Dean v London Borough Of Islington

Factual and Procedural Background

An appeal was made against a decision of an Employment Tribunal sitting at London (North) which concluded that the Respondent did not unlawfully discriminate against the Applicant on racial grounds. The Tribunal found that the only acts complained of within the statutory three-month time limit were those related to an appeal hearing held on 13 July 1995 before a panel of councillors. The Tribunal declined to extend time to consider earlier complaints, ruling it was not just and equitable to do so.

The Tribunal made findings of fact including that the Applicant was employed by the Respondent from 1 May 1985, later in two part-time social worker posts. The Applicant was suspended following events in the summer of 1993 and was on sick leave during the interim. On 17 March 1995, a disciplinary hearing was held considering various charges. One charge was dismissed, and the Applicant received a final written warning and demotion. The Applicant appealed against this decision, with the appeal heard by a panel of councillors chaired by Councillor Jeapes. The appeal upheld most charges and the penalty, though one charge was dismissed. The Applicant was represented by a solicitor during the appeal hearing. No complaint of racial discrimination was made at the time of the appeal hearing. The Tribunal found no inference of unlawful racial discrimination at the appeal hearing.

The appeal before the Employment Tribunal was dismissed, with the Tribunal concluding that the appeal hearing was a one-off act and not part of a continuing act of discrimination. The Tribunal also found the Applicant failed to discharge the burden of proof to show unlawful racial discrimination within the relevant time period.

At the Preliminary Hearing before this Tribunal, grounds of appeal were set out, including whether the Employment Tribunal erred in treating the appeal hearing as a one-off act, in refusing cross-examination of a former line manager, and in refusing oral evidence from a witness. The Tribunal also invited submissions on whether it should entertain an appeal against the refusal to extend time under section 68(6) of the Race Relations Act 1976.

Legal Issues Presented

1. Whether the Employment Tribunal erred in concluding that the appeal hearing on 13 July 1995 was a one-off or separate act for the purposes of the time limit under the Race Relations Act 1976.
2. Whether the Employment Tribunal erred in refusing to extend time under section 68(6) of the Race Relations Act 1976 on just and equitable grounds.
3. Whether the Employment Tribunal erred in refusing the Appellant's representative the opportunity to cross-examine a former line manager.
4. Whether the Employment Tribunal erred in refusing to hear oral evidence from a witness.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

• The Employment Tribunal incorrectly treated the appeal hearing as a one-off act rather than part of a continuing act of discrimination.
• The Tribunal erred by not allowing cross-examination of the former line manager, which was relevant to the discrimination complaint.
• The Tribunal erred in refusing to hear oral evidence from a witness whose statement was submitted.
• The Tribunal should have extended the time limit for bringing the complaint based on the internal disciplinary and appeal process pursued by the Applicant.

Respondent's Arguments

• The appeal hearing was properly treated as a separate, one-off act and not a continuing act of discrimination.
• The Applicant failed to prove unlawful racial discrimination within the statutory time limit.
• The refusal to allow cross-examination of the former line manager did not cause unfairness as her role was background, not integral to the final appeal hearing.
• The refusal to hear oral evidence from the witness was within the Tribunal's discretion and did not result in unfairness.
• The refusal to extend time was appropriate given the circumstances and the Applicant's knowledge and conduct.

Table of Precedents Cited

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court carefully analysed the statutory framework under section 68 of the Race Relations Act 1976, particularly the three-month time limit and the discretion to extend time if just and equitable. It examined whether the appeal hearing on 13 July 1995 constituted a one-off act or part of a continuing act of discrimination. Relying on precedent, the Court concluded that the appeal hearing was a separate act and that section 68(7)(b), which treats acts extending over a period as done at the end of that period, did not apply because no policy, regime, or practice was alleged.

Regarding the discretion to extend time, the Court acknowledged the heavy burden on the Appellant to show error in the Employment Tribunal's exercise of discretion. It considered the Applicant's pursuit of internal grievance and appeal procedures but found that the Employment Tribunal had properly taken this into account. The Applicant did not rely on the internal process as a reason for delay, and her allegations of discrimination were unspecific and related to events long before the appeal hearing.

The Court found no unfairness or error in the Employment Tribunal's refusal to allow cross-examination of the former line manager or to hear oral evidence from the witness, as their involvement was background to the appeal hearing, which was the act complained of.

Overall, the Court upheld the Employment Tribunal's findings that the appeal hearing was the relevant act, that the Applicant failed to prove unlawful racial discrimination within the time limit, and that the refusal to extend time was not erroneous.

Holding and Implications

The Court's final decision was to DISMISS THE APPEAL.

This ruling confirms that, for claims under the Race Relations Act 1976, the relevant "act complained of" must be clearly identified and that internal disciplinary or grievance procedures do not automatically constitute a continuing act of discrimination. The decision underscores the strict application of statutory time limits and the high threshold for extending those limits on just and equitable grounds. The refusal to extend time effectively limits the Applicant's ability to bring complaints outside the statutory period unless a continuing act or policy is demonstrated. No new precedent was set; the decision affirms existing principles regarding time limits, burden of proof, and procedural fairness in discrimination claims.