REGINA v Benabbou

Factual and Procedural Background

The Appellant was convicted on 25th October 2011 of sexual assault and assault by penetration, receiving an extended sentence totaling eight years, with four years custodial. The first allegation arose from an incident on 6th March 2010, where the complainant was asleep in her boyfriend's flat when the Appellant allegedly sexually assaulted her. The Appellant denied any involvement, claiming mistaken identity. The initial trial in February 2011 resulted in a hung jury, and the Appellant was released on bail pending retrial.

The second allegation occurred on 16th April 2011 involving a different complainant and her partner. The prosecution alleged that after visiting the Appellant's shop and subsequently drinking alcohol together, the Appellant engaged in inappropriate sexual conduct, including assault by penetration. The Appellant denied the allegations, asserting fabrication to cover up theft of his possessions.

Originally charged separately, the two indictments were joined by the trial judge at the prosecution's request, over the defense's opposition. The Appellant appeals against his convictions by leave of the single judge.

Legal Issues Presented

1. Whether the trial judge erred in refusing to sever the two indictments for separate trials.
2. Whether the admission of bad character evidence, specifically the Appellant's previous conviction for rape, was appropriate.
3. Whether the admission of evidence of a prior robbery conviction was proper under the statutory provisions.
4. Whether the trial judge gave adequate directions to the jury on how to treat the evidence relating to the two counts separately and regarding cross-admissibility.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

• The Appellant argued that the two indictments should have been severed as joining them caused prejudice, especially due to the cross-admissibility of evidence which would unfairly influence the jury.
• He contended that the previous rape conviction should not have been admitted because it was a single, distinct offence committed with others under very different circumstances, and its prejudicial effect outweighed its probative value.
• The Appellant submitted that the admission of the robbery conviction was improper and linked to the wrongful admission of the rape conviction, as the latter led to an attack on the prosecution witnesses' character, which triggered admission of the robbery evidence.
• He also argued that the judge failed to provide sufficient directions to the jury on treating the two counts separately and on the use of cross-admissible evidence.

Respondent's Arguments

• The Respondent maintained that the joining of the two indictments was proper, citing the statutory framework and case law supporting the trial judge's discretion.
• They argued the previous rape conviction was admissible as evidence of propensity, given the similarities in opportunistic nature and vulnerability of the victims.
• The Respondent contended the admission of the robbery conviction was justified under section 101(1)(g) of the Criminal Justice Act 2003 because the Appellant attacked the character of prosecution witnesses.
• They did not dispute the judge's directions to the jury but emphasized the judge's entitlement to direct the jury to consider the counts separately.

Table of Precedents Cited

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court considered the statutory framework under the Indictments Act 1915 and relevant case law, particularly Ludlow, to assess whether the trial judge was correct to join the two indictments and refuse severance. The court agreed that the offences were sufficiently similar to justify a joint trial, especially given the potential cross-admissibility of evidence. The court further noted that appropriate jury directions could mitigate prejudice.

Regarding bad character evidence, the court acknowledged that the previous rape conviction was technically admissible under the principles established in Hanson. However, the court found that the limited probative value was outweighed by the significant prejudicial effect on the fairness of the trial, given the nature and circumstances of the prior offence. Admission of this evidence was deemed to have rendered the convictions unsafe.

The admission of the robbery conviction was upheld as it was properly admitted under section 101(1)(g) of the Criminal Justice Act 2003, given the Appellant's attack on prosecution witnesses' character. The court rejected the argument that this admission was linked improperly to the prior rape conviction evidence.

The court found that the trial judge did not provide sufficient directions to the jury on how to treat the two counts in relation to each other, particularly concerning the use of evidence from one count in considering the other. While the judge eventually instructed the jury to consider the counts separately, the court considered that clearer directions were warranted given the similarities between the allegations.

Holding and Implications

The appeal against conviction is allowed. The court held that the admission of the previous rape conviction rendered the convictions unsafe and necessitated quashing the convictions.

The Appellant must be retried on a fresh indictment at the designated Crown Court unless otherwise directed. The Appellant remains in custody pending retrial due to risk considerations. No new precedent was established by this decision; rather, it reaffirmed established principles governing the admissibility of bad character evidence, the discretion to join or sever indictments, and the importance of clear jury directions in joint trials.