Meachen v REGINA, England and Wales Court of Appeal (Criminal Division), Judgment, Law, casemine.com

Citation Codes

Equivalent Citations

citation codes

Advocates

Kevin Riordan (instructed by CPS) for the respondent
Robert Dudley (instructed by Brown Turner) for the appellant

Judges

MRS JUSTICE DOBBS
LORD JUSTICE THOMAS

See more information ...

Click here to read the full judgment

Meachen v. REGINA

Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

The Appellant was tried at the Crown Court at Swansea on multiple charges including rape, indecent assault under s.14(1) of the Sexual Offences Act 1956, and causing grievous bodily harm (GBH) with and without intent under the Offences against the Person Act 1861. The trial began on 19 May 2003. The judge directed an acquittal on the rape charge due to insufficient evidence of penetration and ruled that there was no defence in law to the indecent assault and s.20 GBH charges based on precedent. Consequently, the Appellant pleaded guilty to indecent assault and s.20 GBH, while the jury convicted him on the s.18 GBH with intent charge. Sentencing followed with 10 years for s.18 GBH and 8 years concurrent for indecent assault. Applications for leave to appeal sentence were refused, but the Appellant later obtained leave to appeal out of time against conviction. After adjournments to clarify trial counsel’s recollections, the appellate court allowed the appeal against convictions on indecent assault and s.20 GBH but dismissed the appeal against the s.18 GBH conviction.

Legal Issues Presented

Whether the convictions on Counts 2 (indecent assault) and 4 (s.20 GBH) were safe given that they followed from a trial judge’s ruling that there was no defence of consent to these offences.
Whether the conviction on Count 3 (s.18 GBH with intent) was safe even if the convictions on Counts 2 and 4 were unsafe.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

The Appellant contended that consent was a defence to the charges of indecent assault and s.20 GBH, contrary to the judge’s ruling.
He argued that he neither intended nor foresaw the risk of injury from the sexual activity involving the insertion of three fingers into the complainant’s anus, which she consented to.
The serious injury was caused by the complainant’s vigorous movements, not by the Appellant’s actions.
The ruling that consent was not a defence was premature and incorrect because the Appellant had not accepted at that stage any intention or recklessness regarding injury.
The Appellant challenged the safety of his guilty pleas to Counts 2 and 4, which were entered following the judge’s ruling.

