Ellis v R

Factual and Procedural Background

On 21 June 1955, following a two-day trial at the Central Criminal Court, the Defendant was convicted of the murder of the Victim and sentenced to death. She did not appeal her conviction, and the death sentence was carried out on 13 July 1955, making her the last woman to be executed in the United Kingdom. The case attracted significant public attention, particularly regarding the decision not to grant a reprieve, which influenced debates on the death penalty.

This appeal does not concern the propriety of the execution but challenges whether the Defendant should have been convicted of murder initially. After the execution, the Defendant's family campaigned against what they perceived as a miscarriage of justice. The case was eventually referred to the Criminal Cases Review Commission (CCRC), which on 21 February 2002 found a real possibility that the conviction would not be upheld if appealed, resulting in a reference to the Court of Appeal. This is the first time the Court of Appeal has considered the conviction.

It was undisputed that the Defendant shot the Victim, and she admitted guilt shortly after the shooting. At trial, however, she pleaded not guilty, with her defence team arguing for manslaughter by reason of provocation rather than murder. The trial judge ruled before closing speeches that the defence of provocation was not available, effectively preventing the defence from addressing the jury on this point. The jury convicted the Defendant of murder within fifteen minutes.

Legal Issues Presented

1. Whether the trial judge was correct to withdraw the defence of provocation from the jury on the basis of the law as it existed in 1955.
2. Whether developments in the law of provocation since 1955 should affect the safety of the conviction in this case.
3. Whether the statutory defence of diminished responsibility, introduced after the trial, can be applied retrospectively to render the conviction unsafe.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

• The trial judge erred in withdrawing the provocation defence from the jury given there was evidence upon which a properly directed jury could have found manslaughter by provocation under the law as it stood in 1955.
• The Crown misunderstood the law at trial by asserting that an intention to kill necessarily negated provocation, a view now recognized as incorrect.
• The judge’s ruling lacked detailed reasoning and failed to identify the evidence considered, undermining its soundness.
• The defence of provocation did not require a prima facie case but only material that could raise reasonable doubt about the absence of provocation.
• Developments in the law since 1955, including recognition of personal characteristics and "slow burn provocation," suggest the issue should have been left to the jury under modern standards.
• Although the diminished responsibility defence was not available at the time, the court should consider whether factors that would now support such a defence render the conviction unsafe.
• Fresh psychiatric evidence was tendered to support these points but was ultimately declined by the court as irrelevant to the legal issues presented.

Respondent's Arguments

• The conviction was safe and the trial fair, decided according to the law as it existed in 1955, which remains the substantive law to be applied on appeal.
• The trial judge’s withdrawal of the provocation defence was proper because there was no act immediately preceding the killing that qualified as provocation under the law then.
• The law at the time required a "sudden and temporary loss of self-control" triggered by a recognised provocative act, which was absent here.
• The Defendant’s actions were premeditated and deliberate, inconsistent with a loss of self-control.
• The statutory defence of diminished responsibility introduced in 1957 cannot be applied retrospectively to cases tried before its enactment.
• Changes in the law since 1957, including the relaxation of restrictions on what constitutes provocation and consideration of personal characteristics, are consequential to statutory amendments and not applicable retrospectively.

Table of Precedents Cited

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court first clarified that the substantive law of murder as it existed at the time of trial in 1955 must be applied, disregarding statutory changes introduced by the Homicide Act 1957, including the defence of diminished responsibility. The court accepted that the Crown’s view at trial—that an intention to kill negated provocation—was a widely held but incorrect interpretation of the law. However, this misunderstanding did not impact the judge’s actual ruling, which was based on the absence of evidence that a reasonable person provoked as the Defendant was could have reacted with the degree and method of violence that resulted in death.

The court examined the evidence of a prolonged history of violence and jealousy within the relationship but noted that the triggering events immediately preceding the killing—namely the Victim’s failure to return and concealment of his whereabouts—were omissions or non-violent acts, which under the pre-1957 common law could not constitute provocation. The law at that time required a sudden and temporary loss of self-control triggered by a recognised provocative act, which was absent here. The court rejected the notion that a prolonged "slow burn" provocation could substitute for a triggering event under the law then applicable.

The court also considered and declined to admit fresh psychiatric evidence, reasoning that it was irrelevant to the issues of provocation and diminished responsibility given the statutory context. Similarly, fresh evidence suggesting greater premeditation was rejected as it would not alter the legal conclusion.

Ultimately, the court concluded that the judge’s withdrawal of the provocation defence from the jury was correct under the law at the time, that the conviction was safe, and that the appeal was without merit.

Holding and Implications

DISMISSED.

The court upheld the Defendant’s conviction for murder, confirming that the trial judge correctly applied the law as it stood in 1955 by withdrawing the defence of provocation from the jury. The statutory defence of diminished responsibility introduced after the trial cannot be applied retrospectively to render the conviction unsafe. No new precedent was established, and the decision affirms that appeals based on developments in the law must respect the substantive law applicable at the time of the original trial. The court also expressed concern about the public interest and resource implications of revisiting historic convictions where the accused did not appeal at the time and the core facts of guilt are undisputed.