TWS, R (on the application of) v Manchester City Council

Factual and Procedural Background

The claim concerns the lawfulness of planning permission granted by Manchester City Council in July 2012 for the development of a football stadium at Moston. FC United, a community-based football club established in 2005 and currently sharing a ground at Gigg Lane, sought to develop its own stadium. After an initial planning permission for a site at Ten Acres Lane did not materialize, a subsequent application was made for a site at the Ronald Johnson playing fields in Moston, leased from the City Council. The development proposed included a stadium with a capacity of about 5,000 spectators, a clubhouse, sports pitches, car parking, and landscaping.

The claimant, a local resident and member of a residents association, challenged the legal validity of the planning permission. The claim was lodged on 28 September 2012 and raised two principal complaints: the alleged failure of the City Council to require an environmental impact assessment (EIA) for the development, and the alleged failure to impose sufficient restrictions on the use of the development in the planning conditions. The claim proceeded to a rolled-up hearing combining permission to apply for judicial review and the substantive claim.

The City Council had undertaken a screening opinion under the EIA regulations in 2011, concluding that an EIA was not required. The planning application was accompanied by various assessments, including noise and transport reports. The City Council granted planning permission subject to 44 conditions and section 106 agreements imposing obligations on FC United, including limitations on the use of the stadium pitch and noise mitigation measures. The claimant challenged the lawfulness of the permission on several grounds, with three main issues remaining for determination: the adequacy of restrictions on the stadium's use, the adequacy of noise control conditions, and the lawfulness of the EIA screening process.

Legal Issues Presented

1. Whether the City Council unlawfully granted planning permission for use of the stadium on an unlimited number of days per year and at unrestricted times of day and night.
2. Whether the City Council unlawfully granted permission without including conditions to ensure compliance with noise standards and limits as suggested by FC United's noise assessment.
3. Whether the City Council failed to undertake a lawful Environmental Impact Assessment screening exercise under the EIA regulations.

Arguments of the Parties

Claimant's Arguments

• The City Council should have imposed express restrictions limiting the number of days and hours the stadium could be used, as the absence of such conditions unlawfully permitted a substantial alteration to the development and deprived consultees of an opportunity to comment on the extended use.
• The planning application and supporting documents assumed a limited number of matches and community uses, but no assessment was made for unrestricted use or large-scale non-sporting events, nor for noise from spectators' movements.
• Existing conditions (notably conditions 2, 6, and 7) did not provide sufficient control over the frequency or timing of stadium use, and the section 106 agreement left gaps, such as no limitation outside the defined football season.
• The planning permission lacked conditions fixing noise standards, specifying monitoring locations, or adequately controlling noise from the public address system, plant, clubhouse, and pitches, thus neglecting matters it should have addressed.
• The City Council's EIA screening opinion was unlawful because it failed to apply the precautionary approach, wrongly equated localized impacts with insignificant impacts, failed to consider use by other users or non-football events, improperly took into account mitigation measures, and irrationally concluded no significant environmental effects would arise.

City Council's Arguments

• The City Council exercised proper planning judgment in determining what controls on stadium use were sufficient, and conditions 2, 6, and 7, together with other conditions and section 106 obligations, provided comprehensive and enforceable controls on the number of events and hours of use.
• Condition 2 encompasses both construction and use of the development, incorporating the application documents which indicate the anticipated use, allowing the Council to control use effectively.
• The noise conditions imposed, including conditions 23, 24, 28, 37, and 38, along with the section 106 obligations, provide an adequate and lawful regime for controlling noise impacts, addressing local concerns appropriately.
• The EIA screening process was thorough, properly applying the statutory criteria and government guidance, considering the characteristics of the development, its location, and potential impacts, and concluding reasonably that no significant environmental effects were likely.
• The City Council did not unlawfully rely on mitigation measures as a substitute for EIA, but rather concluded that the development itself was unlikely to have significant effects, with mitigation measures reinforcing that conclusion.

FC United's Arguments

• Supported the City Council's submissions that the planning conditions and section 106 obligations together provide a comprehensive and legally valid control regime over the use of the stadium and noise impacts.
• Asserted that the section 106 agreement and deed of variation effectively limit the number of days the stadium pitch may be used and the hours of use, including for all events.
• Maintained that the noise assessment and conditions imposed, including the requirement for noise limiters and acoustic insulation, adequately address noise concerns.
• Agreed that the City Council's EIA screening was lawful and well-founded on the information available.

Table of Precedents Cited

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court first addressed the issue of whether the planning permission unlawfully allowed unrestricted use of the stadium. It found that the application did not propose fixed limits on the number of days or hours of use, but rather provided broad indications of likely use. The conditions imposed, particularly conditions 2, 6, and 7, combined with the section 106 agreement and its deed of variation, provided an effective and enforceable control regime. The court emphasized that the imposition of conditions is a matter of planning judgment, which the court will not interfere with absent irrationality. The claimant's submissions that additional express restrictions were legally required were rejected.

On noise control, the court noted that the City Council had carefully considered the noise impacts through expert reports and advice from its environmental health officers. The conditions imposed addressed various noise sources and included requirements for acoustic insulation, noise limitation, and an acoustic fence. The absence of conditions requiring specific noise monitoring was not unlawful, as it was a matter for planning judgment. The court found no legal error or perversity in the City Council's approach.

Regarding the EIA screening, the court held that the City Council correctly identified the development as Schedule 2 urban development and properly applied the selection criteria in Schedule 3 of the regulations. It undertook a detailed and structured assessment of the characteristics of the development, its location, and potential impacts. The conclusion that no significant environmental effects were likely was supported by the evidence and was not irrational. The court rejected the claimant's arguments that the screening failed to apply the precautionary principle or improperly considered mitigation measures. The City Council's repeated reviews of the screening opinion further supported its reasoned judgment.

Finally, the court considered the adequacy of the reasons given in the decision notice. It found that the omission of two paragraphs from the Head of Planning's report was an administrative error and that the reasons in the notice were minimal but not so deficient as to invalidate the permission. The court ordered the City Council to issue fresh reasons including the omitted paragraphs to ensure compliance with statutory requirements.

Holding and Implications

The court held that the claim for judicial review fails on all grounds.

The planning permission granted by the City Council is lawful. The conditions and section 106 agreements provide a comprehensive and enforceable regime controlling the use of the stadium and addressing noise concerns. The City Council's EIA screening opinion was valid and properly reasoned. The omission of parts of the reasons in the decision notice does not invalidate the permission but should be remedied by the City Council issuing fresh reasons. No new precedent was established; the decision affirms established principles regarding planning conditions, EIA screening, and the scope of judicial review in planning matters.