IK (Returnees, Records, IFA) Turkey CG

Factual and Procedural Background

The Appellant appeals, with permission, against an Adjudicator's determination allowing the Respondent's appeal against the Appellant's decision to issue removal directions and refuse asylum. The Respondent is a citizen of Turkey and an Alevi Kurd from a village in Karamanmaras in southeast Turkey. The Respondent had sympathised with and provided low-level assistance to the PKK. He was detained and ill-treated by Turkish authorities in 1997 during two separate incidents but lived safely in Istanbul under a false identity for four years thereafter. The military sought him for compulsory service in 2001, prompting his illegal departure to the UK where he claimed asylum.

The Tribunal initially allowed the Appellant's appeal, but this was quashed on appeal to the Court of Appeal and remitted for reconsideration in light of new country guidance. The appeal was reheard alongside six other appeals. This determination serves as the lead decision, providing detailed country guidance and addressing both generic and specific issues arising from the appeals.

Legal Issues Presented

1. What is the ambit and accessibility of the information systems maintained by the Turkish authorities?
2. In what circumstances is there a real risk that a returnee to Istanbul Airport will be placed in the non-routine investigation stream and subjected to detailed questioning?
3. If a person faces non-routine investigation, what should they be expected to say when questioned and what further information is reasonably likely to be accessed?
4. Does the Tribunal’s guidance in A (Turkey) require review in light of subsequent developments?
5. Should an individual (and their family) be expected to live in Turkey without registration with the local Mukhtar to avoid persecution?
6. Is there an internal relocation option for a person at real risk of persecution in their home area?

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

• The Adjudicator erred in concluding that brief detentions would be recorded on computerised systems and revealed at airport checks, lacking material support.
• Insufficient consideration was given to whether there were reasonable grounds or a real risk of persecution if detentions were revealed, especially given the Respondent's detentions were brief and without charge.
• The scope of the GBTS computer system is limited and does not include records of detentions without court sanction.
• Information beyond GBTS is speculative and lacks evidence of accessibility at airport immigration controls.
• Individuals should not be expected to live without local Mukhtar registration; such a requirement would be unduly harsh.

Respondent's Arguments

• The Respondent submitted evidence that Turkish authorities maintain extensive records including detentions and other secret information ("tab" records) centrally accessible through KIHBI.
• Detentions, even without formal charges, are significant and increase risk of ill-treatment on return.
• There is a real risk of persecution on return to Turkey arising from the Respondent’s Kurdish ethnicity, Alevi faith, family links to PKK, and history of detention and ill-treatment.
• Internal relocation may not be viable due to pervasive surveillance and risk in home areas.

Table of Precedents Cited

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Tribunal carefully analysed both the specific facts of the Respondent’s case and the broader country guidance on Turkey, particularly focusing on the scope and accessibility of Turkish information systems relevant to returnees. The Tribunal distinguished between "arrests" requiring court intervention, which are recorded on the GBTS system, and "detentions" by security forces without judicial sanction, which are not recorded on GBTS but may be held in other local or secret records.

The Tribunal accepted credible evidence that GBTS is a well-defined, accessible computerised system containing limited categories of information such as outstanding arrest warrants, previous arrests, travel restrictions, draft evasion, and tax arrears. It rejected broader claims that all detentions and secret intelligence records are centrally computerised and accessible at airport immigration controls, noting inconsistencies and lack of sourcing in some expert testimony.

Additional information systems exist, including border control records (tracking legal arrivals/departures and lists of undesirable aliens), local Nufus registration records, judicial records, and "tab" or intelligence records held by various security agencies. These may not be centrally accessible or available at the airport but can be accessed by authorities upon further enquiry, especially if initial questioning raises concerns.

The Tribunal outlined the procedural steps at Istanbul Airport for returnees: initial screening at immigration booths using GBTS and border control data, with possible transfer to airport police station for extended questioning if concerns arise. Risks of ill-treatment, including torture, are generally not found during initial questioning but may arise if transferred to anti-terror police or intelligence services.

The Tribunal considered subsequent developments since the A (Turkey) determination, including the ending of the PKK ceasefire, Al Qaeda attacks, and updated EU reports on Turkey’s human rights record. It acknowledged legislative and institutional reforms by the Turkish Government and a policy of zero tolerance towards torture, but concluded that torture remains a risk in practice and that the long-established risk assessments remain valid.

On internal relocation, the Tribunal concluded that while many Kurds face highest risk in their home areas, relocation to other parts of Turkey may be viable if the risk of persecution is not present there. Registration with the local Mukhtar is generally compulsory and necessary for many basic rights and services; expecting an individual to live without such registration would be unduly harsh in most cases.

Applying these principles to the Respondent’s case, the Tribunal found the Adjudicator’s conclusion that the Respondent faces a real risk of persecution on return was sustainable. The Respondent’s Kurdish ethnicity, Alevi faith, family links to PKK members, history of detention and ill-treatment, and draft evasion status were all relevant risk factors. The Tribunal noted the Respondent’s detentions were brief and occurred in the context of a village clearance policy rather than individual targeting, and that he lived safely in Istanbul for years thereafter. However, the military’s later pursuit for conscription and the information likely accessible to authorities on return justified the risk finding. The Tribunal rejected the appeal on these grounds.

Holding and Implications

The Tribunal DISMISSED the Appellant’s appeal against the Adjudicator’s determination allowing the Respondent’s appeal against removal and refusal of asylum.

The decision confirms that:

• The GBTS system in Turkey is limited in scope and accessible at border controls, but does not include records of detentions without judicial sanction.
• Additional secret or local records may exist but are not routinely accessible at airports; further enquiries may be made if initial questioning raises concerns.
• Returnees with relevant adverse histories, particularly Kurdish individuals with family or personal links to the PKK, face a real risk of ill-treatment including torture on return, especially in conflict-affected home areas.
• Internal relocation within Turkey may be viable in some cases, but living without local registration is generally not a reasonable expectation.

No new precedent was established beyond updating and consolidating previous country guidance on Turkey, notably superseding seven prior Tribunal decisions. The ruling affirms the application of established legal principles and evidentiary standards in asylum appeals concerning Turkey.