Adebowale v Peninsula Business Services Ltd

Factual and Procedural Background

This opinion concerns an appeal by the Appellant against the decision of the Employment Tribunal in Manchester, which dismissed his claims of unfair constructive dismissal and race discrimination against his former employer, Company A. The Tribunal allowed the Appellant, apparently out of time, to amend the proceedings to include a breach of contract claim, in which the Appellant succeeded to a limited financial extent. The Tribunal’s key factual findings centered on a meeting held on 21 December 2000 concerning the Appellant’s driving licence status after he was stopped by police for driving without a valid UK licence. The Tribunal found that this meeting was not disciplinary, did not address prior complaints about the Appellant’s conduct, and that the employer’s conduct was justified. The Appellant’s resignation following the meeting was held to be unjustified and did not amount to constructive dismissal. The Tribunal further found no evidence of race discrimination by the employer.

Legal Issues Presented

1. Whether the Employment Tribunal erred in concluding that the meeting on 21 December 2000 was not disciplinary and did not amount to a repudiatory breach justifying constructive dismissal.
2. Whether the Tribunal’s factual findings, particularly its preference for the employer’s witnesses over the Appellant, were perverse or unreasonable.
3. Whether the Tribunal failed to properly consider or apply the Code of Practice relevant to disciplinary procedures.
4. Whether the Tribunal failed to make necessary findings of fact concerning alleged differential treatment and race discrimination relating to two other employees, Mr McGlashan and Mrs Evans.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

• The Appellant challenged the Tribunal’s factual findings as perverse, invoking Wednesbury principles, arguing the Tribunal’s preference for certain witnesses was unreasonable.
• The Appellant contended that the Tribunal should have considered the Code of Practice on disciplinary procedures, even though the meeting was found not to be disciplinary.
• The Appellant objected to the Tribunal’s reference to prior severe criticisms against him by other Employment Tribunal Chairmen without recording his denials, invoking Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights analogously.
• The Appellant alleged differential treatment and race discrimination based on comparisons with two other employees who had no driving licences but were treated differently, arguing the Tribunal failed to make findings on this point.
• The Appellant sought to obtain Notes of Evidence from the Chairman regarding three witnesses to support his appeal grounds.

Respondent's Arguments

The opinion does not contain a detailed account of the Respondent's legal arguments, as the Respondents did not appear at the preliminary hearing and were given no real notice of the specific ground that was considered potentially arguable.

Table of Precedents Cited

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court carefully reviewed the Tribunal’s factual findings, emphasizing that the meeting on 21 December 2000 concerned only the Appellant’s driving licence issue and was not disciplinary. The Tribunal’s conclusion that the Appellant’s resignation was unjustified and did not amount to constructive dismissal was upheld, as there was no repudiatory breach by the employer.

The Appellant’s challenge based on perversity was rejected because the standard for overturning factual findings in Employment Tribunals is high, and the Court found no arguable perversity.

The Court rejected the Appellant’s claim that the Tribunal should have applied the Code of Practice since the meeting was not disciplinary, rendering this point irrelevant.

Regarding the Appellant’s complaint about references to prior criticisms without recording his denials, the Court held this was a misconception; the Tribunal merely noted the existence of prior criticisms without relying on them for its decision.

The only potentially arguable ground was the Appellant’s contention that the Tribunal failed to make findings on alleged discriminatory treatment relating to two other employees, Mr McGlashan and Mrs Evans. The Court acknowledged the absence of clear findings in this regard and considered it appropriate to remit this issue back to the Employment Tribunal for clarification.

The Court noted procedural irregularities, including the lack of a Skeleton Argument from the Appellant and the Respondents’ absence, but nevertheless proceeded to dispose of the appeal save for the remitted ground.

Holding and Implications

The Court DISMISSED all grounds of appeal except for ground 6(e), which concerned the alleged failure by the Employment Tribunal to make findings on the treatment of other employees potentially relevant to race discrimination.

The Court ordered that ground 6(e) be referred back to the Employment Tribunal for them to clarify whether findings were made, expressly or impliedly, concerning Mr McGlashan and Mrs Evans and whether any evidence relating to them indicated discrimination against the Appellant.

The preliminary hearing was adjourned pending the Employment Tribunal’s response. The parties were granted liberty to make written submissions to the Employment Tribunal within fourteen days to assist in this determination.

No new precedent was established; the decision primarily affects the procedural posture of the Appellant’s appeal, allowing a limited remittal for clarification while dismissing all other grounds.