Principal Reporter v K & Ors (Scotland), United Kingdom Supreme Court, Judgment, Law, casemine.com

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Attorney(S)

Appellant Janys M Scott QC Alison Stirling (Instructed by Drummond Miller WS)
First Respondent Morag Wise�QC Lynda Brabender (Instructed by Biggart Baillie LLP)
Second Respondent Rosemary Guinnane David Sheldon (Instructed by Aitken Nairn WS)
First Minuter David Johnston QC Roddy Dunlop QC (Instructed by The Scottish Government Legal Directorate)
Second Minuter Marie Helen Clark (Instructed by HBM Sayers)

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Principal Reporter v. K & Ors (Scotland)

Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

The Appellant is an unmarried father who co-habited with the child’s mother (“Defendant”) when their daughter was born in May 2002. After the relationship ended the Appellant maintained regular contact and, in May 2004, obtained an interim contact order and sought full parental responsibilities and rights under section 11 of the Children (Scotland) Act 1995 (“the 1995 Act”).

In 2006 serious allegations of sexual abuse were made against the Appellant. Although the police found insufficient evidence, the local authority referred the child to the Children’s Reporter. Two children’s hearings (June and July 2006) excluded the Appellant because he was not classed as a “relevant person” under section 93(2)(b) of the 1995 Act. The grounds of referral, including abuse allegations, were deemed established by a sheriff in the Appellant’s absence.

On 27 October 2006 the sheriff court granted the Appellant limited parental rights and responsibilities “to the extent that he becomes a relevant person” and continued interim contact. Relying on that interlocutor, the Appellant participated in later children’s hearings until March 2009, when the Principal Reporter petitioned the Court of Session to suspend the interlocutor as incompetent. The First Division upheld the petition and also rejected the Appellant’s human-rights arguments. The present appeal is against that decision.

Legal Issues Presented

Whether the sheriff’s interlocutor of 27 October 2006, conferring limited parental rights so the Appellant could participate in children’s hearings, was competent.
Whether the exclusion of the Appellant from children’s hearings by virtue of section 93(2)(b) of the 1995 Act violates his (and the child’s) rights under Articles 6, 8 and 14 of the European Convention on Human Rights (“ECHR”).
If incompatibility exists, whether it can be remedied by interpretative “reading-down” of section 93(2)(b) pursuant to section 3 of the Human Rights Act 1998, or whether a declaration of incompatibility is required.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

The sheriff had power under section 11(1) of the 1995 Act to confer parental rights sufficient to render him a “relevant person”.
Even if the wording of the interlocutor lacked precision, any defect was one of form, not competence.
Excluding an unmarried father who has established family life with his child from key proceedings breaches Articles 6 and 8 ECHR and is discriminatory under Article 14.
The 1995 Act must be interpreted compatibly, by reading additional words into section 93(2)(b)(c) so that fathers with de facto family life are included.

Principal Reporter's Arguments

The interlocutor was incompetent because section 11 allows only defined parental rights and responsibilities, not a free-standing “right to participate in hearings”.
The sheriff failed to apply the “overarching principles” in section 11(7) (paramountcy of the child’s welfare, minimum intervention, etc.).
No ECHR incompatibility arises because an unmarried father can swiftly seek a section 11 order; the statutory scheme is therefore proportionate.
If any incompatibility were found, only the legislature—not judicial interpretation—should amend the statutory definition of “relevant person”.

