Skinner v Director of Public Prosecutions

Factual and Procedural Background

The Appellant was convicted of driving a motor vehicle having consumed excess alcohol contrary to section 5(1) of the Road Traffic Act 1988. The Appellant was stopped by police on 17th October 2002 while driving a vehicle and provided two breath specimens at a police station, both registering 72 micrograms per 100 millilitres of breath, exceeding the legal limit of 35 micrograms.

The Appellant's case was one of several challenging the reliability of the intoximeter device used at the police station. At a pre-trial hearing, a District Judge ordered that the Appellant's case be joined with two other defendants' cases. A subsequent District Judge interpreted this order as permitting the cases to be heard separately but concurrently to avoid repetition of expert evidence, rather than as a joint trial with co-defendants.

The trial began in July 2003 and was conducted over several days with adjournments, concluding in February 2004 with the Appellant's conviction and sentence. The trial procedure involved hearing common expert evidence once for all three defendants, while factual evidence and cross-examinations were confined to each defendant's case.

Legal Issues Presented

1. Whether the court was entitled to presume that the intoximeter device was operating with the correct type-approved software in the absence of evidence to the contrary.
2. Whether the court was entitled to rule that there was a presumption the approved device was operating correctly, including with correct software, absent sufficient evidence challenging its reliability.
3. Whether it was proper to commence and continue a trial over an extended period with adjournments, including interpreting the earlier order to join cases as directing that the cases be heard together but separately.
4. Whether the court was entitled to refuse cross-examination of expert witnesses not called on behalf of the Appellant, and to refuse permission to call additional expert evidence without prior service of statements.
5. Whether the court was entitled to continue hearing the Appellant's case after concluding the case against one of the other defendants.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

• The presumption that the intoximeter software was approved was challenged, relying on cross-examination of the prosecution expert who could not confirm the software version.
• The trial's lengthy adjournments and delays were argued to be unfair and unreasonable, impairing the ability to conduct a fair trial.
• The interpretation of the earlier order joining the cases was contested, asserting that the cases should have been tried jointly with all procedural implications.
• The refusal to allow cross-examination of an expert witness called for another defendant and refusal to call additional expert evidence without prior notice was challenged as unlawful and a breach of the European Convention on Human Rights Articles 3 and 6.
• The continuation of the Appellant's trial after the conviction of another defendant was argued to be improper, as acceptance of evidence in one case should preclude continuation in the other.

Respondent's Arguments

• There was a lawful presumption that the intoximeter was the approved device containing the correct software, and no evidence displaced this presumption.
• The District Judge acted within discretion in commencing and continuing the trial despite adjournments, considering witness availability and procedural fairness.
• The interpretation of the earlier order as permitting cases to be heard together but separately was proper and avoided unnecessary repetition of expert evidence.
• The refusal to allow cross-examination or calling of additional expert evidence without prior notice was appropriate and did not disadvantage the defense.
• Continuing the Appellant's case after the other defendant's conviction did not pre-judge the Appellant's case and was proper given the differences in issues between cases.

Table of Precedents Cited

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court carefully analysed the procedural history and the nature of the evidence concerning the intoximeter device. It accepted the District Judge's interpretation that the cases were not joined as co-defendants but heard together to avoid repetitive expert evidence. The court found no procedural unfairness or prejudice to the Appellant.

Regarding the presumption that the device was operating with the approved software, the court emphasized that in the absence of evidence to the contrary, such a presumption was reasonable and within the limits of lawful presumptions as outlined in precedent authorities. The cross-examination of the prosecution expert, which did not confirm the software version, was insufficient to displace this presumption.

The court held that the District Judge's decisions on trial management, including starting and continuing the trial despite adjournments, were within her discretion and not unreasonable. The refusal to allow cross-examination of an expert witness not called on behalf of the Appellant and refusal to admit additional expert evidence without prior notice were deemed proper and not prejudicial.

Finally, the court rejected the submission that the District Judge should have ceased the Appellant's trial following the conviction of another defendant, noting that the findings in one case did not pre-judge the other and that the issues differed sufficiently.

Holding and Implications

The court DISMISSED THE APPEAL.

The direct effect of this decision is to affirm the conviction and sentence of the Appellant. The court upheld the procedural and evidential rulings of the District Judge, confirming the permissibility of presuming the correctness of an approved intoximeter device absent evidence to the contrary, and endorsing the trial management decisions made in complex multi-defendant cases. No new legal precedent was established beyond the application of established principles to the facts of this case.