Lexi Holdings Plc v Luqman & Ors

Factual and Procedural Background

The Appellant was sentenced to multiple concurrent terms of imprisonment for contempt of court, including three terms of two years, commencing 2nd July 2007. The contempt proceedings arose from allegations brought by the administrators of Company A concerning a substantial commercial fraud, of which the Appellant was alleged to be the principal perpetrator. The sentencing judge found most of the grounds supporting the contempt application proven to the criminal standard. The imposed sentences were the maximum available under the Contempt of Court Act 1981. Under early release provisions, the Appellant was due for unconditional release after serving half the term, i.e., on 2nd July 2008. The Appellant sought permission for temporary release on licence from the governor of the prison where he was serving his sentence, on terms similar to those applicable to prisoners convicted of criminal offences.

The application was initially made without notice and based on the Prison Service Order 6300 (PSO 6300), paragraph 5.2, which suggests that prisoners sentenced for contempt may not be granted temporary release without the permission of the clerk of the court concerned. This raised uncertainty as to the identity of the relevant court officer in the High Court context and whether the sentencing judge’s permission was required. The court directed service of skeleton arguments and held an oral hearing to clarify these issues.

Legal Issues Presented

1. Whether the sentencing court or judge has jurisdiction or a judicial role in granting permission for temporary release on licence to a prisoner sentenced for contempt of court.
2. Whether paragraph 5.2 of PSO 6300 lawfully requires the permission of the sentencing judge before temporary release may be granted to a contempt prisoner.
3. The proper interpretation and application of Rule 9 of the Prison Rules 1999 regarding temporary release of prisoners sentenced for contempt.
4. The appropriate allocation of costs arising from the application and hearing.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

• Rule 9 of the Prison Rules confers discretion exclusively on the Secretary of State or, practically, the prison governor, to grant temporary release; no other party, including the sentencing court, should have a veto or permission role.
• Paragraph 5.2 of PSO 6300, if read literally as requiring the sentencing court’s permission, unlawfully delegates the Secretary of State’s discretion and should be interpreted as requiring only consultation with the sentencing court, not permission.
• The application for temporary release on compassionate grounds should be considered solely by the prison governor, without judicial interference or a requirement for court permission.
• If consultation with the sentencing court is needed, it should be initiated by the prison governor, not the prisoner.

Claimant's Arguments

• The grant of temporary release is a matter exclusively for the Secretary of State under Rule 9 of the Prison Rules, and the sentencing court has no role in granting permission.
• The sentencing court retains jurisdiction only to entertain applications by the contemnor to purge contempt or for exceptional release under RSC Order 52, Rule 8(1), but not for temporary release on licence.
• The present application was misconceived as it did not rely on the proper statutory basis for judicial intervention and should be dismissed.
• Costs should be awarded against the Appellant due to the improper framing of the application necessitating opposition and a contested hearing.

Table of Precedents Cited

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court began by contextualising PSO 6300 paragraph 5.2 within the statutory framework governing temporary release, emphasising that Rule 9 of the Prison Rules 1999 confers exclusive discretion to the Secretary of State, who acts through the prison governor. The court noted that PSO 6300, as a non-statutory guidance document, cannot contradict or unlawfully delegate the statutory discretion vested in the Secretary of State.

The court found paragraph 5.2 to be ambiguous and misleading, particularly as it was interpreted by the Prison Service as requiring the sentencing judge's permission for temporary release of a contempt prisoner. This interpretation was held to be unlawful and inconsistent with the statutory scheme. The sentencing judge's judicial role ends upon imposition of sentence; thereafter, entitlement to temporary release is a matter for the prison authorities under Rule 9.

The court accepted that limited consultation between the prison governor and the sentencing court’s administrative officers may be appropriate to avoid scheduling conflicts or to provide relevant sentencing information, but this does not amount to a delegation of discretion or judicial involvement in the decision.

The court expressed concern that paragraph 5.2’s wording may have led to contempt prisoners being treated less favourably than other prisoners in relation to temporary release, which is contrary to the statutory framework.

On costs, the court recognised that the application was initially framed improperly, justifying opposition and a contested hearing, but also acknowledged the necessity of clarifying the legal position for the public interest. Balancing these considerations, the court ordered the Appellant to pay three-quarters of the claimant's costs, reflecting the mixed nature of the proceedings.

The court further ordered the Appellant to disclose details of the funding arrangements for the application within 14 days, with liberty to apply for extension if necessary.

Holding and Implications

The court held that the discretion to grant temporary release on licence to a prisoner sentenced for contempt of court lies exclusively with the Secretary of State or their representative (usually the prison governor), and not with the sentencing court or judge.

The court declared paragraph 5.2 of PSO 6300 unlawful insofar as it requires or is interpreted as requiring the sentencing judge's permission for temporary release of contempt prisoners. The sentencing judge's role ends upon sentencing, and the prison authorities must consider applications for temporary release on the same basis as for other prisoners convicted of criminal offences.

The direct effect is that the Appellant’s application for permission from the court was misconceived and no such permission can be granted. The court made no order on the substantive application but clarified the legal position, which benefits the public interest by ensuring proper administration of temporary release procedures for contempt prisoners.

No new precedent was established beyond the clarification of existing statutory and procedural rules. Costs were apportioned with the Appellant ordered to pay three-quarters of the claimant's costs, reflecting the partly improper framing of the application and the necessity of judicial clarification.