Curator ad litem's Arguments

Supported the Appellant’s position that the sheriff did apply the section 11(7) principles and that the interlocutor was competent.
Argued that, on Article 8 grounds, fathers with established family life must have procedural rights in children’s hearings.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent	Rule or Principle Cited For	Application by the Court
Russell v Duke of Norfolk [1949] 1 All ER 109	Scope of natural-justice requirements depends on context.	Used to illustrate that the right to be heard varies with circumstances.
Ceylon University v Fernando [1960] 1 WLR 223	Approval of Russell v Duke of Norfolk.	Reinforced contextual approach to natural justice.
In re K (Infants) [1965] AC 201	Natural-justice principles yield to child welfare when necessary.	Cited to recognise welfare as paramount.
T v A 2001 SCLR 647	Courts should not grant section 11 orders solely to secure hearing participation.	Quoted by First Division; Supreme Court did not dissent from reasoning.
Greenhorn v Hamilton (2 Mar 1999, unreported)	Similar view to T v A on limits of section 11 orders.	Cited in discussing competence of sheriff’s order.
McDougall v Galt (1863) 1 M 1012	Implemented judgments cannot normally be reviewed by suspension.	Used to question suitability of suspension remedy.
Berrehab v Netherlands (1988) 11 EHRR 322	Family life between parent and child is presumed.	Part of Article 8 family-life analysis.
Gül v Switzerland (1996) 22 EHRR 93	Recognition of family life beyond marriage.	Supporting same analysis.
Johnston v Ireland (1987) 9 EHRR 203	Cohabitation indicates family life.	Same purpose.
Keegan v Ireland (1994) 18 EHRR 342	Family life may exist outside marriage.	Applied to Appellant’s circumstances.
Lebbink v Netherlands (2005) 40 EHRR 18	Criteria for establishing de facto family ties.	Guided identification of Article 8 protection.
Marckx v Belgium (1979) 2 EHRR 330	Family life extends to near relatives.	Cited when considering broader relatives.
Bronda v Italy (2001) 33 EHRR 4	Grandparents’ family-life interests.	Referenced in possible extension beyond parents.
GHB v United Kingdom [2000] EHRLR 545	Family life with extended family.	Same context.
L v Finland (2001) 31 EHRR 30	Procedural safeguards in family cases.	Supports Article 8 procedural requirement.
X, Y & Z v United Kingdom (1997) 24 EHRR 143	Non-traditional families can have family life.	Used illustratively.
Jucius & Juciuviene v Lithuania (2009) 49 EHRR 3	Family life with non-parent carers.	Supports potential inclusion under section 93(2)(b)(c).
Johansen v Norway (1997) 23 EHRR 33	Court orders restricting contact are Article 8 interferences.	Applied to supervision requirement.
W v United Kingdom (1988) 10 EHRR 29	Parents must be involved in decision-making.	Foundation for procedural-safeguard analysis.
Elsholz v Germany (2002) 34 EHRR 58	Insufficient parental involvement violates Article 8.	Authority for stricter scrutiny of contact restrictions.
K & T v Finland (2001) 31 EHRR 18	Necessity of relevant and sufficient reasons.	Supports proportionality reasoning.
McMichael v United Kingdom (1995) 20 EHRR 205	Older Scottish scheme; Article 8 breach but no Article 14 breach on facts.	Distinguished; not determinative of present discrimination claim.
Sommerfeld v Germany (2004) 38 EHRR 35	Weighty reasons needed for birth-status distinctions.	Supports Article 14 analysis.
Mazurek v France (2000)	Strict scrutiny for discrimination based on birth.	Same.
Camp v Netherlands (2002) 34 EHRR 59	Same principle as Mazurek.	Referenced under Article 14.
Sahin v Germany [2003] 2 FLR 671	Procedural equality for unmarried fathers.	Supports discrimination argument.
Zaunegger v Germany (2010) 50 EHRR 38	Joint custody and discrimination.	Reinforces Article 14 reasoning.
In re S (Minors) [2002] 2 AC 291	Convention rights are “civil rights.”	Used in Article 6 discussion.
Ghaidan v Godin-Mendoza [2004] 2 AC 557	Section 3 HRA interpretation duty; distinction between interpretation and amendment.	Guided “reading-down” approach.
Authority Reporter v S [2010] CSIH 45, 2010 SLT 765	Court read words into section 93(2)(b)(a) to include parents with contact orders.	Precedent for judicial insertion of wording.
Pla v Andorra (2006) 42 EHRR 25	Succession rights as family life.	Explained limits of family-life extension.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

Competency of the Sheriff’s Interlocutor
The Court held that the sheriff sought legitimately to confer specified parental responsibilities (e.g. the duty to safeguard the child’s welfare) and correlated rights (e.g. to maintain personal relations) so the Appellant could participate in the hearing. Any drafting imprecision was a matter of specification, not substance. No ambiguity caused practical difficulty, and for over two years the Principal Reporter acted on the order without objection. The First Division’s reliance on the sheriff’s alleged failure to apply section 11(7) principles lacked evidential basis; contemporaneous continuation of contact and scheduling of a welfare hearing indicated that the sheriff had those principles in mind.

ECHR Compatibility
1. Article 8: The Appellant had established family life with the child. Excluding him from pivotal decisions and accepting abuse allegations without his participation constituted an interference lacking necessary procedural safeguards. The statutory scheme’s blanket exclusion of pre-2006 registered fathers was disproportionate and therefore incompatible with Article 8 rights of both father and child.
2. Article 14: Differential treatment of unmarried fathers versus married fathers and mothers, once family life is established, requires “very weighty reasons.” None existed; thus the scheme was discriminatory in conjunction with Article 8.
3. Article 6: Given that Convention rights are civil rights, any determination that may interfere with established family life engages Article 6, but the Court found Article 8 analysis sufficient and did not rest decision on Article 6.

Remedy under the Human Rights Act 1998
Applying section 3, the Court preferred interpretation over declaration of incompatibility. Reading words into section 93(2)(b)(c) is consistent with the statute’s purpose—ensuring those intimately involved with the child are present. The Court inserted the phrase “or who appears to have established family life with the child with which the decision of a children’s hearing may interfere,” thereby including fathers (and others) with de facto family ties. This approach parallels earlier judicial additions approved in Authority Reporter v S.

Holding and Implications

HOLDING: The appeal is ALLOWED; the First Division’s interlocutor is recalled; the petition to suspend the sheriff’s order is dismissed.

Immediate Effect: The Appellant is declared a “relevant person” and may participate fully in children’s hearings concerning his daughter.

Broader Implications: Section 93(2)(b)(c) of the Children (Scotland) Act 1995 must now be read as including anyone who appears to have established family life with the child that may be affected by a children’s hearing. This interpretative insertion enhances procedural safeguards for unmarried fathers and other carers, ensuring compliance with Articles 8 and 14 ECHR without creating new statutory text.