Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Attorney(S)
- MS H GREWAL (of Counsel) Instructed By: Commission for Racial Equality Elliot House 10-12 Allington Street London SW1E 5EH
- MISS I SIMMER (of Counsel) Instructed By: Borough Solicitor Haringey Council Corporate Services Alexandra House 10 Station Road Wood Green London N22 7TR
Judges
- LORD DAVIES OF COITY CBE
- HIS HONOUR JUDGE J R REID QC
- MRS R A VICKERS
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Al-Azzawi v. Haringey Council
Smart Summary
Factual and Procedural Background
The appeal arose from decisions of an Employment Tribunal at London (North) concerning allegations by Plaintiff, a senior architect of Iraqi Arabic origin employed by Company A, against Defendant, the Council. Plaintiff claimed racial discrimination, victimisation, and unfair dismissal related to his employment and redundancy process within the Design Partnership Department. The initial Tribunal dismissed Plaintiff's claims in case number 6001211/99 but found racial discrimination in an earlier case (2205729/97), awarding Plaintiff £8,000 plus interest. Defendant cross-appealed against that finding and award. The Tribunal also dismissed a further complaint of discrimination and victimisation by Plaintiff in case number 6003039/99, which was not appealed. The Tribunal hearing lasted nine days in November 1999. Plaintiff’s complaints included a racial slur made by a fellow employee (Mr Armstrong) for which Defendant was vicariously liable, alleged unfair redundancy selection, victimisation linked to prior complaints, and failure to provide a performance pro forma. The appeal and cross-appeal concerned these findings and the adequacy of the Tribunal’s fact-finding and legal conclusions.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the Tribunal erred in law by failing to make primary findings of fact necessary to support its conclusions on discrimination in the redundancy selection process.
- Whether the Tribunal erred in law by failing to make a necessary finding of fact regarding differential treatment of Plaintiff and another employee in the provision of a performance pro forma.
- Whether the Tribunal erred in law by considering events occurring after the racial slur in determining whether Defendant took all reasonably practicable steps to prevent the discriminatory act, affecting Defendant’s liability under section 32(3) of the Race Relations Act 1976.
Arguments of the Parties
Appellant's Arguments
- The Tribunal failed to find primary facts on whether Plaintiff’s interview marking was fair, merely accepting management’s decision without explanation, which was central to the discrimination claim.
- The Tribunal did not properly determine whether Plaintiff was treated less favourably than another employee regarding the performance pro forma, with evidence suggesting differential treatment.
- On cross-appeal, the Tribunal erred in relying on post-incident disciplinary events to find Defendant had not taken all reasonably practicable steps to prevent discrimination, despite evidence of prior racist incidents and inadequate penalties.
- The damages award of £8,000 was excessive relative to the single discriminatory remark and circumstances, especially since the Tribunal had indicated a maximum award of £5,000 during the hearing.
Defendant's Arguments
- The Tribunal’s findings clearly showed that Defendant had an effective racial awareness policy properly implemented and did not merely pay lip service to it.
- The redundancy process was properly conducted without discrimination, supported by clear findings of fact.
- The Tribunal found that no performance pro forma was sent to the other employee, so there was no basis to infer differential treatment.
- The Tribunal correctly found that Defendant took all reasonable steps to prevent discrimination, and criticisms of the disciplinary process were irrelevant and unjustified.
- The damages award was disproportionate to the act of discrimination, which was a single remark not directed at Plaintiff, and failed to account for other factors affecting Plaintiff’s distress.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent |
Rule or Principle Cited For |
Application by the Court |
| Chapman v Simon [1994] IRLR 124 |
Tribunal must clearly set out primary facts before drawing inferences. |
Cited to confirm that failure to find primary facts prevents drawing inferences of discrimination. |
| Anya v Oxford University [2001] ICR 847 |
Tribunal’s duty to find primary facts; no inference without such findings. |
Supported the principle that Tribunal’s fact-finding is essential before concluding discrimination. |
| King v Great Britain-China Centre [1992] ICR 516 |
Tribunal may draw inference of discrimination if no satisfactory explanation for difference in treatment. |
Referenced as legal basis for drawing inferences in discrimination cases. |
| Glasgow City Council v Zafar [1998] ICR 120 |
Similar principle as King regarding drawing inferences of discrimination. |
Applied to support the Tribunal’s approach to discrimination claims. |
| Marks & Spencer v Martins [1998] ICR 1005 |
Employer liability under Race Relations Act and defence of taking all reasonably practicable steps. |
Clarified that subsequent events are relevant only to show if policies were effectively operated prior to the act. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Court found that the Tribunal’s decision was carefully reasoned and contained the necessary primary fact findings. The Tribunal properly concluded that the redundancy selection process was fair and non-discriminatory, accepting that Plaintiff’s interview performance was inferior in relevant respects despite his academic qualifications and experience. The Tribunal’s findings regarding the performance pro forma were also upheld, as it accepted that it was not standard practice to issue such forms and no difference in treatment was established.
Regarding Defendant’s liability for the racial slur by Mr Armstrong, the Court held that the Tribunal erred in focusing on disciplinary events occurring after the incident. Such subsequent events are only relevant to demonstrate whether Defendant’s policies were genuinely implemented before the act. The Tribunal had rejected the suggestion that policies were merely superficial and found that Defendant had taken all reasonably practicable steps to prevent discrimination, including training and disciplinary measures. Therefore, Defendant’s defence under section 32(3) of the Race Relations Act 1976 was made out, and the cross-appeal was allowed, dismissing the claim for racial discrimination.
The Court did not need to decide on the appropriateness of the damages award but expressed concern that it appeared disproportionate to the single discriminatory remark and the overall circumstances.
Holding and Implications
The Court DISMISSED the appeal by Plaintiff and ALLOWED the cross-appeal by Defendant.
This resulted in the dismissal of Plaintiff’s claims of racial discrimination, victimisation, and unfair dismissal. The Tribunal’s findings on the fairness of the redundancy process and absence of differential treatment were upheld. Defendant was found to have taken all reasonable steps to prevent discrimination, negating liability under the relevant statutory defence. The Court’s decision reversed the prior award of compensation. No new legal precedent was established; rather, the judgment clarified the proper application of statutory defences and the necessity of Tribunal fact-finding in discrimination claims.
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