Factual and Procedural Background
In August 2006, police in the UK, with assistance from intelligence services and police forces in other states, uncovered an alleged plot involving the detonation of improvised explosive devices (IEDs) on transatlantic airliners by suicide bombers, intending to cause massive loss of life. Eleven individuals were indicted and tried at the Crown Court at Woolwich. After multiple trials before various judges, eight were convicted of conspiracy to murder and two of lesser offences. Appeals were filed against convictions and sentences, and after a hearing, leave to appeal was granted on several grounds including double jeopardy, abuse of process, and jury directions. The appeals were ultimately dismissed.
The trials involved an original indictment charging conspiracy to murder and conspiracy to commit acts of violence endangering aircraft safety. The first trial involved eight defendants; some were acquitted, and others convicted on different counts. Amendments to the indictment were made to distinguish between a conspiracy to murder generally and a conspiracy to murder by detonating IEDs on transatlantic aircraft. Subsequent retrials were held for some defendants, with applications to stay proceedings on grounds of abuse of process and fairness. The third trial concerned three defendants who were convicted after 47 days of trial. Separate trials occurred for three other defendants, resulting in convictions and sentences, with no appeals arising from those convictions except one application against sentence.
Sentences imposed ranged from 7 years to life imprisonment with minimum terms between 18 and 40 years. Applications for leave to appeal against sentence were made for some defendants.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the principle of autrefois convict (double jeopardy) barred retrials on substantially the same offence.
- Whether there was an abuse of process in retrying appellants convicted at the first trial on substantially the same offence.
- Whether a fair trial was possible in light of extensive media publicity following the first trial.
- Whether the proceedings should have been stayed prior to the third trial as not in the interests of justice or as an abuse of process.
- Whether a direction should have been given to the jury after two jurors were discharged during the third trial.
Arguments of the Parties
The opinion does not contain a detailed account of the parties' legal arguments.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent |
Rule or Principle Cited For |
Application by the Court |
| Connelly v DPP [1964] AC 1254 |
Defines scope of autrefois convict and its relationship to abuse of process. |
Used to establish that double jeopardy applies only where the offence is the same in fact and law. |
| R v Beedie [1998] QB 356 |
Clarifies application of Connelly principles. |
Supports the limited and technical scope of double jeopardy. |
| R v G [2001] 2 Cr App R 615 |
Double jeopardy plea can be raised even if counsel agreed not to do so. |
Reaffirmed that the plea is mandatory and technical. |
| Richards v The Queen [1993] AC 217 |
Privy Council decision overruling earlier cases on whether sentence is required before autrefois convict applies. |
Considered but not decided upon by the court; the court deferred to this authority. |
| Stosiek (1982) 4 Cr App R (S) 205 |
Distinguishes offences for indictment based on different legal characteristics. |
Supports that different counts must charge different offences, not just factual variations. |
| Newton (1983) 77 Cr App R 13 |
Judicial resolution of factual disputes relevant to offence charged. |
Used to support the judge's role in resolving factual issues rather than jury deciding alternative facts. |
| Young (1990) 12 Cr App R (S) |
Indictment cannot include alternative counts that do not constitute different offences. |
Supports limitation on counts in indictment to distinct offences only. |
| Dowdall and Smith (1992) 13 Cr App R (S) 441 |
Indictment must be kept short and simple; alternative factual bases not amounting to different offences are impermissible. |
Reinforces the principle of distinct offences for separate counts. |
| Efionayi (1995) 16 Cr App R (S) 380 |
Alternative counts must reflect distinct offences for jury to decide. |
Supports rejection of alternative counts differing only in factual details. |
| Coughlan & Young (1976) 63 Cr App R 33 |
Separate conspiracies can be charged even if overlapping conspirators exist. |
Used to establish that multiple conspiracies can coexist and retrials on different conspiracies are permissible. |
| Greenfield (1973) 57 Cr App R 849 |
Judge must assess role of conspirators for sentencing; distinguishes between one and multiple conspiracies. |
Supports the court's analysis that counts 1 and 1A charged distinct conspiracies. |
| Gerakiteys v The Queen [1984] HCA 8 |
Defines identity of conspiracies by agreement terms; parties may be involved in general and subsidiary conspiracies. |
Applied to confirm the existence of distinct conspiracies charged in counts 1 and 1A. |
| Bell [2010] EWCA Crim 3 |
Sets principles for ordering a second retrial, emphasizing caution and public interest. |
