B v R

Factual and Procedural Background

The Appellant was convicted of counts of rape and common assault upon his partner and of a minor offence of criminal damage to her house. At the time of the offences, the Appellant was mentally ill, suffering from paranoid schizophrenia with delusional beliefs. The relationship between the Appellant and his partner began around 2004 and they had a daughter residing in Algeria without a passport. The couple lived in the partner's house in Chelmsford.

In 2009, the Appellant's behavior deteriorated, becoming aggressive and possessive, leading to assaults on his partner. He pleaded guilty to these assaults in March 2010 and was subject to a suspended sentence with a condition to live apart from the partner. The second prosecution, which resulted in the current trial, arose from incidents occurring shortly after the lifting of the non-residence condition in July 2010.

The charges included multiple counts of rape, common assault, and one count of criminal damage. The Appellant was acquitted of some counts but convicted on others. The Appellant did not give evidence at trial but was interviewed by police. Psychiatric evidence was provided by a consultant psychiatrist who assessed him shortly before trial and reviewed earlier records, confirming the presence of paranoid schizophrenia at the relevant time.

Legal Issues Presented

1. Whether the mental illness of the defendant could be taken into account when considering the reasonableness of his belief in the complainant's consent to sexual intercourse under the Sexual Offences Act 2003.
2. Whether the jury should have been directed to consider the defendant's mental condition in assessing the reasonableness of any belief in consent.
3. The proper legal interpretation and application of the objective test of reasonable belief in consent where the defendant suffers from mental illness.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

• The trial judge erred by directing the jury to exclude the defendant's mental illness when assessing the reasonableness of his belief in consent.
• The jury should have been instructed that the reasonableness of the defendant’s belief must be considered in the context of his mental condition, without more specific guidance.
• The mental illness should be a relevant factor in determining whether the belief was reasonable.

Crown's Arguments

• The judge's direction was correct as a delusional belief, by definition irrational, cannot constitute a reasonable belief.
• The law requires an objective standard for reasonable belief in consent, which excludes delusional or mentally ill-induced beliefs.

Table of Precedents Cited

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court examined the statutory framework under the Sexual Offences Act 2003, which requires that a defendant's belief in consent must be both genuine and reasonable. The court emphasized the objective nature of the reasonableness test, excluding mental illness-induced delusional beliefs from being reasonable. The judge’s direction to the jury—that mental illness should be disregarded in assessing the reasonableness of belief—was upheld as consistent with public policy and legislative intent.

The court considered psychiatric evidence showing the defendant had paranoid schizophrenia but that this illness did not impair his ability to understand his partner's refusal. The court rejected speculative submissions that the defendant might have misunderstood consent due to mental illness.

Parliamentary materials and prior case law supported an objective standard for reasonable belief, rejecting subjective tests that incorporate the defendant’s mental disorder. The court noted the difficulties and unworkability of allowing mental illness to justify a reasonable belief in consent, drawing parallels with the evolution of the law on provocation and partial defences.

Furthermore, the court distinguished the law on rape from other areas such as self-defence and criminal damage, where genuine belief alone may suffice, noting the deliberate legislative departure in sexual offence law to require reasonableness as well.

Regarding common assault and criminal damage, the court found the trial judge’s directions appropriate. For common assault, the judge correctly rejected the defence that the assault was justified by a benevolent motive. For criminal damage, the judge properly directed that genuine belief in consent, whether reasonable or not, is a defence.

Holding and Implications

The appeal against the convictions for rape, common assault, and criminal damage was DISMISSED.

The court confirmed that under the Sexual Offences Act 2003, a defendant’s mental illness and resulting delusional beliefs cannot render a belief in consent reasonable if that belief is irrational. The ruling reinforces the objective standard for reasonable belief in consent, excluding mental illness as a factor in that assessment, although mental illness remains relevant to sentencing and other legal considerations.

This decision does not establish new precedent beyond the application of existing statutory interpretation and public policy considerations but clarifies the limits of mental illness as a defence in sexual offence cases.