ITN News & Ors v R

Factual and Procedural Background

This opinion concerns an application under section 159 of the Criminal Justice Act 1988, alternatively under section 46(10) of the Youth Justice and Criminal Evidence Act 1999, by several media organisations seeking leave to appeal against a reporting restriction order made by Judge Thirlwall at Nottingham Crown Court during the trial of three defendants charged with manslaughter following a fatal fire at their residence.

The case arose after a fire in May 2012 resulted in the deaths of six children at the home of the defendants. The defendants were subsequently convicted by a jury. A key prosecution witness was a woman referred to here as the mother, who had previously lived at the same address and was involved in a dispute with one of the defendants regarding child arrangements. The fire was alleged to have been deliberately started to implicate the mother as unfit to care for the children.

The mother and her children had been subject to extensive media coverage prior to the tragic events, including appearances in several televised programmes and widespread publication of photographs and images. During the trial, special measures were granted to protect the mother while giving evidence, including the use of protective screens to prevent her physical identity from being revealed, due to her expressed fears for her and her children’s safety.

Judge Thirlwall initially made an order under the Contempt of Court Act 1981 prohibiting publication of photographs of the mother and her children. This was later replaced by an order under section 46 of the Youth Justice and Criminal Evidence Act 1999, restricting publication of any images connecting them to the case. The media organisations sought to have this order revoked, but their application was dismissed by the Crown Court judge. The present appeal concerns that refusal to revoke the reporting restriction order.

Legal Issues Presented

1. Whether the Crown Court had jurisdiction under section 46 of the Youth Justice and Criminal Evidence Act 1999 to make a reporting restriction order prohibiting publication of photographs of the witness and her children connected to the trial.
2. Whether the eligibility criteria for such a reporting restriction were properly satisfied in this case, given the witness’s prior public identification.
3. The appropriate scope and limits of reporting restrictions under section 46 in the context of protecting witnesses and their children during criminal proceedings.
4. The proper procedural route and legal basis for media organisations to challenge such reporting restriction orders, including the application of section 159 of the Criminal Justice Act 1988.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

• The meaning of "reporting direction" under section 46(6) did not extend to the order made by the Crown Court judge, despite its limited scope.
• The Crown Court had no common law power to make such an order; the power was statutory and must be strictly construed.
• A special measures order does not automatically justify a reporting restriction; eligibility for reporting restrictions requires a separate fact-finding process.
• The protection of the children’s identities was a matter better suited to family courts rather than criminal courts.
• The mother had already been publicly identified through previous media coverage and internet publications, thus undermining the justification for the order.

Respondent's Arguments

• The Crown Court’s order was properly made under section 46 of the 1999 Act, which provides a distinct power to impose reporting restrictions in addition to special measures.
• The eligibility criteria were satisfied because publication of photographs of the children would lead to identification of the mother and could diminish the quality of her evidence due to fear or distress.
• The criminal court must control its own proceedings and may impose reporting restrictions necessary to maintain the integrity of evidence, even if family courts also provide protection.
• The order provided necessary reassurance to the witness to preserve the integrity of her evidence.
• The scope of the reporting restriction extends beyond mere naming to include images, and anonymity is a separate, more extreme measure governed by other statutory provisions.

Table of Precedents Cited

No precedents were cited in the provided opinion.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court first addressed the procedural basis for the appeal, concluding that section 159 of the Criminal Justice Act 1988 provides a proper route to challenge reporting restriction orders made under section 46 of the Youth Justice and Criminal Evidence Act 1999, even when the restriction is limited to photographs or film.

The court agreed with the view that the Crown Court has no common law power to impose reporting restrictions; such powers must be statutory. Section 46 provides a distinct statutory power to impose reporting restrictions separate from special measures, requiring a specific eligibility determination based on whether the quality of the witness’s evidence would be diminished by fear or distress from being identified.

The court rejected the argument that protection of the children’s identities should be solely a family court matter, affirming that the criminal court may impose reporting restrictions when necessary to protect the witness and the integrity of evidence.

The court carefully analysed the eligibility test under section 46, noting that it extends beyond mere naming to include images of the witness. The fact that the witness’s identity was publicly known did not preclude the order, as the purpose was to prevent further identification that could undermine the quality of evidence.

The court emphasized that reporting restrictions must be no wider than necessary and that the order made was appropriately limited to photographs and images, reflecting a balanced approach to the competing rights of the witness and the media’s right to report.

Holding and Implications

The court DISMISSED the appeal against the reporting restriction order made under section 46 of the Youth Justice and Criminal Evidence Act 1999.

The direct effect is that the reporting restriction prohibiting publication of photographs or images connecting the witness and her children to the criminal proceedings remains in force. The court found no basis to revoke the order despite prior public knowledge of the witness’s identity. No new legal precedent was established; rather, the decision affirmed the proper application of statutory provisions governing reporting restrictions to protect witness evidence quality and safety.