Arthur, R (on the application of) v RSPCA

Factual and Procedural Background

The Appellant appealed against a decision of the Crown Court at Swansea dated 12 November 2004, which dismissed his appeal against conviction at Swansea Magistrates' Court on 13 August 2003. The conviction was for breaching an order made on 9 April 2001 by the Llanelli Justices under section 1 of the Protection of Animals (Amendment) Act 1954. This order disqualified the Appellant for five years from keeping any equine animal.

The breach related to three horses owned by the Appellant. On 5 September 2002, the Appellant had a court order requiring a third party, Mr Bourne, to deliver the horses to him. Mr Bourne restricted access to the field to the Appellant only, despite being aware of the disqualification order. The police and RSPCA observed that the Appellant was the only person able to enter the field to gather the horses. Once the horses were loaded into a horsebox, the Appellant was accompanied by another individual, Mr Lewis, who was intended to be the keeper of the horses to comply with the order. However, the Appellant drove the horsebox to the destination, while Mr Lewis followed separately. The Crown Court and Magistrates concluded that during transportation in the horsebox, the Appellant was "keeping" the horses and thus in breach of the order.

Legal Issues Presented

1. Whether there is a legal distinction between "keeping" and "having custody of" animals under the Protection of Animals (Amendment) Act 1954.
2. Whether the period during which the Appellant had sole control of the horses in the horsebox was sufficiently substantial to constitute "keeping" or "custody."
3. Whether the original order was invalid due to using the term "keeping" instead of the statutory phrase "having custody of."

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

• There is a distinction between "keeping" and "having custody of" animals, relying on Crawford v Coggan [1964] Crim LR 292.
• The Appellant's involvement with the horses was transient, particularly in the field, providing a defence as per the cited case.
• The cited cases RSPCA v Miller [1994] Crim LR 516 and RSPCA v Taylor & Taylor [2001] 2 Crim App R 450 should be distinguished because the Appellant is the owner of the horses, and these cases do not address rights of owners disqualified from keeping animals.
• The right to ownership versus custody is confusing and requires clear legal distinction.
• The original disqualification order was defective or invalid because it used "keeping" instead of the statutory language "having custody of."
• The Appellant believed transporting the horses in the horsebox was custody but not keeping, thus not breaching the order.
• There was no evidence on the duration of the Appellant's control of the horses in the horsebox, so the Crown Court was wrong to find the period substantial.
• Analogies were drawn to cases where disqualified persons had contact with animals without breaching orders, such as rescuing animals or emergency situations, arguing the current case should be treated similarly.
• Suggested that the court should not go behind the face of the order to interpret its terms.

Respondent's Arguments

• The Crown Court and Magistrates properly applied the law and found that the Appellant had custody and was keeping the horses during transportation, which breached the order.
• The transient involvement in the field did not constitute keeping, but transporting the horses in the horsebox was a substantial act of keeping.
• The distinction between "keeping" and "having custody of" does not affect the outcome; ordinary English usage supports that the Appellant was keeping the horses in the horsebox.
• The original order's use of "keeping" was intended to mean "having custody of" and is valid.
• The Appellant could have avoided breach by arranging for another insured person to drive the horsebox.
• The period of control of the horses in the horsebox was not insubstantial, and the Crown Court was entitled to draw this inference from the evidence.
• The analogies to emergency or rescue situations do not apply to this case involving transportation of horses in a horsebox.
• No order for costs was sought given the unusual facts and legal aid status of the Appellant.

Table of Precedents Cited

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court analysed the statutory language of section 1 of the Protection of Animals (Amendment) Act 1954, focusing on the phrase "having custody of." The original order used "keeping," but the court found no invalidity in this, interpreting "keeping" as synonymous with "having custody" in this context.

The court considered the Appellant's control of the horses during the transportation in the horsebox as constituting custody and keeping. The transient nature of the Appellant's actions in the field was insufficient to prove breach, but the substantial act of driving the horsebox with the horses was decisive.

The court rejected the Appellant's argument that ownership rights created confusion or exceptions, stating that ownership was not relied upon to establish breach. Instead, the focus was on actual custody and keeping during the transport period.

Analogies to emergency or rescue scenarios were deemed inapplicable, as the facts involved deliberate transportation rather than incidental contact.

The absence of direct evidence on the duration of control was not fatal; the Crown Court was entitled to infer that the period was not insubstantial.

The court declined to provide further guidance on distinguishing custody and keeping beyond the facts of the case, emphasizing the need for case-by-case analysis.

Holding and Implications

The court DISMISSED the Appellant's appeal against conviction for breaching the disqualification order.

The direct effect is that the Appellant remains convicted for the breach related to keeping the horses during transportation. No new legal precedent was established, and the court emphasized the importance of clear arrangements for custody where ownership and custody are separated due to disqualification orders.

No order as to costs was made, reflecting the unusual facts and the Appellant's legal aid status.