Allitt, Re

Factual and Procedural Background

In May 1993, the Defendant, a State Enrolled Nurse aged 31, was convicted of the murder of four young children, the attempted murder of three others, and causing grievous bodily harm with intent on six further children. All victims were under her care in the paediatric ward of The Hospital. She was acquitted of charges relating to two additional children. The Defendant was sentenced to 13 concurrent life terms of imprisonment.

At the time of sentencing in 1993, the Home Secretary was responsible for setting the minimum period to be served before eligibility for release on licence in mandatory life sentences. The trial judge recommended a minimum period of 30 years, which was agreed by the Lord Chief Justice. However, the Home Secretary did not set a minimum period, nor has any subsequent Home Secretary done so, leaving the Defendant without a notified tariff.

Under the Criminal Justice Act 2003, the absence of a Home Secretary determination requires the case to be referred to the High Court to decide whether a whole life sentence or a minimum term should be set. This judgment addresses that reference, considering representations made on behalf of the Defendant and the relevant statutory framework.

The offences involved multiple acts of suffocation, injection of air or drugs, and other serious harm inflicted on vulnerable children in what should have been a safe hospital environment. The Defendant’s mental health was a significant factor, with evidence of severe personality disorders and complex psychiatric conditions presented.

Legal Issues Presented

1. Whether the Defendant should serve a whole life sentence or a determinate minimum term before eligibility for release on licence.
2. The appropriate minimum period of detention reflecting retribution and general deterrence, having regard to the seriousness of the offences and the Defendant’s mental condition.
3. Whether the Court should depart from the trial judge’s and Lord Chief Justice’s original recommendation of a 30-year minimum term.
4. Compliance with Article 7 of the European Convention on Human Rights concerning retrospective increase of penalties.
5. Application and interpretation of paragraphs 5 to 8 of Schedule 22 to the Criminal Justice Act 2003 and section 269 of the Act.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

• It would be unlawful and contrary to Article 7 ECHR to impose a minimum term exceeding 30 years, as this would amount to a heavier penalty than applicable at the time of the offence.
• The Home Secretary, if he had set a tariff, would likely have fixed a period shorter than any proposed above 30 years, influenced by political considerations.
• Imposing a longer tariff many years after sentencing would be inhumane and contrary to natural justice.
• The Defendant’s mental disorder should be considered a mitigating factor reducing culpability and thus the minimum term.
• Preference should be given to medical evidence supporting the Defendant’s diminished responsibility and mental health condition at the time of the offences.

Court's Observations on Evidence

• The Court preferred the psychiatric evidence of Professor Peckitt over that of Professor Meadow, noting the former’s forensic expertise and more nuanced diagnosis including sadistic elements in the Defendant’s personality disorder.
• The Court acknowledged the Defendant was suffering from a long-standing abnormality of mind, including severe personality disorders, at the time of the offences.
• The Court rejected submissions that the Defendant’s progress since the offences justified reducing the minimum term.

Table of Precedents Cited

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court’s primary function was to determine the minimum period the Defendant must serve before release on licence can be considered, focusing on retribution and deterrence rather than risk assessment, which remains the remit of the Mental Health Review Tribunal and Parole Board.

The Court acknowledged the extreme seriousness of the offences, involving multiple murders and grievous harm to vulnerable children in a trusted environment, constituting a grave breach of trust. The absence of mitigating factors other than the Defendant’s mental health was noted.

The Court carefully evaluated the psychiatric evidence, preferring the expert forensic psychiatric report of Professor Peckitt, which identified sadistic elements and a complex personality disorder. This contrasted with earlier evidence from Professor Meadow, whose expertise was limited to paediatrics and who did not fully appreciate the psychiatric complexity.

Recognising the Defendant’s long-standing abnormality of mind, the Court concluded that this warranted departure from a whole life order, which would otherwise have been appropriate given the gravity of the offences.

The Court found it inappropriate to increase the tariff beyond the original 30 years recommended by the trial judge and Lord Chief Justice, particularly given the Home Secretary’s failure to set a tariff despite ample opportunity. The Court rejected the argument that a longer tariff would breach Article 7 ECHR, noting that life imprisonment was the penalty in effect at the time of the offences.

In applying paragraph 8 of Schedule 22 to the Criminal Justice Act 2003, the Court concluded that the Home Secretary would not have imposed a whole life order and would likely have set a tariff no greater than the judicial recommendation. The Court also rejected the submission that the Defendant’s progress since conviction warranted a reduction in the tariff.

Ultimately, the Court ordered that the early release provisions apply after the Defendant has served 30 years less the time spent on remand, fixing the minimum period at 28 years and 175 days.

Holding and Implications

The Court held that the Defendant shall serve a minimum term of 28 years and 175 days before becoming eligible for release on licence, applying the early release provisions accordingly.

The Court declined to impose a whole life order, acknowledging the Defendant’s mental disorder as a mitigating factor but affirming the gravity of the offences. The decision respects the original judicial recommendations and the Home Secretary’s historical practice, providing clarity on the minimum term after a prolonged period without a tariff determination.

No new precedent was set beyond the application of existing statutory provisions and principles to this particular case. The ruling delineates the respective roles of the judiciary, the Home Secretary, and mental health tribunals in sentencing and release decisions for offenders with complex psychiatric profiles.