Prosecution's Arguments

The prosecution maintained that consent was no defence to the offences involving actual bodily harm or more than trivial injury, relying on established case law.
They argued that the injuries were caused by the insertion of a fist or blunt object, not by consensual sexual activity involving fingers.
The prosecution contended that the Appellant intended or was reckless as to causing really serious injury, particularly regarding Count 3.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent	Rule or Principle Cited For	Application by the Court
R v Emmett [1999] EWCA Crim 1710	Consent is no defence to offences under s.20 and s.47 where actual bodily harm or risk thereof is caused in sexual activity.	The Court relied on Emmett to support the trial judge’s preliminary ruling that consent was no defence to Counts 2 and 4, though ultimately found the ruling premature given the Appellant’s case.
R v Brown [1994] AC 212	Consent is generally not a defence to assault occasioning actual bodily harm or more serious injury outside specific exceptions.	The Court applied Brown’s principle that consent does not generally excuse infliction of bodily harm but noted no step-by-step analysis exists and that consent remains a defence to indecent assault.
R v Wilson [1996] 2 Crim. App. R. 241	Consent may be a defence in cases of bodily harm inflicted for personal adornment (e.g., branding), absent aggressive intent.	Wilson was distinguished as involving intentional harm with consent but of a different nature; thus, it was of limited assistance to the present case.
R v Barnes [2004] EWCA Crim 3246	For s.20 offences, prosecution must prove conduct was malicious (intended or reckless causing of bodily harm); consent does not negate this element.	The Court emphasized that mens rea (intent or recklessness) is an ingredient of s.20 and must be proven regardless of consent.
R v Court [1989] AC 28	Definition and mens rea of indecent assault; assault is intentional touching without consent.	The Court confirmed that absence of consent is essential to indecent assault and intent to assault is required.
R v Donovan [1934] 2 KB 498	Consent is a defence to indecent assault; actual bodily harm negates consent only if intended or likely.	Donovan was analyzed to clarify the role of consent and intention in indecent assault, supporting the principle that consent is a defence absent intention to harm.
Attorney-General's Reference No 6 of 1980 [1981] 1 QB 715	Consent is no defence to assault causing actual bodily harm in public fights; intention or recklessness to harm required.	Approved in Brown and distinguished from consensual sexual activity; relevant for mens rea in assault cases.
R v Boyea [1992] Crim LR 574	Consent irrelevant if assault likely or intended to cause bodily harm; mens rea for assault is intention or recklessness.	The Court discussed the objective test for likelihood of harm and mens rea, highlighting complex interplay with consent.
R v Slingsby [1995] Crim LR 571	Accidental injury during consensual sexual activity does not constitute assault if injury was neither intended nor foreseen.	Distinguished from cases involving deliberate infliction of harm; supported principle that unintentional injury during consensual acts is not criminal.
R v Dica [2004] EWCA Crim 1103	Deliberate infliction of bodily harm for sexual gratification remains unlawful despite consent; distinguishes consensual intercourse with health risks.	The Court clarified public policy limits on consent in cases involving deliberate infliction of harm and transmission of disease.
R v Savage; DPP v Parmenter [1992] 1 AC 699	Mens rea for assault occasioning actual bodily harm requires intention or recklessness as to causing some harm.	Confirmed that recklessness involves foresight of risk; applied in assessing intent for offences under s.20 and assault.
R v Cunningham [1957] 2 QB 396	Definition of "maliciously" as intending or recklessly causing bodily harm.	Applied in Barnes and other cases to explain mens rea for s.20 offences.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court first examined the judge’s ruling that consent was no defence to Counts 2 and 4, relying on Emmett and Brown, which establish that consent generally does not excuse offences involving actual bodily harm or more serious injury. However, the Court found that ruling premature and incorrect in this case because the Appellant’s defence was that he neither intended nor foresaw any injury, and that the injury was caused accidentally by the complainant’s vigorous movement during consensual sexual activity. The Court emphasized that mens rea—intent or recklessness to cause bodily harm—is a necessary element of the offences charged and must be proven by the prosecution. At the time of the ruling, the Appellant had not accepted such mens rea, so the judge should not have ruled that consent was no defence as a matter of law. This error rendered the guilty pleas on Counts 2 and 4 unsafe, leading to their quashing.

Regarding Count 3, the Court reviewed the judge’s summing up, which clearly identified the issues for the jury: causation of the injuries and whether the Appellant intended to cause really serious bodily harm. The judge directed the jury that consent was no defence to this charge if they were sure the prosecution’s account of causation and intent was correct. The Court found that the jury was properly directed and that the issues were fairly left to their determination. The Court saw no reason to question the safety of the conviction on Count 3 and dismissed the appeal on that count.

Holding and Implications

The Court ALLOWED the appeal against the convictions on Counts 2 (indecent assault) and 4 (s.20 GBH) and quashed those convictions, on the basis that the trial judge’s ruling that consent was no defence was premature and legally incorrect given the Appellant’s case on mens rea. The Court DISMISSED the appeal against the conviction on Count 3 (s.18 GBH with intent), finding that conviction safe and fairly determined by the jury.

The direct effect is that the Appellant’s convictions for indecent assault and s.20 GBH are overturned, but the conviction for causing grievous bodily harm with intent remains. No new legal precedent was established; the decision applies existing principles concerning consent, mens rea, and the necessity of proof of intention or recklessness in offences involving bodily harm.