Guided the court's assessment of whether a second retrial was in the interests of justice. |
| Locabail (UK) v Bayfield Properties Limited [2000] QB 451 |
Test for apparent bias based on informed observer standard. |
Applied in assessing whether media publicity barred a fair trial. |
| Porter v Magill [2002] 2 AC 357 |
Affirms bias test from Locabail. |
Supported the court's evaluation of jury impartiality amid publicity. |
| R v Horseferry Road Magistrates' Court ex parte Bennett [1994] 1 AC 42 |
Principles relating to abuse of process in criminal proceedings. |
Referenced in considering abuse of process arguments for third trial. |
| R v Carter [2010] EWCA Crim 201 |
Jury directions after juror discharge; views of discharged jurors form part of jury deliberations. |
Followed in rejecting the need for special directions after juror discharge in the third trial. |
| R v Z, R v Terry [2005] 2 Cr App R 7 |
Effect of prior acquittals on subsequent trials. |
Applied by Holroyde J in ruling on autrefois acquit and jury directions. |
| R v Byrne [2002] EWCA Crim 632 |
Admissibility of evidence at retrials and effect of prior acquittals. |
Distinguished and used to assess evidence admissibility in third trial. |
| A v Secretary of State (No.2) [2006] 2 AC 221 |
Principles of common law development in harmony with international obligations. |
Referenced in submissions on double jeopardy principles. |
| S (An infant) v The Recorder of Manchester [1971] AC 481 |
House of Lords' stance on overruling precedent on autrefois convict. |
Discussed in context of conflicting authorities. |
| Bowe v R [2001] UKPC 19 |
Public interest and interests of justice in retrials. |
Guided the court's balancing of interests in ordering retrials. |
| DS v The Judges of the Cork Circuit Court and the DPP [2008] IESC 37 |
Irish Supreme Court's approach to interests of justice in retrials. |
Referenced in assessing interests of justice. |
| HM Attorney General v Associated Newspapers [2011] EWHC 418 (Admin) |
Test for publication causing substantial risk to justice. |
Considered in evaluating media publicity impact. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The court conducted a detailed analysis of the legal principles governing double jeopardy, abuse of process, and the fairness of retrials in the context of multiple trials on overlapping charges. It examined the ancient and modern principles of autrefois convict and acquit, emphasizing their narrow and technical application. The court carefully distinguished between the offences charged in counts 1 and 1A, concluding that they represented distinct conspiracies: one a general conspiracy to murder, the other a specific conspiracy to murder by detonating IEDs on transatlantic aircraft. This distinction was supported by statutory interpretation, case law on conspiracy, and the factual matrix of the indictment and trials.
The court rejected submissions that the retrials constituted double jeopardy or abuse of process, finding that the retrials were permissible as they concerned different offences or conspiracies. It held that the amendments to the indictment and the way the cases were presented to the jury maintained the necessary distinction between the conspiracies.
Regarding media publicity, the court applied established principles concerning impartiality and the ability of juries to follow judicial directions. It found no evidence that jurors had been influenced improperly by publicity and concluded that fair trials were possible despite extensive media coverage.
On the issue of retrials, the court applied the principles set out in Bell and other authorities, balancing the public interest in convicting the guilty against the hardships and potential prejudice to defendants. It found that the interests of justice justified the second retrial in this exceptional case.
The court also addressed the jury directions after the discharge of two jurors during the third trial, endorsing the approach in R v Carter that no special direction was necessary as the remaining jurors would naturally assess and adopt or reject the views of the discharged jurors.
Finally, the court considered the admissibility of evidence and the effect of prior acquittals, holding that evidence relevant to the conspiracy charged in count 1A remained admissible even if it overlapped with evidence from count 1, provided the jury were properly directed.
Holding and Implications
The court DISMISSED THE APPEALS against conviction and sentence.
The court held that the retrials did not violate the principle against double jeopardy, were not an abuse of process, and could be conducted fairly despite media publicity. It affirmed the sentences imposed, finding them appropriate given the gravity of the offences and the roles of the defendants. The decision confirms the legal framework permitting retrials on distinct conspiracies arising from the same factual matrix and clarifies the application of autrefois convict and autrefois acquit in such contexts. No new precedent was established beyond the careful application of existing principles. The direct effect is that the convictions and sentences stand, and the procedural and evidential rulings made during the trials are upheld.