could offer “good-enough” parenting within a stable family unit.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| In re G (Children) [2006] UKHL 43 | Welfare is paramount; parenthood is only one factor and creates no presumption in favour of biological parents. | The court clarified that lower courts had misinterpreted In re G; biological parenthood must be evaluated solely in terms of its contribution to the child’s welfare. |
| G v G [1985] 1 WLR 647 | An appellate court should not interfere with a discretionary welfare decision unless it is “plainly wrong.” | Used to demonstrate that Judge Richards should not have reversed the justices’ order because their decision lay within the permissible range. |
| J v C [1970] AC 668 | Defines “paramount” as the factor that “rules upon or determines the course to be followed.” | Cited to reinforce that a child’s welfare overrides any parental claims or rights. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The court held that the Family Proceedings Court had undertaken a careful evaluation of all evidence, explicitly treating the Child’s welfare as paramount. The reference to “compelling reasons” was merely a quotation from a social-work report and did not impose a legal threshold. Judge Richards misdirected himself by:
- Elevating biological parenthood to a quasi-presumption, contrary to In re G.
- Introducing the “good-enough parenting” concept, which is pertinent to public-law care proceedings, not private residence disputes.
- Failing to state—let alone demonstrate—that the Child’s welfare remained paramount in his analysis.
The Court of Appeal, while recognising some of Judge Richards’ errors, nevertheless upheld his order on the basis that the justices were “plainly wrong.” The present court rejected that view, finding ample material supporting the justices’ conclusion: the Child had a lifelong, stable placement with the Appellant; severing that bond risked significant emotional harm; and the Respondent’s new family arrangements were untested at the relevant time. The court further observed that the extensive contact regime imposed by the Court of Appeal had already caused disruptive changes and should not have been used as a condition of a stay pending appeal.
Holding and Implications
APPEAL ALLOWED. The residence order in favour of the Appellant is reinstated, and a phased return to the pre-existing contact arrangements was ordered.
Implications: The judgment re-emphasises that a child’s welfare is the single paramount consideration in private-law residence disputes. Biological parenthood is an important factor but never a presumption; it must be assessed solely for its impact on the child’s best interests. The decision also cautions appellate courts against imposing disruptive interim conditions that may prejudice the very welfare interests under consideration.
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