Jones v Director of Public Prosecutions

Factual and Procedural Background

The Appellant, a consultant psychiatrist practising in north Wales, was the registered keeper of a vehicle caught speeding at 42 mph in a 30 mph zone in Cardiff on 29 January 2002. Pursuant to section 172 of the Road Traffic Act 1988, a notice requiring information as to the identity of the driver was sent to the Appellant. The Appellant responded with a letter stating he was not the driver and that the vehicle was driven by multiple authorised drivers, but did not identify the specific driver on the date in question.

The Appellant was subsequently charged with failing to provide the required information under section 172(2) and (3) of the Road Traffic Act 1988. He pleaded not guilty but was convicted by a deputy district judge in the magistrates' court at Cardiff, fined, ordered to pay costs, and had penalty points endorsed on his driving licence. The Appellant appealed by way of case stated, challenging the correctness of the deputy district judge's legal interpretation, particularly concerning the statutory defence under section 172(4).

Legal Issues Presented

1. Whether the deputy district judge was correct in law in determining the test for the statutory defence under section 172(4) of the Road Traffic Act 1988.
2. Whether the letter sent by the Appellant was admissible evidence.
3. Whether the deputy district judge was correct in law in relying on authorities not brought to the parties' attention during the trial.

Arguments of the Parties

The opinion does not contain a detailed account of the parties' legal arguments.

Table of Precedents Cited

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court analysed the statutory framework under section 172 of the Road Traffic Act 1988, which requires the keeper of a vehicle to provide information identifying the driver. The defence under subsection (4) applies if the keeper did not know and could not with reasonable diligence have ascertained the driver’s identity.

The Appellant responded to the notice with a letter rather than completing the prescribed form. While the deputy district judge held that this was a failure to comply with the statutory requirement based on the precedent of DPP v Broomfield, the appellate court disagreed. It found that the letter, being written, signed, and containing the requested information (except naming the driver, which the Appellant said he could not identify), was a proper compliance in substance with the statutory requirement.

The key issue was whether the Appellant had established the statutory defence under section 172(4). The deputy district judge rejected the defence based largely on an adverse credibility finding, partly influenced by the view that the Appellant had not complied with the form requirement. The appellate court found this reasoning flawed because it was premised on the erroneous legal conclusion that the letter was insufficient compliance.

The appellate court noted that the deputy district judge’s adverse credibility finding was substantially based on the mistaken belief that the Appellant’s method of response was improper. The absence of supporting witnesses was not held against the Appellant’s credibility. The court rejected the prosecution’s submission that the conviction could stand solely on credibility grounds unrelated to the form of response.

Consequently, the appellate court allowed the appeal and directed the magistrates’ court to acquit the Appellant.

Holding and Implications

The appeal is allowed and the conviction is quashed with a direction to acquit.

The court held that a written letter signed by the keeper, containing the requested information but not naming the driver due to genuine inability to identify, constitutes proper compliance with section 172(2) of the Road Traffic Act 1988. The prior conviction was substantially based on an erroneous legal premise regarding the form of response and an adverse credibility finding linked to that premise.

The direct effect is that the Appellant’s conviction is overturned and no retrial is ordered. No new precedent beyond the interpretation of compliance with section 172(2) and the application of section 172(4) was established.